Why are consumers willing to pay almost double for food labeled organic? The average consumer probably believes that the “USDA Organic” label issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture implies the food comes from small local farms that use production techniques that are environmentally friendly and result in food that is better for human health. The Washington Post published an article recently about an organic farm that does not seem to be consistent with such perceptions. The High Plains dairy complex in Colorado, the main facility of Aurora Organic Dairy, has over 15,000 cows. In the organic dairy industry 87 percent of farms have less than 100 cows, but farms with 100 or more cows produce almost half of organic dairy products.
The Post article argues that these large dairy operations may be violating the USDA’s regulations for organic milk. Though Aurora officials maintain that they meet all the requirements for the USDA Organic label, the article contends that satellite images, visual inspections by Post reporters, and tests of milk from High Plains all indicate that the company may not be complying with the natural grazing standards of the organic regulations.
But the Post article misses the important point that even if Aurora were in technical compliance with the grazing regulation, the label does not convey any information about health and environmental benefits. As then-secretary of agriculture Dan Glickman stated at the release of the final standards for organic foods in 2002:
Let me be clear about one thing: the organic label is a marketing tool. It is not a statement about food safety. Nor is ‘organic’ a value judgment about nutrition or quality.
The executive order that President Trump signed today doesn’t go as far as some hoped and others feared, mainly putting a thumb on the scales for future regulatory and enforcement actions. Its three main parts are as follows:
Declares protecting religious freedom to be executive-branch policy, underlining an intent “vigorously enforce” the law’s “robust protections for religious freedom.”
Instructs the Treasury Department effectively not to enforce the Johnson Amendment – which prohibits nonprofit organizations from endorsing or opposing political candidates – against religious organizations.
Directs the Secretaries of Treasury, Labor, and Health & Human Services to issue new regulations that “address conscience-based objections” to Obamacare’s preventive-care mandate.
All of these are salutary, but none are earth-shattering. The IRS, which ultimately answers to Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, already has vast discretion in enforcing the Johnson Amendment. HHS also has broad authority over how and against whom to apply the preventive-care mandate, but its freedom of action has already been restricted in several ways by the Supreme Court’s rulings in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Zubik v. Burwell (a.k.a. the Little Sisters of the Poor case) – and Secretary Tom Price were already expected to accommodate the religious nonprofits in a way the Obama administration refused to.
So all this move really does is signal the direction of executive policy preferences, which at the margin will lead agencies to implement federal statutes in a way that’s more solicitous of the freedom of religion, expression, and conscience. That’s a good thing, and a welcome change from the Obama years, but it’s not a radical (or any) change in the law.
This Sunday, French voters will return to the polls to decide the country’s next president. Last month’s first-round vote reduced the field to two unconventional candidates: Emmanuel Macron, formerly a top official of the left-wing Parti Socialiste and now leader of the fledgling En Marche! party; and Marine Le Pen, until recently the leader of the nationalist-right FrontNational.
French employment and the country’s overall economy have sagged before, of course. U.S. observers often attribute those downturns in part to France’s labor laws, which they say (with irony) protect current workers by discouraging employers from creating new jobs. But French employment and the country’s economy have also surged before; typically France is Europe’s 2nd largest economy, after Germany. The past several decades have heard many predictions that France has reached “the end of the road” (to borrow from Ronald Reagan in 1964) unless it reforms its labor, entitlements, and other domestic policies, but neither economic doom nor dramatic reform has occurred.
Université du Québec en Outaouais economist Pierre Lemieux explored this in last fall’s cover story for Regulation magazine. It’s a great read if you want to learn more about what has led to France’s current conditions and what may lie ahead.
Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to regulate certain employment practices between employers and employees. In order to put the law into effect, Congress delegated authority to the Department of Labor (DOL) to enforce the statute’s provisions. It’s a fundamental legal principle, however, that an executive-branch agency may only regulate those provisions that Congress has actually put into its authorizing statute. Where Congress has not address a certain practice, the agency has no authority to regulate and the practice is presumptively legal.
Fast forward almost 80 years. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. (better known as DuPont), following standard industry practice, paid their employees for otherwise noncompensable meal breaks, using that compensation as credit towards the time employees spent performing certain work duties (especially “donning and duffing” special clothing and gear) before and after their shifts. The employees sued DuPont in federal court, arguing that the FLSA forbids this type of crediting and that they must be paid overtime pay for the donning/duffing time.
The district court disagreed, finding that the statute was silent about the practice and so DuPont had done nothing illegal under the FLSA. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit invited DOL to file an amicus brief regarding whether DuPont had violated the law—essentially allowing it to regulate. DOL admitted in its brief that the FLSA was silent on the issue, but argue that the statute implicitly forbade the practice. The Third Circuit then adopted that view by granting DOL Skidmore deference (by which judges defer to agency interpretations according to their persuasiveness), and reversed the district court’s ruling.
