An editorial note atop Andy Craig’s June 26 article in the UnPopulist, “The Unfortunate Necessity of Court Packing to Stop America’s Authoritarian Drift,” opens with a striking observation: “Desperate times require desperate measures.” That aphorism is ancient: it dates back to Hippocrates’s precept that very sick patients require aggressive treatment. Its wisdom has traveled through centuries: in Hamlet, King Claudius explains that “Diseases desperate grown / By desperate appliance are relieved, / Or not at all.” Craig’s article diagnoses a social pathology; he prescribes adding four new Justices to the Supreme Court. He concedes that court packing will be very hard on the patient but explains that “sometimes a smaller harm is necessary to avoid a far bigger one.” 

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“What are you doing?” former public school teacher Emma Rodriguez asked herself when she realized she wouldn’t send her own kids to her school. It was 2020, and she’d been teaching for seven years at a highly rated school in Dallas, Texas. She started thinking about her future family and what she believed as an educator. 

Emma began to dream and pray about how she could do things differently. “How could I come alongside families that maybe want to homeschool for the flexibility, the personalization of it, but just don’t want to transition from mom to teacher?” she wondered. She thought there had to be something between full-time school and full-time homeschooling. “I had no idea there was actually a term for it. It was just my thought,” she says. “As I started doing more research, I figured out there was actually the term of microschool.”

Her husband told her, “Please go live your dream. I’ll take care of you. We’ll figure it out.” She quit teaching in May 2024. After a fall spent planning, she soft-launched Lighthouse Christian Academy in January 2025 with two students—kids of a family she already knew—who happened to have empty daytime space in the after-school STEM program they ran. “They said, here’s your first two kids and here’s your space, ready, go,” she recalls. “Like we believe in you.”

Number 27 in our series of occasional roundups on election law and policy, focusing this time on issues of electoral reform that will endure beyond the midterm battles of the moment:

• Reform failure: One reason reaction has been muted to the Supreme Court’s new decision in NRSC v. FEC, striking down limits on party coordination of spending with candidates, is that many close observers on the left and center agreed that the existing rules were counterproductive [Samuel Issacharoff, NYU Law Democracy Project (calling ruling a “welcome correction” and citing what “Pam Karlan and I have called the hydraulics of campaign finance regulation: money under pressure does not disappear, it finds the path of least resistance”); Richard Pildes, Rick Hasen]. 
• “In my view, there are plausible policy reasons to specify that all ballots should be in hand, not simply in the mail, by Election Day. But the Supreme Court was not presented today with that, or any, policy question” [my statement on the Supreme Court’s Watson v. RNC for Cato, together with Stephen Richer’s statement]. More from me: Maintaining accurate and up-to-date voter rolls should be ranked as a real reform priority, and Maryland is falling short [Free State Notes; also, why Maryland’s recent primary mail ballot foul-up didn’t pose a practical integrity issue, though it was embarrassing and confused voters (Alexander Shur, Votebeat; Christine Condon, Maryland Matters)]. 
• “Report: ‘Understanding How Proportional Representation Might Work in New York City’ ” [Jack Santucci (and John Ketcham}]; Discontent with California’s top-two system contributing to interest in multiparty options [Dennis Lytton, Liberal Currents]; Rob Richie discusses the proportional-ish voting method known as cumulative voting, as well as the promise of ranked-choice balloting in presidential primaries [Expand Democracy]; A caution from the Netherlands on the difficulties of national coalition formation under proportional representation [Tarunabh Khaitan and Mike Winterwerp, Social Europe]. 
• I and others have generally praised as admirable the Nebraska–Maine approach of divvying up a state’s electoral votes based on congressional district. But what if it has a dark sibling that would enable a state to use gerrymandered districts to hand most or even all of its electoral votes to a candidate who loses its popular vote? [Henry Noyes, Marquette Law Review via Electoral Law Blog]
• Reformers of an earlier day structured the Federal Election Commission so appointees from no one party could control it, which made for either partisan fairness or a kludgy guarantee of ineffectiveness, depending on who you ask. Will that structure survive the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. Slaughter? [Bob Bauer, Executive Functions] 
• Meaningful representation of coherent geographical areas in national election processes seems to be less and less valued as time goes on, as witnessed by both the race to the bottom on gerrymandering and the continued momentum behind the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact electoral vote deal [Philip Wallach, American Enterprise Institute, with a discussion of “general ticket voting,” banned since the Apportionment Act of 1842, which was designed to award the party that won overall in a state its entire House delegation]. 

