Beijing’s Bullying of Taiwan Is Backfiring

            Beijing continues to intensify its diplomatic campaign to isolate Taiwan internationally, and as I describe in a recent article in China-U.S. Focus, that bullying strategy threatens to trigger dangerous tensions between China and the United States.  Chinese leaders were shocked and angered when Taiwanese voters endorsed Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2016 elections.  The communist regime soon moved to adopt an aggressive strategy of diplomatic strangulation.  During her presidency, Beijing has induced five of the 22 countries (mostly small, poor nations in Africa and Latin America) that had still recognized Taipei when she took office to switch ties to Beijing.  The latest defector is El Salvador. 

            Although the Chinese strategy appears to be paying off in the narrow sense of achieving its primary objective, it may ultimately come at an unacceptably high price.  The campaign is producing the opposite reaction in Taiwan of what Beijing seeks.  Tsai and her government have adopted a stance of outright defiance, making it clear that Taipei will not be bullied into taking steps toward reunification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

More ominously, American supporters of Taiwan are pushing back firmly, and they are moving to increase Washington’s support of the island’s de facto independence.  The State Department immediately issued a statement that Washington was “deeply disappointed” by El Salvador’s decision—even though the United States itself does not maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.  

 Taipei’s friends in Congress ratcheted-up their support for the beleaguered democratic island.  Senator Cory Gardner (R-CO), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Asia subcommittee, indicated his intention to propose a measure pressuring countries to stick with Taipei.  Among other things, his legislation planned to authorize the State Department to downgrade relations or alter foreign assistance programs to discourage countries from making any decisions deemed adverse to Taiwan.  “The Taipei Act of 2018 would give greater tools and directions to the State Department in making sure we are as strong a voice as possible for Taiwan,” Gardner told Reuters.  A little more than a week later, he and a group of bipartisan co-sponsors, including Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ed Markey (D-MA) carried through on that pledge and introduced the legislation.

Their initiative is just the latest indication that American backers of Taiwan are becoming more vocal and proactive in pushing U.S. measures to counter the PRC’s hardline policies.  A major step occurred in March 2018 when President Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act, which encouraged “officials at all levels of the United States Government” to visit and meet with their Taiwan counterparts and to “allow high-level officials of Taiwan” to enter the United States and to meet with their U.S. counterparts.  That legislation, which passed both houses of Congress overwhelmingly, ended Washington’s practice adopted when the United States recognized the PRC in 1979 of authorizing meetings only with relatively low-level Taiwanese officials.  It was especially noticeable that the new law specifically promoted interaction by “cabinet-level national security officials.” 

In early July, the Pentagon sent two U.S. warships through the Taiwan Strait, the first such passage in more than a year, in a display of support for Taipei.  That move occurred on the heels of a State Department request that the Defense Department send a small contingent of Marines to guard the American Institute in Taiwan (Washington’s de facto embassy in Taipei).  The United States also invited two senior Taiwanese military officials to participate in a May ceremony at the U.S. Pacific Command. 

Any one of these episodes might not be all that significant, but taken together they confirm that Washington’s backing for Taiwan is escalating.  Beijing can blame itself for much of that development.  The PRC’s strategy of diplomatic strangulation is backfiring, and the surge of Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait is making matters even worse.

Beijing would be wise to dial back its confrontational policies toward Taiwan.  However, Taiwan’s supporters in Congress, the media, and the Trump administration need to appreciate just how sensitive the Taiwan issue is to PRC leaders and the Chinese people.  Excessive, ostentatious U.S. diplomatic support for Taiwan could bring the PRC and the United States closer to a dangerous confrontation.  Both sides need to exercise much greater caution and restraint than they are showing now.

 

 

 

“The Difference between Justice for the Masses and Justice for the Few”

In today’s New York Times, Brooklyn public defender Scott Hechinger makes a very strong case that criminal defendants in American courts face a two-tiered system of justice, and most defendants get the worse of it.

Mr. Trump assailed the practice of pretrial detention as “tough” when Paul Manafort had his bail revoked before his trial began. He then bemoaned the “very unfair” power that prosecutors wield to force people in the system “to break” in the wake of the Michael Cohen plea and the Manafort jury conviction and subsequent guilty plea. He lamented the devastating collateral consequences that arise from “a mere allegation” when Rob Porter was forced to resign after being accused of domestic violence; raged about the late-night, “no knock” raids of Mr. Cohen’s properties; and expressed outrage that the government, in its investigation of Carter Page, was able to overcome the protections of the Fourth Amendment to obtain a FISA warrant with “no hearings,” while also endorsing the idea, raised by the writer Andrew McCarthy, that they should be “looking at the judges who signed off on this stuff.”

