Trade Policy

Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of the National Security Rationale for Restricting Trade

Over its first two years, the Trump administration has aggressively reshaped U.S. trade policy. One of its most controversial initiatives is the expansive use of national security to justify imposing tariffs and quotas. Internationally, many U.S. trading partners responded immediately to the tariffs with tariffs of their own, and both the U.S. tariffs and the retaliatory tariffs are the subject of litigation that will test the limits of the WTO’s dispute settlement process and the trading system itself. In a new paper, Cato scholars Simon Lester and Huan Zhu suggest an alternative mechanism to handle these issues.

Trump’s First Trade Deal: The Slightly Revised Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement

While the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement has received far more attention, a lesser-known U.S. trade deal has also been reworked. The renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) provides a useful example of Trump’s trade dealmaking in practice. In a new paper, Simon Lester, Inu Manak, and Kyounghwa Kim demonstrate how the renegotiation made only minor changes to the agreement and could be taken to mean that the reality of Trump’s trade policy may not always match the rhetoric.

New Billboards in New York City Area Blame the Onerous Jones Act for Snarling Traffic

The Cato Institute is launching a new billboard campaign in the heavily trafficked New York City region this month to educate motorists on the impact of the Jones Act on their daily commute. The boards direct readers to BlameJonesAct.com, which explains that the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, better known as the Jones Act, helps clog America’s highways with 18-wheelers by making it prohibitively expensive for companies to ship goods via container ships, which would be a cheaper and more efficient option were it not for the act.

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Of Special Note

Candy-Coated Cartel: Time to Kill the U.S. Sugar Program

Candy-Coated Cartel: Time to Kill the U.S. Sugar Program

For decades, the federal government has been operating a program to control the production and importation of sugar. The program’s main purpose is to ensure minimum prices for sugar, typically much higher than those found in international markets. In leading this sugar cartel, Cato scholar Colin Grabow argues in a new paper, the government has raised costs for U.S. consumers and U.S. businesses that use sugar in their products, while making citizens suspicious that their government is actually working for them, instead of advancing the narrow interests of special interest groups, such as sugar producers.

Trade Politics

#CatoConnects: Simon Lester & Inu Manak on NAFTA and Trump’s Tariffs

The President has linked tariffs on aluminum and steel to the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations, although he has exempted Canada and Mexico for now. Negotiations on a new NAFTA had been looking positive, but linking the trade deal to tariffs could undermine that progress. What is the future of continental free trade? And how should a renegotiated NAFTA be different?

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From the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, the Cato Trade Newsletter is a periodic email featuring trade policy news, commentary, and resources from a free-trade perspective.

Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the Congress

Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the Congress

This interactive web site allows users to examine how Congress and its individual members have voted over the years on bills and amendments affecting the freedom of Americans to trade and invest in the global economy. The web site includes votes previously examined in a series of Cato studies published from 1999 through 2005, as well as more recent votes.