The second Trump administration has indulged in the art of changing names. The Pentagon, the Kennedy Center, the tallest mountain in the US, and the body of water west of Florida and east of Mexico have all been objects of rebranding (or attempted rebranding). In a surprise announcement on June 16, the Pentagon’s largest geographic combatant command joined the list. According to the press release, the US Indo-Pacific Command, which has operational authority over US military forces from Hawaii west to India, has reverted to its original name, the US Pacific Command or “PACOM.”

This reverses the 2018 decision of the first Trump administration to tack on “Indo.” That revision was enthusiastically adopted first by the foreign policy community and then by the Biden administration as a proclamation linking US interests in the Western Pacific with its interests in the Indian Ocean. The Department of Defense says the reversion “honors the command’s deep historical roots” and “collective spirit.”

The change does not alter the geographic scope of the command, but the fact that it is a reversal suggests it has policy import. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby and his office, which almost certainly had a say in the decision, have worked to prioritize and discipline US defense policy toward the goal of sustaining a balance of power in Asia—particularly by denying a Chinese attack on the First Island Chain, which runs from Northern Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. The 2026 National Defense Strategy defined this as America’s most important geographic objective short of preserving US dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth dropped “Indo” from his May 2026 remarks to the Shangri-La Dialogue, saying “our approach in the Pacific centers on deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain.” Its formal deletion is a further bureaucratic and diplomatic manifestation of this focus. 

It is also a welcome embrace of reality. The First Island Chain is the center of gravity for the US military presence west of Hawaii and the main defense perimeter of US interests across the Pacific Ocean. It contains two treaty allies, dozens of US bases, and roughly 55,000 US troops (three treaty allies and 80,000 troops if South Korea is included). By contrast, there is one US military base in the Indian Ocean—at Diego Garcia. The US has interests in the Indian Ocean and in cultivating closer ties with India, but these are peripheral to the stakes and challenges of our boots-on-the ground posture in the Western Pacific.

“Indo-Pacific” was a rhetorical and diplomatic aspiration. The phrase originated with the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who meant for it to help diversify Japanese grand strategy. The thinking was that balancing China would be easier if India were part of Japan’s strategic neighborhood. Its adoption by the US government and the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad” group of Japan, India, Australia, and the US) seemed to give it unstoppable cachet. But aspirations and geographic abstractions are also a route to potential mission creep. Eight years of “Indo-Pacific” did not will into being a decisive coupling of the Indian Ocean and Pacific theaters or meaningfully alter US strategic circumstances along China’s maritime frontier.

Those circumstances are imperiled, if not quite desperate. The US posture and base structure on and near the First Island Chain are a legacy of the early Cold War, when the US possessed a large conventional military advantage in the region and China had yet to field large arsenals of drones and theater ballistic missiles. Today, US forces in the Pacific are increasingly vulnerable, as are the security commitments they underpin. They are within range of at least hundreds of Chinese conventional missiles and in a conflict may become liabilities, as US bases in the Middle East have become in the Iran War. Efforts since the 2010s to improve the resilience of these forces through hardening and dispersion have not sufficiently moved the needle, so it is not surprising that an effort to “build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense along the [First Island Chain]” is a core pillar of the 2026 National Defense Strategy.

Bringing back the Pacific Command does not magically remedy the vulnerability of our forward deployments. Rather, the change will help focus the minds of US and allied defense planners on the most urgent problem of our security role in Asia: how to sustain our regional military commitments without military dominance. 

The July 1 update that US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provided the Court of International Trade (CIT) shows that the agency has made significant headway in returning the billions of dollars owed to US importers based on the Supreme Court’s recent invalidation of “emergency” tariffs. However, the filing also shows that frictions built into the process continue to slow the issuance of tariff refunds and that an entire class of importers—collectively owed tens of billions of dollars—might be unable to get their money back without having to sue for it.

Here’s where things stand.

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court invalidated the tariffs that President Trump implemented last year under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). As of June 29 (more than four months after the ruling), CBP has authorized $104.29 billion in refunds and paid out $71.06 billion (including interest). Based on our calculations of the total amount owed by the government as of June 29 (taking into account interest and payouts), the government still owes importers about $100.65 billion—more than half of the total owed. 

CBP deserves credit for giving most eligible importers the opportunity to receive refunds—even if the process was not automatic. It’s also good that CBP has now rolled out Phase 2 of its refund (CAPE) system, covering entries flagged for reconciliation. Refunds could eventually climb to $130 billion of the $166 billion in IEEPA duties paid by importers (before interest).

Eventually.

Indeed, that only $71.06 billion of the approved $104.29 billion has actually been paid suggests that frictions built into the CAPE process are creating obstacles for importers seeking refunds. For example, CBP claims that refunds for 8,384 approved declarations have not been issued because the eligible importers lack proper automated clearinghouse or banking information.

