Heritage Report Shows Refugees Are Not a Major Threat

Olivia Enos, David Inserra, and Joshua Meservey of the Heritage Foundation published an interesting Backgrounder last week about the U.S. refugee program. We agree with many, though not all, of its conclusions and think that it serves as a wonderful example of policy experts grappling with a difficult policy question in a nuanced and thoughtful way – two characteristics often lacking in Washington, D.C.

However, the Backgrounder’s claim that 61 refugees were convicted of Islamist “terrorism-related” offenses since 2002 has earned a lot of attention from the media. David Inserra was kind enough to send us a complete list of the refugee terrorists he and his colleagues counted. Here are the facts about these 61 people:

  • None of these refugees killed anyone in a terrorist attack on U.S.-soil.
  • Only five (8 percent) were refugees who attempted or planned an attack on U.S. soil. The other 56 (92 percent) of the list were either not refugees or not terrorists targeting U.S. soil.
  • At most 50 were actual refugees who may have committed terrorism offenses, out of the 2.1 million refugees admitted since 1989, which is the earliest year that anybody on the list entered as a refugee. At least eleven (18 percent) of the refugee terrorists reported by Heritage were either not actually refugees or not convicted of terrorism offenses.
  • Only five (8 percent) entered as refugees since 2008.
  • Only five (8 percent) were likely refugee security vetting failures who entered as adults or older teenagers and committed an offense soon after entering.
  • The 50 refugees represent just five of the 124 nationalities of refugees admitted since 2002 (4 percent). Three-quarters of the refugees who committed a terrorism offense came from a single nation.

The security threat from refugees is minuscule, concentrated among a few Somalis, and has little to do with vetting.

The Non-Refugees and Non-Terrorists

The Backgrounder’s use of terrorism-related offenses is problematic as it is not synonymous with actual direct or indirect support of terrorism. There is no definition of a terrorism-related offense in U.S. statutes but there is a broad working GAO definition: that it relates to “terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement, as well as other information.” As far as we can tell, the term terrorism-related is used to describe a conviction for any offense that results from a terrorism investigation – even if it is for crimes that bear no relation to terrorism such as buying stolen cereal. David Inserra told us that “Our [Heritage’s] inclusion criteria wasn’t based on convictions for terrorism offenses because people could be involved in that sort of activity and not ever be convicted. We were trying to find the happy medium between overly-restrictive and too loose definitions.” Thus, we are working with different definitions and the reader should keep that in mind. 

Six individuals on the Heritage list were not convicted of terrorism offenses. The government dismissed its complaint against Al-Hazmah Mohammed Jawad. Aws Mohammed Younis Al-Jayab and Ali Mohammed Al Mosaleh were charged with making false statements. Abdi Mahdi Hussein was convicted of failure to follow financial reporting requirements and was “not charged with any terrorism offense and was not alleged to have knowingly been involved in terrorism activities,” according to the FBI. Yusra Ismail was charged with stealing a U.S. passport—not terrorism—and Saynab Hussein was convicted of perjury.

CFPB’s Theory of Consumer Protection: Less Choice, More Cost

Signaling its intent to proceed with business as usual, despite ongoing controversy over its leadership and structure, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently finalized a rule restricting the ability of financial services companies to use arbitration clauses in their contracts. 

An arbitration clause requires the parties to the contract to take any dispute to arbitration, a privately operated hearing procedure that typically has a legally binding effect. Arbitration is often attractive because it can be quicker and less expensive than a case brought in court. It also typically means that the plaintiff cannot join together with other plaintiffs to bring a class action suit. This is the crux of the issue. 

Supporters of the new rule claim that these clauses, buried in fine print and ubiquitous in almost all parts of American legal life, allow banks and credit card companies to get away with abuses that would otherwise be checked by class action litigation. An unlawful practice that costs every customer $5 is almost assuredly not worth the cost or hassle of going to court over. However, bring together a class of one million customers (most of whom will never realize they’re part of the class at all), and there’s real money at stake. Enough money to entice a lawyer to litigate and, let’s be honest, control the entire process for a chance at the typical fee of 33 percent of whatever is recovered. 