[…]

I understand President Trump’s outrage. It is remarkable that people, presumed innocent, are locked up before being convicted of any crime. It is deeply unfair that mere accusations can lead to devastating, lifelong consequences. It is alarming that, in a system theoretically built around transparency and truth seeking, police and prosecutors have such outsize power to surveil, search, detain, bully, coerce and nearly destroy a person without producing evidence sufficient to secure a conviction. (emphasis in original.)

But it’s important to note how these defendants were actually treated as they work their way through the system, and how it differs from most everyone else.

Take Mr. Manafort’s experience with pretrial detention. Despite the seriousness of the allegations and his clear ability to flee, he was not in jail for a majority of his case pretrial. He and his attorneys were able to arrange an intricate bail package that was tailored to his financial circumstances, including $10 million bond and the surrender of his passport. This is how bail is supposed to work — not as punishment to lock someone up before a conviction, but as a way to guarantee that the accused will return to court while at liberty. Mr. Manafort was detained pretrial only after the presiding judge found evidence of witness tampering, following nearly two weeks of motion practice and then oral argument while Mr. Manafort continued to sleep in his own bed.

This kind of accommodation is unheard-of for the roughly quarter million people, my clients included, in jail for no reason other than their inability to pay bail. In the real world, despite the constitutional prohibition on excessive bail, decisions to detain people happen in a matter of seconds, with little to no consideration of an individual’s ability to pay. In just the past month alone, prosecutors requested and judges set bail totaling over $200,000 on clients of mine who, collectively, could not have afforded one one-thousandth of that.

Hechinger is also correct when he writes that the treatment of these high-profile defendants should not be resented: rather, it’s the double-standard for the privileged that should be eliminated. A meaningful presumption of innocence and the other rights afforded to Manafort et al. should be replicated and applied to the accused throughout the state and federal justice systems because they reflect constitutional protections intended to curb the coercive power of government.

The piece is worth reading in full here.

Highways and Gas Tax Diversions

The federal government imposes a gasoline tax of 18.4 cents per gallon. Lobby groups are pressing for an increase and President Trump has suggested that he may support one. But a federal gas tax increase makes no sense.

State governments own America’s highways, and they are free to raise their own gas taxes whenever they want. Indeed, 19 states have raised their gas taxes just since 2015, showing that the states are entirely capable of raising funds for their own transportation needs. State gas taxes average 34 cents per gallon.

Also consider that gas taxes used to be a more pure user charge for highways, but these days gas tax money is diverted to inefficient nonhighway uses such as transit. Politicians say, “We need a gas tax increase to fix our crumbling highways,” and then they spend the money on other things. It is a bait-and-switch.

Federal fuel taxes and vehicle fees raise about $41 billion per year. About 20 percent of those funds (about $8 billion) are diverted to transit and other nonhighway uses.

With state fuel taxes the diversion is even larger, as shown in this Federal Highway Administration table. In 2016, state governments raised $44 billion from fuel taxes, and they diverted 24 percent—14 percent to transit and 10 percent to other activities. Texas, for example, diverts 25 percent of its fuel taxes to education spending.

The states also raised $38 billion from vehicle fees. They diverted 34 percent of those funds—13 percent to transit and 21 percent to other activities.

In total, states raised $82 billion from fuel taxes and vehicle fees. They spent $59 billion (72 percent) on highways and $23 billion (28 percent) on other activities. If the highways in your state have congestion and potholes, it may because your government is taking money raised from highway users and diverting it to other activities.  

The chart below shows the shares of state fuel taxes and vehicle fees diverted to nonhighway uses. South Carolina, for example, diverts 31 percent.

Last year, South Carolina’s governor Henry McMaster vetoed a gas tax increase. He objected to his state’s diversion: “Over one-fourth of your gas-tax dollars are not used for road repairs … They’re siphoned off for government agency overhead and programs that have nothing to do with roads.”

As a rough user charge, gas taxes are a good way to fund highways, and our highways do need more investment. But motorists should be skeptical of gas tax increases until policymakers stop diverting funds to inefficient transit systems with declining riderships.

Many transportation experts say that the rise of electric vehicles will be the end of the road for gas taxes, and they are eager to impose new vehicle miles traveled (VMT) charges to fund highways. However, governments are diverting more than $30 billion in fuel tax revenues and vehicle charges a year to nonhighway uses. If that diversion was ended, these revenues could continue to be America’s highway funding source for years to come.

