Cato At Liberty

University of Massachusetts toxicologist (and Cato adjunct scholar) Edward J. Calabrese has arrived.  On October 3, he testified to the Senate Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Management, and Regulatory Oversight, a part of the larger Committee on Environment and Public Works, chaired by John Barrasso (R-WY).

Calabrese was asked for his expert opinion on a draft EPA proposal to consider alternative regulatory models, including ditching the “Linear-No Threshold” (LNT) model that it employs, as does almost every other regulatory agency on earth.  You can read about EPA’s proposal here.

The LNT model assumes that the first photon of ionizing radiation (or the first molecule of a carcinogen) is capable of inducing a genetic mutation (i.e. altered DNA) that can be then transmitted to future generations.

Many years ago, Calabrese went looking for the scientific basis for the LNT, for it ran counter to what he was finding in his toxicological research—that low doses of some toxins or ionizing radiation may actually confer benefits. That, of course, is also the basis for much of modern chemical pharmacology.

Try as he could, and he tried for years, he could not locate the seminal science that gave rise to the LNT.  But he did find its progenitor, Hermann Muller, who claimed to have induced heritable point mutations with X-rays in the fruit-fly Drosophila. But where was the data and the peer-reviewed study?  Muller did author a brief article in Science on July 22, 1927, but, as Calabrese notes in his brand new paper, “He made this gene mutation claim/interpretation in an article that discussed his findings, but failed to include any data.”  The Science article said the data would be in a subsequent publication.

In fact, the data underlying what may have been the most important claim in the history of regulatory science, were never published in a peer-reviewed journal. 

Nonetheless amidst public concern about atomic radiation, the National Academy of Sciences formed the Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (BEAR-1) panel, which reported its findings in Science in 1956.  Muller was obviously highly influential, and the Science report clearly established the LNT:

Any radiation dose, however small, can induce some mutations. There is no minimum amount of radiation dose, that is, which must be exceeded before any harmful mutations occur.

Calabrese documents that Muller’s good friend and another Drosophila geneticist, Edgar Altenberg, confidentially challenged Muller’s interpretation that he was inducing point mutations.  Rather, the very large doses of x-rays that Muller subjected the fruit flies to was simply knocking out wholesale portions of the chromosomes. 

But Altenburg never went public with his criticism.  Perhaps, Calabrese speculates, it was because of personal loyalty and a deep relationship.  When Muller attempted suicide in 1932, rather than addressing his family, his final note was to Altenburg. Muller and Altenburg ultimately lived until 1967, dying within months of each other.

Muller’s Science publication allowed him to claim research primacy, which landed him both prestige and the eventual 1946 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.

That prize validated Muller’s hypothesis and ultimately enshrined the LNT model as gospel, and it spread beyond ionizing radiation to other carcinogens and mutagens, as well as to many toxic chemicals in which, literally, the dose makes the poison. In Calabrese’s words,

…it has been Muller’s incorrect gene mutation interpretation and its legacy that created the LNT dose response model, leading to its recommendation by the US National Academy of Sciences in 1956…and then subsequently adopted by all regulatory programs throughout the world.

As a result of his recent testimony and publication, Calabrese may be changing the regulatory world. 

Unlinked References:

Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation Panel, 1956. Genetic effects of atomic radiation.  Science 123, 1157-64.

Muller H. J, 1927.  Artificial transmutation of the gene. Science 66, 84–87

Reuters reports (“French lawmaker proposes bill to outlaw mockery of accents”) that lawmaker Laetitia Avia of Emmanuel Macron’s ruling party intends to introduce a bill adding discrimination based on accent or pronunciation (“glottophobia”) to the list of banned discrimination categories. This came after an exchange between leftist party leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon and journalist Véronique Gaurel, born in Toulouse, in which he appeared to make fun of Gaurel’s southwestern accent and then called for the next question to be in “comprehensible French.”

I thought of researching whether France has enacted other vaguely framed laws aimed at soothing the sensibilities of the Toulouse region. But since there is no way to search for vague laws as a category in themselves, I soon realized that might set me off on — if you will excuse the expression — a Too-Loose-Law Trek.