Yesterday, Federal Communications Commission Chairman Ajit Pai announced his intention to reverse Obama administration “net neutrality” rules governing the internet that were put in place in 2015. Some commentators are criticizing the announcement as a give-away to large telecom companies and an attack on consumers. But the Obama rules create some serious problems for consumers—problems that Pai says he wants to correct.
Under the Obama rules, internet service providers (ISPs) are subject to “rate-of-return” regulations, which the federal government previously applied to AT&T’s long-distance telephone service back when it was a monopoly more than 50 years ago. Ostensibly, rate-of-return regulation gives government officials the power to review and approve or reject ISP rates. In reality it basically guarantees ISPs government-enforced market protection and profitability, in exchange for regulators ensuring that ISPs won’t be too profitable.
As explained in this 2014 post, rate-of-return regulation involves more than just telecom. It is an attempt to settle fights between “producers” and “shippers”—whether those are farms, mines, and factories on one side and railroads and shipping lines on the other, or Netflix and Hulu on one side and ISPs on the other. In all those cases, the producers and shippers need each other to satisfy consumers, but they fight each other to capture the larger share of consumers’ payments. If shippers charge more, then farmers, factories, and Netflix must charge less in order to maintain the same level of sales.
The political resolution of the producer–shipper fights was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and its rate-of-return regulations, which were initially written with railroads in mind. Similar efforts were later extended to trucking, air transportation, energy, and telecom. It took about 100 years for policymakers to accept that those efforts hurt consumers much more than it helped them, forcing on consumers too many bad providers with high prices and poor quality.
Back when the GOP was selecting its nominee for president last year, I warned my Republican friends that on ObamaCare, Donald Trump might be worse than Hillary Clinton:
Good ol’ partisanship would stop Hillary Clinton from expanding ObamaCare even a little. A faux opponent like Trump could co-opt congressional Republicans to expand it a lot.
I even quipped that a President Trump might sell out ObamaCare opponents for 10 feet of border wall.
It looks like my prediction was eerily accurate. Even as the House Republican leadership and President Trump claim they are moving legislation that would repeal and replace ObamaCare (itwouldn’t), Trump is offering to expand ObamaCare in return for Democratic cooperation in funding a new border wall.
ObamaCare requires participating insurers to offer more comprehensive coverage to low-income enrollees, with the understanding that Congress would compensate insurers for that added cost. The thing is, the Democratic Congress and president that enacted ObamaCare never appropriated funding for those so-called cost-sharing subsidies. President Obama initially recognized the lack of an appropriation, but then began issuing those subsidies anyway–because ObamaCare would have collapsed if he hadn’t.
By that time, Republicans had taken over the House of Representatives, and they sued the Obama administration in federal court for encroaching on Congress’ power of the purse by spending federal funds without an explicit appropriation. A federal judge sided with the House. She ruled that paying those cost-sharing subsidies “violates the Constitution,” and ordered that they stop, pending an appeal, which the Obama administration timely filed.
That was the state of play when President Trump took office. His administration now has three choices.
It can declare that it agrees with the court’s ruling and enforce the court order. This would mean ending the illegal payments that are the only reason ObamaCare is still on the books. If Trump ends those illegal subsidies, it is likely that even more insurers will announce they are leaving the Exchanges. As I have written elsewhere, taking this step would create even more pressure on Congress to repeal ObamaCare, particularly the law’s community-rating price controls that are causing health insurance markets to collapse.
It can appeal the lower court’s ruling. This is the strategy the Obama administration pursued. It would be an awkward step given that Trump’s attorney general Jeff Sessions and Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price have each stated they believe these payments are unconstitutional.
It can ask Congress to appropriate the subsidies. This may be the most politically awkward option of all. It would mean the first legislative change that congressional Republicans and the Trump administration make to ObamaCare would not be to repeal it, but to expand it. Funding cost-sharing subsidies would mean Republicans would be providing more money for ObamaCare than a Democratic Congress did at the height of its power.
President Donald Trump put pressure on Democrats on Sunday as U.S. lawmakers worked to avoid a government shutdown, saying Obamacare would die without a cash infusion the White House has offered in exchange for their agreement to fund his border wall…
Spending legislation will require Democratic support to clear the Senate, and the White House says it has offered to include $7 billion in Obamacare subsidies to help low-income Americans pay for health insurance, if Democrats accept funding for the wall.
Last year, a paper by economist Bruce Blonigen explored the impact of industrial policies in steel on downstream industries, i.e. those where steel is an input to the production process. Unsurprisingly, less openness to foreign competition through direct protection or state support or privileges raises the price of steel within a country. This in turn raises costs for downstream industries such as fabricated metals and machinery manufacturers.
More pertinently given Trump’s obsession with trade deficits, Blonigen’s work suggests the effect of this cost increase is to significantly reduce exports from these industries. The headline result is that a one standard deviation increase in industrial policies associated with steel leads to a 1.2 percent decline in the export competitiveness of the average manufacturing sector in the years immediately after implementation. For those that use steel intensively, the decline is as large as 6 percent.
If President Trump really wants an export-led manufacturing jobs boom then, his steel policies are utterly self-defeating.