 

More on highways and the gas tax:

https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/federal-highway-policies

https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/infrastructure-investment

https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/chamber-commerce-misguided-gas-tax

https://www.cato.org/blog/federal-gas-tax-increase-misguided

https://www.cato.org/blog/federal-gas-tax-lahood-makes-no-sense

Census Data Detail Transit’s Decline

Transit ridership has been declining now for four years, and the latest census data, released last week, reveal that the biggest declines are among the groups that you might least expect: young people and low-income people. These results come from the American Community Survey, a survey of more than 3 million households a year conducted by the Census Bureau. Here are some of the key findings revealed by the data.

Young People Are Deserting Transit

Those who subscribe to the popular belief that Millennials and other young people prefer to  transit over owning and driving a car were shocked last week when the Washington Post published an article indicating that “a Millennial exodus” was “behind [Washington] Metro’s diving ridership.” This was based on a study that found that, from 2016 to 2018, young people had reduced their use of transit for commuting by 20 percent, while older people had reduced it by smaller amounts or not at all. The study used cell phone records from one of the nation’s largest wireless carriers, probably Verizon or AT&T.

Young people seem to be deserting transit more than older commuters.

Although the census data only go as far as 2017, they seem to confirm this finding. As shown in the above chart, the largest declines in transit commuting, both nationally and in the Washington DC urban area, are among younger people. Commuting forms only a part of transit ridership, but to the extent that declining ridership is due to ride-hailing services such as Uber and Lyft, those services disproportionately used by people the age of 35. For more information about transit declines by age class, including links to data files for 2017 going back to 2005, see my longer post on the subject. In addition to national data, the files show how people in various age classes commuted to work in each state and each major county, city, and urban area.

2. Low-Income People Are Deserting Transit

Although transit subsidies are often justified by the need to provide mobility to low-income people, the reality is that transit commuting by people in the lowest income classes is shrinking while transit commuting is growing fastest among people in the highest income classes.

Transit commuting in the lowest income classes is shrinking faster than the total size of those classes while in the highest classes it is growing faster than the total size of those classes.

Transit commuting is increasingly skewed to people who earn more than $75,000 a year. Even though only 19 percent of American workers were in this income class in 2017, they made up 26 percent of transit commuters, an increase from just 14 percent in 2005. Both the average and the median income of transit commuters are higher than those of all workers. For more information on transit commuting and income, including links to data files from 2006 through 2017, see my more detailed post on the subject.

3. Vehicle Ownership Continues to Rise

While ride hailing is probably responsible for much of the decline in transit ridership among young people, increasing auto ownership is responsible for much of the decline among low-income people. Between 2014 and 2017, the share of households that lacked access to a motor vehicle declined from 9.1 to 8.6 percent. Moreover, the share of workers who live in households with no vehicles declined from 4.6 to 4.2 percent.

In 1960, more than 20 percent of American households had no motor vehicles while only a small percentage owned three or more, figures that have practically reversed themselves today.

While a few tenths of a percent may not sound like much, remember that in all but a handful of urban areas more than 90 percent of commuters get to work by car while less than 2 percent take transit. Thus, a small increase in auto ownership can lead to a large percentage decrease in transit usage.

Curiously, most American workers who live in households without cars don’t take transit to work. In fact, in most states and urban areas, more workers who live in households without cars nevertheless drive alone to work than take transit to work. How do they drive alone if they don’t have a car? Probably in employer-supplied vehicles. In any case, this is just one more indicator of transit’s declining relevance. For more information on increasing auto ownership, including data files, see my detailed post on the subject.

4. Transit Is Increasingly Irrelevant

Transit agencies and their supporters act as though transit is somehow vital to the national and local economies. That may still be true in New York City, but it is only marginally true in Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, and not at all true elsewhere. The decline in transit ridership among young people who were supposed to love transit the most, and among low-income people who were supposed to need transit the most just reinforces this declining relevance and argues against any further subsidies to this obsolete industry.

If Someone Disputes Racism in the Criminal Justice System, Show Them This

At his Washington Post blog, Cato alumnus Radley Balko has cultivated a running list of data-driven reports that show persistent, measurable, widespread, and common racial disparities in criminal justice enforcement. In police stops, sentencing, pretrial detention, the death penalty, and a host of other areas, enforcement disproportionately affects African Americans and Latinos. For those who study or work in criminal justice for a living, the racial disparities are glaring and the quantitative research supports our policy prescriptions. But most people aren’t criminal justice wonks, and what Radley has created is a great public education resource about what our system is doing all around the nation. 