The ongoing controversy surrounding the murder of a dissident Saudi journalist and Saudi Arabia’s brutal bombing campaign of a largely defenseless neighboring Yemen, which has come with an enormous human toll, have elicited increased scrutiny over the U.S.-Saudi alliance. The White House remains supportive of Riyadh, both diplomatically and with continued military aid. Republicans have offered mildly critical words for the Saudi regime, while an increasing number of Democrats are calling for a fundamental reassessment of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

Such a reassessment is long overdue. Washington’s partnership with Riyadh has often been treated as sacrosanct, at least here in the nation’s capital. It should have been clear long ago that the Saudis are not good allies. In fact, they often act in ways that undermine U.S. interests. Backing one of the world’s most appallingly tyrannical regimes to the hilt has actually not been a net positive for U.S. national security or for stability in the region.

With any luck, the unfolding drama over the U.S.-Saudi partnership will extend beyond merely this troubled bilateral relationship to U.S. policy in the Middle East as a whole. The United States is deeply entangled in this region, with roughly 50,000 boots on the ground, dozens of permanent military bases and deployed assets, and a staggering sum of taxpayer dollars, essentially wasted. We are engaged in active combat operations in at least five countries across the Middle East and North Africa, bogged down in endless counter-insurgency campaigns, grisly counter-terrorism operations, and inglorious proxy wars. Washington also tasks Central Command with the responsibility of supporting, training, arming, and stabilizing various corrupt dictatorships, while we also try to put the squeeze on Iran.

A well-timed paper  by Chatham House’s Micah Zenko clarifies the failure of U.S. regional objectives, despite the gargantuan resources devoted to them. Zenko lists four primary objectives: (1) enhancing regional security and reducing political instability within Middle East governments; (2) preventing the emergence of terrorist safe havens; (3) ensuring the free flow of energy resources; and (4) enabling allies to build enough military capacity to defend themselves.

We have failed at each of these. Indeed, far from serving a stabilizing role, U.S. policy has rather plainly destabilized the region. The Iraq War upended the Middle East, empowered Iran, and fueled a new generation of jihadist terrorists. Washington bungled a series of changes in the Egyptian regime and helped (along with other external actors) fuel Syria’s civil war. The Obama administration’s Libya war created anarchy and new refugee flows. And our longstanding support for Saudi Arabia as a balance to Iran has not only failed to roll back Iran’s regional activity, but it has also emboldened Riyadh to act aggressively and pick fights with several of its neighbors.

Second, the effort to prevent terrorist safe havens is based on a false premise that territorial safe havens matter much at all. But even accepting the flawed premise, U.S. policies have multiplied the number of “ungoverned spaces” as incubators for terrorist groups. As Zenko points out, “troops maintained in foreign countries to prevent terrorism actually increase the probability that those troops’ home countries and global interests will experience terrorism.”

Third, there is good reason to believe that U.S. efforts to ensure the free flow of oil actually address a problem that largely solves itself. Each state has a strong interest in maintaining the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia is not the juggernaut it once was. Global energy markets have evolved over the last 40 years and are much more resilient and able to overcome supply shocks than in the past. At best, patrolling the Persian Gulf waterway deters a scenario - an attempt by Iran or some other party to close to Strait of Hormuz - that is already an extremely low probability event.

Fourth, the United States has certainly provided numerous authoritarian regimes in the Middle East with the military capability and know-how to protect themselves, but whether that has redounded as a benefit to U.S. interests and regional stability is another question entirely. Much of what we provided to Iraq ended up in the hands of ISIS. American made weapons have been used to ruthlessly suppress peaceful protesters, from Egypt to Bahrain. And U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia is currently enabling unspeakable war crimes in Yemen, in a conflict that has actually bolstered the position of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Washington is terrible at self-evaluation. Our record in the Middle East is one of abject failure. Strangely, even when we have presidents that agree with that assessment to one degree or another, policy doesn’t change. President Obama wanted to shift U.S. focus and resources away from the Middle East to East Asia. It didn’t happen. Trump, in April 2018, said, “We’ve spent $7 trillion in the Middle East and we’ve got nothing for it. Nothing, less than nothing, as far as I’m concerned.” And yet his administration has increased overall troop levels in the region, doubled down on backing traditional allies, and revived an anti-Iran posture that harkens back to the Bush era neocons.

A real reevaluation of U.S. policy toward this region is imperative. After decades of trying, Washington has failed in its primary objectives. A new and enlightened policy framework should appreciate the dearth of serious threats to core U.S. security emanating from the region and should emphasize diplomacy as a way to manage relations with regional actors, rather than the military-centric approach that has failed so miserably.