Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

NATO Expansion Is Unwise. Saying So Isn’t Treasonous.

Ad hominem has always been a feature of politics, but Senator John McCain (R-AZ) elevated it to a new level earlier this week. The incident occurred when McCain came to the Senate floor to ask for unanimous consent to move forward on a vote formally bringing Montenegro, a small country in the Balkans, into the NATO alliance. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) objected. McCain responded by suggesting Paul was a traitor to his country and accusing him of “working for Vladimir Putin.”

McCain seemed particularly incensed that Paul objected without explaining his reasons. As reported at the Daily Beast:

“I note the senator from Kentucky leaving the floor without justification or any rationale for the action he has just taken. That is really remarkable, that a senator blocking a treaty that is supported by the overwhelming number—perhaps 98, at least, of his colleagues—would come to the floor and object and walk away.”

He then directly connected Paul to the Russian government: “The only conclusion you can draw when he walks away is he has no justification for his objection to having a small nation be part of NATO that is under assault from the Russians.

“So I repeat again, the senator from Kentucky is now working for Vladimir Putin.”

Paul later issued a statement in response:

“Currently, the United States has troops in dozens of countries and is actively fighting in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen (with the occasional drone strike in Pakistan)…In addition, the United States is pledged to defend 28 countries in NATO. It is unwise to expand the monetary and military obligations of the United States given the burden of our $20 trillion debt.”

That seems like a reasonable position to hold, and certainly not one that requires Paul to be a Russian stooge.

Indeed, many of America’s most reputable officials and academics have opposed post-Cold War NATO expansion for substantive reasons. George Kennan, perhaps our most famous Cold War diplomat and widely considered to be the father of the United States’ containment strategy, famously opposed NATO expansion in the 1990s, writing in the New York Times that expanding NATO would be a “fateful error” that would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion” and “restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations.” Like Senator Paul, Kennan also worried about the problems of credibility and overextension. Would McCain accuse Kennan of treason?

Upcoming Event: America’s Global Role in the 21st Century

The Cato Institute has long been unique in Washington, D.C.’s foreign policy debate. For years, our scholars have argued that there is essentially no debate over grand strategy here in the nation’s capital. Vigorous political battles about U.S. foreign policy tend to happen only within a very narrow range of opinion, usually centering on tactics rather than competing strategic visions. These surface level disagreements mask a bipartisan consensus in favor of a grand strategy of primacy (alternatively termed “liberal hegemony” or “deep engagement”), which is further buttressed by an extensive network of foreign policy professionals within the national security bureaucracies. The consensus sees the United States as the indispensable nation - the policeman of the world - that must maintain military preponderance and extensive security commitments in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia in the name of upholding the international order.

The election of Donald Trump to the presidency has, in an odd way, created incentives for a debate about grand strategy. The president’s erratic and often contradictory utterances on alliances, free trade, and interventionism - what the Brookings Institution’s Thomas Wright describes as Trump’s Jekyll and Hyde foreign policy -  has occasionally questioned the core foundations of U.S. grand strategy in the post-WWII era. Unfortunately, Trump is just about the worst vessel for ushering in such a debate, for reasons that are too numerous to count but include his economic protectionism, chauvinistic nationalism, habitual threat inflation, and worrying illiberal tendencies. Nevertheless, the shock to the status quo that is Trump’s rise has elicited number of well-publicized defenses of primacy by people in the Washington foreign policy community.

And that’s what makes an upcoming Cato Institute event so timely and important. The debate over grand strategy in academia has always been comparatively robust, and two leading scholars who advocate the continuation of America’s deep engagement, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, both professors at Dartmouth College, will be here on March 21 to discuss their newest book, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century. Our two discussants are at the other end of the spectrum on grand strategy: Cato’s own Benjamin H. Friedman and Eugene Gholz, professor at the University of Texas at Austin and Cato adjunct scholar. 

Please join us for this vital discussion of America’s role in the world. Register to attend the event here

Refugees, Immigration, and the Trolley Problem

During the presidential campaign Donald Trump’s son, Eric Trump, tweeted a picture of a bowl of Skittles candies along with the caption: “If I had a bowl of skittles and I told you just three would kill you. Would you take handful? That’s our Syrian refugee problem.”