The abundance of evidence Radley collected shows that our criminal justice system harasses and punishes racial minorities more harshly than whites. These findings are important because so many critics of justice reform and of activist groups like Black Lives Matter deny that many of these disparities exist. The denial of these problems—which have been well-known or, at least, strongly suspected in many American minority communities for all of living memory—precludes the identification of any potential remedies. This clearinghouse of peer-reviewed academic papers, government reports, and books that measure racial disparities marks a new starting point for individuals who want to understand our criminal justice system.

Read the whole thing here.

Thank you, Radley.

The Constitution and Parental Rights

Child custody is among the most fraught topics the law confronts. It is the area in which personal relationships and raw emotions must be reconciled with legal rules and court judgements. Such is the case of “Ann,” an eight-year-old girl at the center of a case now before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Ann has periodically spent time with her paternal grandmother, but due to family squabbles, Ann’s mother stopped bringing Ann to visit. The grandmother filed a lawsuit saying she was entitled to visitation rights, which a Wisconsin statute allows grandparents to ask for in circumstances where they have a preexisting relationship with the child such that the severing of that relationship would not be in the child’s best interest.

Complicating matters, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that these familial relationships have a constitutional dimension. In the 2000 case of Troxel v. Granville, the Court struct down a Washington State law that granted grandparents visitation rights when to do so would be in “the best interests of the child.” This standard was constitutionally infirm, the Court held, because parents have important rights that cannot by overcome by a bare showing that the child would be better off being raised by someone else.

As the late Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out, a great number of children should be taken from their homes if the question is whether someone else might do a better job raising them. Wisconsin’s statute is somewhat different than the Washington law, in that it requires a greater showing before invading the parent’s decision-making. The question for the Wisconsin Supreme Court is whether that’s different enough to shift the constitutional calculus.

About 1,100 Puerto Rican Deaths from Maria — NOT 2,795 or 4,645

The estimated number of above-average “excess deaths” in Puerto Rico attributed to Hurricane Maria (Sept 20, 2017) is a difficult figure to estimate objectively.  Puerto Rico’s official figure of 64 deaths by December 9, 2017 (which the President remembered) counted only those deaths directly attributed to the storm and confirmed by medical examiners.  Most of the direct deaths from Katrina were from drowning – which is much easier to attribute to the storm than many other causes of death. Studies of Puerto Rican deaths from Maria aspire to account for a wide range of indirect effects that are presumed (not proven) to be consequences of the storm such as suicides and heart attacks, infectious diseases, and damage to electricity and therefore to dialysis and respirator equipment.

Among at least eight major studies of direct and indirect effects on mortality attributed to Maria, two outliers stand out as being 3-5 times larger than the others, which all cluster around 1000. The first big number was from Harvard. On September 13, Time said, “Harvard’s report, which was based on systematic household surveys throughout Puerto Rico, reached an estimate of 4,645 storm-related deaths between September and December 2017, many as a result of ‘delayed or interrupted health care.’”  Nonsense. The Harvard study extrapolated from only 15 deaths reported in a survey of 3299 households to estimate that “between 793 and 8498 people died … up to the end of 2017.” By adding 793 and 8498 and dividing the result by 2, Time and others came up with a totally meaningless “average” which were widely reported with predictable sensationalism: “The hurricane that struck Puerto Rico in September was responsible for more deaths than the Sept. 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina combined,” exclaimed The Daily Beast.” In reality, these “estimates of death from people who were interviewed” are little better than an opinion poll, and finding 15 deaths out of a sample of 3299 can’t plausibly be multiplied into 4645 for the whole island.

The latest sensational estimate of 2,975 excess deaths over six months is from an August 28 report from the Milken Institute School of Public Health at George Washington University  (GWU) commissioned by the Government of Puerto Rico. The study mentions two “scenarios” (census and displacement) yet only publicized the one with the biggest number: “Total excess mortality post-hurricane using the migration displacement scenario is estimated to be 2,975 (2,658-3,290) for the total study period of September 2017 through February 2018.” 

The 2,975 estimate only applies to the “displacement scenario.”  That is, the study “estimates cumulative excess net migration from Puerto Rico in the months from September 2017 through February 2018 and subtracts this from the census population estimates in these months.”  The population fell by about 8%, mainly due to migration rather than death, so the fact that there were more deaths than average after the hurricane means the death rate (deaths per thousand) rose more than the unadjusted statistics would suggest because the population is smaller.  But this issue is the number of deaths, not the death rate, and displacement (migration) did not make that number any higher than half a dozen other studies found (about 1000) much less three times higher.