A bigger problem, however, is what we and CIT Judge Richard Eaton, who has overseen the refund process, have flagged: Many smaller US firms have been unable to obtain refunds through the current CAPE process. In particular, CBP has approved refunds for nearly 60 percent of the government’s total obligations, but that $104.3 billion in processed refunds was for just 30 percent of all import entries on which IEEPA tariffs had been paid. In other words, the approved refunds mainly come from large, high-value entries—a strong indication that, as Judge Eaton noted, most refunds have thus far gone to large firms/​importers such as Walmart and Ford. This underscores what we and others have suspected since the beginning of the refund process: The deck is stacked against small firms that lack the resources to fight for and obtain what the government owes them.

Any delays caused by the government’s appeal of Judge Eaton’s universal injunction will further complicate the process. That appeal, filed before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) on June 2, challenges the injunction’s applicability to entries for which liquidation has become final (i.e., more than 180 days have passed since CBP rendered a final determination of the duties and other import charges owed on those entries). As a reminder, finally liquidated entries are not eligible for Phase 1 or 2 of CAPE processing. CBP’s latest filing indicates that it could begin processing finally liquidated entries—which cover about $11.4 billion, or 7 percent of total IEEPA tariff revenue—in a forthcoming Phase 3 of CAPE by late July. However, the government is arguing before the CAFC that CBP cannot issue refunds for these entries without the importer of record filing suit at the CIT first. 

In a preemptive move, US importers whose refunds could be affected by this appeal are making initial moves toward a class-action lawsuit that would satisfy this requirement—yet the government is also challenging this approach at the CIT.

Finally, CBP’s refund data suggest that the agency still owes another $25 billion in refunds for entries not covered in Phases 1 through 3. These include entries subject to certain anti-dumping and countervailing duties, entries for which active drawback claims or administrative protests exist, and entries not filed within ACE (CBP’s online portal for processing imports and exports). The agency’s latest filing does not provide a timeline for processing these entries through CAPE or otherwise issuing refunds.

In sum, it’s good news that refunds accounting for most of the IEEPA tariffs paid have been issued or should be issued soon and that the CAPE system’s functionality is being updated to cover additional imports. However, frictions embedded in the system and the unique hurdles faced by small businesses deserve continued attention and a quick resolution by CBP. 

The ongoing litigation is also unfortunate and worth monitoring. Collectively, the government’s actions indicate that it could end up keeping tens of billions of dollars that it unlawfully confiscated from US importers, through absolutely no fault of their own. 

The Trump administration has failed so far to deliver on its affordability promises. Yet, in a recent Department of Defense video on X, Secretary Hegseth boasted that the administration’s $1.5 trillion proposed defense budget would “supercharge” the American economy. It’s not exactly a novel plan.

The secretary’s statement echoes a long-standing argument since the publishing of NSC-68 in 1950: More defense spending is good for the economy. Of course, as with all federal spending, defense budgets certainly do affect Americans—just not in the way Secretary Hegseth thinks. 

Instead of boosting economic growth, increased defense spending stunts the US economy, wastes money, and raises costs for Americans.

True enough, defense spending can create jobs and contribute to the economy. But this misses a more fundamental question: Which type of federal spending is most beneficial for the economy? The federal government can spend and borrow only so much money, and there are only so many resources and workers to go around. Should scientists be hired for defense research or domestic manufacturing? Should land be used for missile production or building a school? With limited resources and people, policymakers need to know how to spend federal dollars efficiently to limit waste and bloat. 

Herein lies the central problem with Hegseth’s argument: Of all federal outlays, defense spending creates the least number of jobs. And the reasoning is simple—it is a “parasitic output.” The finished products from defense spending—tanks, missiles, bullets, and so on—leave the market once they are made. When that $4 million Patriot missile is built, that’s it. That $4 million either sits in storage or explodes in combat. Parasitic output is accounted for as part of a country’s gross domestic product, which is why, among other reasons, measuring defense spending as a contribution to GDP is misleading. 

Increased defense spending also weakens America’s manufacturing industry, an economic sector in rough shape these days. The workers, research, and capital that could’ve been used to strengthen domestic manufacturing are being used to make weapons. Yes, building new weapons may increase employment rates. But such an obsessive focus on defense production means missing out on the wider employment and economic benefits of manufacturing other products with higher returns on investment. 

Additionally, increased defense spending puts upward pressure on inflation. As the federal government pumps more money into the economy with little return, inflation rises. To offset this, governments have three primary options: increase interest rates, raise taxes, or reduce spending in other sectors. All three options are politically unpopular. 

Reducing defense spending is the logical position for policymakers to take. Reforming the weapon acquisition process and walking back US military commitments abroad, for instance, are compelling policy options. But bolder action is needed. A spending cap should be placed on the defense budget, which is in fact how these budgets were made prior to the 1960s. Such a cap would force the military to make use of set funds, laying down an imperative to spend efficiently.