Trump’s tweet generated backlash from many corners but the general logic of this vivid metaphor continues to resonate for many, despite research that demonstrates that the risk of an American dying in a terrorist attack carried out by refugees and immigrants in the United States is astonishingly low. For many Americans, the prospect of just one bad skittle overwhelms a more rational calculation embracing both immigration’s costs and benefits.

But perhaps a different vivid mental picture can help people see the immigration question in a new light.

The trolley problem is a famous thought experiment in ethics. The general form of the problem (quoted here from Wikipedia) is this:

There is a runaway trolley barreling down the railway tracks. Ahead, on the tracks, there are five people tied up and unable to move. The trolley is headed straight for them. You are standing some distance off in the train yard, next to a lever. If you pull this lever, the trolley will switch to a different set of tracks. However, you notice that there is one person on the sidetrack. You have two options:

  1. Do nothing, and the trolley kills the five people on the main track.
  2. Pull the lever, diverting the trolley onto the sidetrack where it will kill one person.

This is a tough scenario for sure. Do you believe that pulling the lever is the best option? What is your justification for that choice?

Surveys have shown that around 90% would make the difficult decision to pull the lever to save the five people. The justification for most people is straightforward: saving five lives is better than saving one life. But studies also show that it matters a great deal who that one person is. For example, if the person happens to be the respondent’s relative or loved one, a respondent is far less likely to indicate he or she would pull the lever.

Book Forum: The Ukraine Crisis and U.S.-Russian Relations

Nearly three years ago, Ukraine’s Kremlin-backed president fled the country’s capital amidst massive anti-government protests. The series of events to follow would alter the geopolitical landscape of post-Soviet Eurasia, destabilize security within the wider region and pose a major challenge for U.S.-Russia relations.

Following an unrecognized referendum in eastern Ukraine, Russia proceeded in its annexation of the Crimean peninsula in a brazen act transgressing the notion of Westphalian sovereignty. The United States and the European Union responded by imposing sanctions on Russia, with debatable efficacy, while two ceasefire agreements have failed to end a protracted and bloody conflict on the ground.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration has indicated a willingness to lift Russian sanctions in order to improve bilateral relations—a move which would be unpopular in Congress. Simultaneously, there is continued insistence from the United States and Europe that Russia must return control of the Crimea to Ukraine—a stipulation which Russia refuses to consider. Where do U.S.-Russia relations go from here?

Prior to looking into the policy options, an upcoming Book Forum presenting the recently released book Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (Routledge, January 2017) will first examine how U.S.-Russian relations arrived at such a precarious point in the first place.  

The book’s authors, Timothy J. Colton (Morris and Anna Feldberg Professor of Government and Russian Studies, Harvard University) and Samuel Charap (Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, International Institute for Strategic Studies; Former Senior Advisor, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security), argue that a series of grave strategic miscalculations, resulting from years of zero-sum behavior on the parts of both Russia and the United States, have destabilized the post-Soviet Eurasian sphere to the detriment of the West, Russia and the countries caught in the midst. With regional and international security now deteriorated and all parties worse off, Colton and Charap conclude that all governments must commit to patient negotiation aimed at finding mutually acceptable alternatives, rather than policies aimed at securing one-sided advantages.

Please join us for what is sure to be an insightful and comprehensive foray into the roots of the Ukraine crisis during Cato’s Book Forum on March 10th, featuring co-author Samuel Charap with comments provided by Emma Ashford, Cato Institute Research Fellow. You are invited to register for the event here.

Donald Trump’s “Rules of Civility and Decent Behavior”

As any pedantic patriot can tell you, there’s really no such thing as “Presidents’ Day”–the official name for the federal holiday we celebrated on Monday is “Washington’s Birthday.” And it wasn’t the first president’s actual birthday, which is today, February 22.