Is this true? Were companies able to get away with practices that netted them cash while harming consumers because the harms were so diffuse? Maybe.  Probably. Without speculating about what kinds of practices companies may have engaged in or how wide-spread any were (I have no intention of impugning an entire industry, but every industry has its bad eggs), to the extent litigation was required to check any particular misconduct, if the harm per customer was marginal, it is unlikely anyone would bother with litigation. 

House Republicans Drop Mandate to Prioritize Removing Criminal Aliens Over Others

Last week, when discussing the Trump administration’s secret memo requiring “enforcement action” against “all removable aliens” who immigration agents encounter, I pointed out that every year since 2008, the House Appropriations Committee has included a provision in its version of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding bill that requires the department to “prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime.”

I also noted that this provision was strangely left out of the “omnibus” funding bill enacted into law this May, which packaged funding for all departments in a single bill. But I chalked that up to an oversight due to the irregular process of putting together the large bill and predicted that the provision would reappear in the individual appropriations bill for 2018. I was wrong. The new House appropriations bill for DHS contains no requirement for prioritization. Now the Trump administration’s illogical non-prioritization policies will receive the tacit consent of the committee.

Remember that this provision has been included no matter which party controlled the House for almost a decade—really for as long as DHS has carried out major deportation operations. The first bill to contain this language was 2008 to fund the department for 2009 written by House Democrats and signed by President Bush. Here’s 2010 written by House Democrats and signed by President Obama. In 2011, House Republicans funded the government with a series of continuing resolutions—which essentially maintain the earlier funding bills’ status quo.

In 2012, 2013, 2014, however, Republicans wrote the bills and President Obama signed them with the requirement to prioritize criminal aliens based on the severity of their crime. Then in March 2015, the House of Representatives entered a bitter fight to stop President Obama’s proposed program to give work permits to certain non-criminal unauthorized immigrants who were parents of U.S. children (DAPA). In so doing, it nearly shut down the department. Yet the Republican funding bill for 2015 still included explicit language requiring prioritization. It did again in 2016.

What Federal Spending to Cut?

Federal government spending is rising, deficits are chronic, and debt is reaching dangerous levels. Growing spending and debt are undermining the economy and may push the nation into a crisis. The solution is cutting and eliminating programs in every federal department.

I have posted a new plan at DownsizingGovernment.org that would reduce spending by almost one-quarter and balance the budget within a decade. The cuts compliment the ones proposed by President Trump in his 2018 budget.

Federal spending cuts would spur economic growth by shifting resources from lower-valued government activities to higher-valued private ones. Indeed, much federal spending is not just low value, it actively distorts markets and thus reduces overall income levels.

Cuts would expand personal freedom by giving people more control over their lives and by reducing the top-down controls that come with federal spending activities.

Liberals see government spending cuts as evil, while conservatives may see them as a necessary evil. Actually, spending cuts would positively benefit society.

From the full list of proposed cuts, these are my favorites: 

  • End farm subsidies and rural subsidies.
  • End K-12 school subsidies.
  • End HUD, including rental and public housing subsidies.
  • End urban transit subsidies.
  • End the ACA.
  • Reduce Social Security growth by indexing initial benefits to prices.
  • Raise Medicare cost sharing to increase skin in the game.
  • Block grant Medicaid to encourage states to find savings.
  • Privatize TVA, the PMAs, USPS, Amtrak, and air traffic control.

 See the full plan here.

  

DHS: Don’t Want Your Face Scanned? Don’t Travel!

Last month, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a privacy impact assessment for its Traveler Verification Service (TVS), a program designed to develop and expand DHS’s biometric entry-exit system for international flights. The document sends a clear message to passengers: if you don’t want your biometric information to be collected, don’t travel.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 required an automated screening system for foreign nationals leaving and entering the United States. Since 1996 a range of legislation has called for the implementation of a biometric entry-exit system, although such a system has yet to be fully implemented. In March, President Trump signed Executive Order 13780, which called upon DHS to “expedite the completion and implementation of a biometric entry-exit tracking system for in-scope travelers to the United States.”