Matching the defense budget to America’s national interests makes sense in theory. And indeed, this is what the current Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process aims to do. Yet, threat inflation regularly goads Congress into paying any price to safeguard against exaggerated threats.

Proponents of hiking the defense budget argue that proposals to reduce defense spending put money before national security and that less spending in a world characterized by risk is radical. But what is truly radical is the notion that the United States can sustain its exorbitant defense spending indefinitely. It’s also radical to suppose that there are no trade-offs with federal spending. And it is radical to separate economic conditions from national security. 

If the Trump administration is serious about lowering costs for American families, it cannot pretend that defense spending is somehow exempt from basic economic realities. A larger Pentagon budget does not create prosperity out of thin air. Lawmakers will need to scrutinize defense spending more heavily if they hope to fix the country’s economic woes.

US steel prices continue to rise and are now at their highest level since mid-2023. Although domestic supply-side factors are likely behind the more recent price movements, US tariffs continue to play a significant role by limiting consumers’ access to foreign-made steel, thereby entrenching domestic producers as the dominant players in the US steel market.

According to SteelBenchmarker, the price of US hot-rolled band (HRB) reached $1,208 per metric ton on June 24, the highest reading since April 2023. The price of HRB in the US is 54 percent higher than in Western Europe ($780) and 146 percent higher than the world steel export market ($490); thus, while steel prices are trending down in other markets, US prices continue to increase. After this latest reading, the current US HRB price is 70 percent higher than it was on February 10, 2025, when President Trump announced that Section 232 tariffs would apply to steel imported from all countries. Figure 1 depicts these trends.

Even though domestic raw steel production is up 6 percent through the first six months of 2026, relative to the same period last year, the market is showing other signs of tightness: Lead times for some products are closing in on six to eight months (multiyear highs); limited quantities of steel are available in spot markets; and some mills are reportedly capping the amount of steel that customers can order through longer-term contracts. Some of this tightness can be explained by domestic supply-side issues, including outages and damage to equipment that US steel mills experienced in late 2025 and early 2026. As these issues are resolved, market participants expect lead times to decline and more output to become available to spot buyers. 

Yet, the market is likely to remain tight—and therefore, prices are likely to remain high—given the significant decline in US steel imports since the tariffs entered into effect. 

According to an American Iron and Steel Institute analysis of Census Bureau data, the United States imported 26 percent less steel by volume from January to May 2026 than during the same period last year (Figure 2). Imports rose month over month in May but remained far below last year’s pace. A recent Steel Market Update analysis illustrates the tariffs’ role in driving this decline and increasing costs for American steel consumers: After incorporating the costs of duties and theoretical importing costs (i.e., freight, handling, and trader margins, which may vary in practice), domestic hot-rolled steel costs just $10 per short ton (st) more than Italian steel and $6/​st more than German steel. Strip out the 50 percent Section 232 tariffs, however, and the gap explodes: American steel would run $363/​st more expensive than Italian steel and $361/​st more expensive than German steel. This dynamic is also evident across other steel products. Put differently, the tariffs are artificially propping up higher-priced American steel vis-à-vis European steel. Meanwhile, steel from other regions, including Türkiye and East Asia, remains cheaper than US-made steel, but higher imports from these regions have not replaced lost volumes from elsewhere.

The tariffs have also compounded additional global disruptions that have further complicated firms’ access to steel from abroad. Earlier this year, the conflict in Iran pushed up energy costs and disrupted the supply of certain products, and those pressures may persist depending on the future of the US–Iran ceasefire. Even so, the US market remains tight enough that buyers who can secure more competitive terms abroad, or absorb the financial and logistical costs of importing, are turning to imports to fulfill their steel needs. On the other hand, smaller firms without the capital or personnel to manage the process stay stuck on the high-price island the United States has become.

By maintaining the steel tariffs, the federal government is giving US steel mills, as one industry analyst put it, “absolute pricing power and absolute supply power.” The domestic industry can afford to increase prices and deliver lower quantities of steel as long as it remains buoyed by tariffs (and additional disruptions) that increase the costs of importing foreign steel. US steel consumers are bearing the cost of this policy-driven reallocation of pricing and supply power, as shown by the Producer Price Index (a widely used proxy for input costs) for steel mill products sitting at its highest point since May 2023 (Figure 3). 

While domestic steel producers are investing in additional industrial capacity, many of these expansions are scheduled to come online in years, not months. Thus, for the foreseeable future, US consumers of steel and products made with steel will continue to operate in a market distorted by a tariff policy that works to empower an industry in long-running decline at the expense of American competitiveness.