Washington had his faults, but, especially when compared to most of those who followed him, he provided an admirable model of probity and restraint. The teenage Washington copied in his own hand 110 precepts on etiquette: “The Rules of Civility and Decent Behavior in Company and Conversation,” and, as I noted recently, they make for a pretty stark contrast with the deportment of 1600 Pennsylvania’s current occupant. So, in honor of Washington’s (actual) Birthday, contemplate the distance between our first president and our 45th, with a selection of Washington’s “Rules”–and Trump’s:

Washington’s “Rules”:

Shew Nothing to your Freind that may affright him.

Speak not when you Should hold your Peace

do not Presently play the Physician if you be not Knowing therein.

Undertake not what you cannot Perform but be Carefull to keep your Promise.

Trump: “I will give you everything. I will give you what you’ve been looking for for 50 years. I’m the only one” (campaign rally, North Dakota).

Event February 27th: U.S. Military Posture and Persian Gulf Oil

Since at least World War II, U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by the necessity of securing scarce oil supplies. And for more than 30 years, it has been shaped by a commitment to safeguard the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. Many of the defining moments in U.S. foreign policy since then– including the Arab oil embargoes of the 1970s, the 1980s ‘tanker war’ and even the 1991 Persian Gulf War – have been shaped by this commitment, perhaps most clearly articulated by President Carter in 1980:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Yet recent years have seen profound changes in the global oil market. Growth in U.S. domestic production – a result of the shale gas revolution – has returned the United States to the top of global hydrocarbon producer rankings for the first time in decades. A more general shift in production from global south to north has made the United States substantially less reliant on Middle Eastern sources of oil, and more on close neighbors like Canada.

These changes, combined with dramatic shifts in the Middle Eastern balance of power raise a key question: should the United States continue to use its military to guarantee the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf?

On February 27th, Cato will host a book forum to discuss the recently published book Crude Strategy: Rethinking the U.S. Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil. The book addresses many of these key questions, pulling together an interdisciplinary team of political scientists, economists, and historians to explore the links between Persian Gulf oil and U.S. national security.

The book’s essays explore key questions such as the potential economic cost of disruption in oil supply, whether disruptions can be blunted with nonmilitary tools, the potential for instability in Saudi Arabia, and the most effective U.S. military posture for the region. By clarifying the assumptions underlying the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, the authors conclude that the case for revising America’s grand strategy towards the region is far stronger than is commonly assumed.

The discussion will feature the book’s editors, Charles Glaser, Professor of Political Science and Director, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University and Rosemary Kelanic, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College. Joining them will be Kenneth Vincent, Visiting Fellow, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, George Washington University and John Glaser, Cato’s Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies.

The event promises a fascinating discussion on the energy security roots of America’s foreign policy in the Middle East, and the future of the U.S. commitment to the region’s oil supplies. You can register for the event here.

Book Forum: Do States With Nukes Have More Coercive Leverage?

There is considerable debate in both academic and policy circles about the utility of nuclear weapons. Of what use are they? Some say just about all nuclear weapons are good for is self defense. States that possess them can more easily deter attack or invasion. Others argue that possessing nuclear weapons also gives states added leverage to get their way in international politics. In this conception, nuclear weapons add to the ability to coerce other states. Not only can they deter actions we don’t like, but they can help compel others to take actions that we do like.

A new and important book, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy by Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, evaluates the empirical record to test whether or not nuclear weapons aid in coercive diplomacy. Their findings are clear: no, nuclear weapons do not have much coercive utility. States with nukes don’t have more leverage in settling territorial disputes, they’re not more likely to initiate military challenges, they are not more likely to escalate ongoing disputes, and they are not more successful in blackmailing rivals. 

This has significant implications for U.S. foreign policy. What do these findings suggest we should expect from our nuclear-armed rivals, like Russia and China? Does it make sense to undertake preventive military action against nascent nuclear weapons programs in countries like North Korea? If Iran were to get nuclear weapons once the time-limited restrictions in the JCPOA expire (as critics of the deal suggest), how would that influence its behavior in the region?

The authors are coming to the Cato Institute on March 7 to discuss their book and explain their theoretical and empirical findings. Matthew Kroenig will be a discussant and offer comments on the book. You can register to attend the event here