According to the DHS privacy assessment, TVS is growing:

[Customs and Border Protection] is publishing this updated [privacy impact assessment] because the recently initiated TVS is expanding to allow commercial air carriers and select airport authorities (“partners”) to provide their own facial recognition cameras and capture the images of travelers consistent with their own business processes and requirements (for example, to use facial images instead of paper boarding passes).

More from the assessment:

These partners will capture the traveler images consistent with their business purposes, and then transmit the photos they capture to CBP through a connection with CBP’s cloud-based TVS. CBP does not capture the photos directly from the traveler under this TVS expansion.

There are already pilot face scanning schemes in place at airports in six American cities; Boston, Chicago, Houston, Atlanta, New York City, and Washington, D.C. These pilot programs allow passengers and pilots to opt out. The DHS assessment explains that while you may be able to opt out of TVS scanning, government collection of your biometrics is unavoidable if you want to travel (highlighting is mine):

The assessment goes on to explain that passengers will be able to opt out of biometric identification under TVS. However, unless this opt-out option is clearly advertised to travelers it’s likely that most travelers will use a ubiquitous facial scanning system at airports.

Anyone who travels from American airports is familiar with the body scanners the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses for security. You can opt out of these scanners, but it’s very rare to see travelers telling TSA officials that they’re not going through the machines. When I opt out of these scanners I’m almost always the only one doing so. That is, unless I’m traveling with some Cato colleagues.

Sadly, millions of Americans consider passing through a body scanner to be an ordinary part of air travel. It would be a shame if facial scans became as widely accepted.

Are ObamaCare’s Community-Rating Regulations a System of Price Controls?

ObamaCare’s community-rating regulations generally bar insurance companies from using any factor other than age to determine premiums, and prevent insurers from charging 64-year-olds more than three times what they charge 18-year-olds. I have long maintained community rating is nothing more than a system of government price controls, and should meet with the usual scorn economists universally heap on such boneheaded policies.

An esteemed colleague challenges my claim that ObamaCare’s community-rating is a system of price controls, because “the government doesn’t set a price.” Here is how I responded:

Price controls don’t always take the form of a fixed integer. Sometimes government sets prices using ratios.

Premium caps control prices by limiting this year’s premium to a ratio of last year’s premium. Medicaid’s prescription-drug price controls set prices as a ratio of the average wholesale price. Medicare’s price controls involve all sorts of complex ratios.

ObamaCare’s community-rating regulations control prices by (a) setting the ratio of premiums for healthy vs. sick people within each age category to 1:1, and (b) setting the ratio of premiums for young vs. old to 1:3. Insurers would not voluntarily follow those ratios, with good reason. But community rating forces insurers to set prices according to those ratios. Thus it is a price-control scheme.

Questioning THAAD’s Successful Test against an IRBM

Yesterday the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced a successful test of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system against an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target. This is a significant milestone for the THAAD system, which was recently deployed to South Korea to defend southern cities and the port of Busan against missile attack by North Korea. Even though this particular test was planned months ago, its timing is especially important given North Korea’s successful test of the Hwasong-12 IRBM in May 2017.

Despite the successful test, it would be dangerous and premature for U.S. policymakers to read too much into THAAD’s capabilities. Initial information about the test suggests that it did not reflect a wartime use of an IRBM by North Korea. Moreover, the test could have negative implications for U.S.-China strategic stability.

Based on the statement released by the MDA and video of the test, the test seems to have been relatively easy for THAAD. For example, at the moment the warhead is intercepted it does not seem close to any other objects. This makes it relatively easy for THAAD’s infrared sensor to locate the warhead and slam into it. However, it would be much harder for the sensor to locate the warhead if the target missile broke up in flight and cluttered the sensor. It is not clear whether the target missile used in the most recent test broke up in flight, but based on past tests it seems unlikely. This makes for successful testing, but it does not reflect real-world scenarios.