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A Troubling Nomination to the U.S. Sentencing Commission
One of the jobs of a think tanker is to synthesize information from other sources and put it in the context of his or her particular field. Hard data are particularly important to our work because data are measurable outcomes from policy and practice in the real world. No one cares what anyone at Cato “feels.” Feelings have their place, of course. Measuring the feelings of a particular group or groups of people can be useful in the aggregate because people will act in accordance with those feelings, but those feelings make up just another metric on which we collect data to explain the world. Reliable data and provable outcomes are fundamental to shaping and forming effective public policy.
As irritating as strict libertarians may find it, several bodies within the federal government are very good at collecting and analyzing data. One of these bodies is the U.S. Sentencing Commission. From the USSC website:
The U.S. Sentencing Commission, a bipartisan, independent agency located in the judicial branch of government, was created by Congress in 1984 to reduce sentencing disparities and promote transparency and proportionality in sentencing.
The Commission collects, analyzes, and distributes a broad array of information on federal sentencing practices. The Commission also continuously establishes and amends sentencing guidelines for the judicial branch and assists the other branches in developing effective and efficient crime policy.
The Commission publishes data on the impacts of sentencing, the levels of recidivism among different populations of the formerly incarcerated, and other inputs and outputs related to our federal carceral system. For criminal justice researchers of all levels, the Commission provides detailed and easily accessible information about how federal policy and law translate into practice and outcomes.
Another component of the Commission’s work is passing along recommendations about sentencing law to Congress. Reasonable people may disagree with these recommendations, but the Commission clearly bases its recommendations on the best available data they have collected and analyzed. Individuals of all ideological persuasions should want any nominee to the Commission to share this dedication to data collection and evidence-based practices. Instead, President Trump nominated William “Bill” Otis.
Otis is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center and spent many years in the Justice Department. He has continuously lambasted bipartisan efforts to reduce sentences and remains a stalwart proponent of the “tough on crime” rhetoric of the 1980s, warning of great crime waves that will follow widespread sentencing reduction.
Otis marshals no empirical evidence for his claims—because there isn’t any. And that’s the problem.
To be clear, I’m not worried about Otis’s nomination because he’s conservative. Plenty of conservatives work on criminal justice issues, and some have led the way on reforms. Republican governors and GOP-controlled legislatures in Georgia, Texas, and other “red” states have passed significant criminal justice reforms that reduced prison and jail populations while also reducing crime rates. When presented with evidence-based opportunities to help individuals and save public money, many realized criminal justice reform could be a conservative cause.
The problem is, as Julie Stewart, the founder of Families Against Mandatory Minimums wrote in 2015, “Otis is impervious to facts and evidence.” Put another way, Bill Otis is interested in the politics, not the policy, of criminal justice.
The mountains of data that support less carceral policies and alternatives to incarceration have not swayed Otis’s rhetoric at all. When a man who had benefitted from reducing the sentence for a crack cocaine conviction brutally murdered a woman and two children, Otis was quick to blame the shortened sentence:
Three people, including two children, are dead today because of early release from a duly imposed, lawful and fully deserved federal drug trafficking sentence.
How many times were we lectured that those released under lowered sentencing rules would be only “low level, non-violent offenders?” I don’t know, exactly. Hundreds if not thousands.
Question: How many more lives are the congressmen and senators who support the [Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act] willing to see sacrificed for their “we’ve-been-too-tough” agenda?
An exact number, please, gentlemen. We want to remember who you are on election day. And we will.
It’s Willie Horton all over again.
Yes, a few people who are incarcerated for drugs may do horrible things when they get out. Most of them, even those who commit new offenses, will not. According to several Commission reports, the most common reason for re-arrest among federal drug offenders is a violation of supervision policies—that is, getting drunk or committing some other minor infraction—and certainly not murder.
The latest data from the Sentencing Commission shows no statistical difference in recidivism among those released early under new drug sentencing guidelines and those who served the longer sentences:
The recidivism rates were virtually identical for offenders who were released early through retroactive application of the [Fair Sentencing Act] Guideline Amendment and offenders who had served their full sentences before the FSA guideline reduction retroactively took effect. Over a three-year period following their release, the “FSA Retroactivity Group” and the “Comparison Group” each had a recidivism rate of 37.9 percent.
These data coincide with previous data from the Commission that measured the effects of crack cocaine sentencing retroactivity that found no significant statistical difference between recidivism among those who got out early and those who served the full sentence.
All this is not to say that policymakers should not find ways to reduce recidivism, no matter how serious the offenses are. But Otis’s belief that serving long drug sentences will make convicted individuals more lawful citizens is at odds with what liberals, conservatives, progressives, and libertarians in criminal justice have found in years of research and by measuring the effects of new policies put into practice. The push for reducing incarceration is not a conspiracy of groups taken in by George Soros and Al Sharpton, as Otis suggested in 2016, but a broad coalition of individuals, organizations, and lawmakers who look at the evidence and formulate policy accordingly.
The Sentencing Commission provides, among many other things, a trove of information that can teach us more about how our policies do and do not work. Otis’s nomination signals a return to reactionary politics based on what some people think and feel, rather than what they can show and prove.
Travel Ban Argument: Weird Cases Make for Bad Law
I was in the courtroom for this morning’s argument in Trump v. Hawaii, otherwise known as the “travel ban” case. Recall that this is Travel Ban 3.0, which is the most detailed executive action regarding entry restrictions yet. Indeed, Solicitor General Noel Francisco called it the most detailed immigration proclamation ever (in contrast to earlier ones by President Carter regarding Iranians and President Reagan regarding Cubans).
It’s an odd case: as Neal Katyal, lawyer for Hawaii and the other state and private challengers, put it, if Donald Trump hadn’t made all his various campaign statements and tweets about Muslim bans, “we wouldn’t be here.” In other words, “no president has ever said anything like this.”
In a normal case involving an executive action over national security, no court would ever second-guess the president. But this isn’t a normal case or a typical president, so the Supreme Court struggled mightily over a travel ban that, all sides seem to agree, wouldn’t be a legal controversy if any other president had implemented it. Indeed, the whole course of the litigation would’ve been different if Travel Ban 1.0—the one President Trump signed his first week in office without interagency process or guidance to the line agents who were supposed to implement it, causing chaos at airports—had been skipped and we’d gone straight to the more fully lawyered 2.0. I doubt there would’ve been quite as much judicial resistance and treatment of this president differently from the president.
But that’s a historical counterfactual, so you go to court with the facts you have.
Of course, it’s not that unusual for a court to apply a law to factual circumstances that were never contemplated. Here, the relevant immigration provision gives the executive wide discretion to deny entry to any type of foreigner when citing great national interest—and it’s not hard to square that with other provisions regarding nondiscrimination in granting visas. Courts don’t get to review that kind of determination.
That really should be the end of it, even if one thinks, as I do, that the travel ban doesn’t do much for national security and has a greater symbolic than practical effect. And it should be the end of it regardless whether one think that in his heart of hearts Donald Trump has anti-Muslim animus.
Chief Justice John Roberts will try mightily to cobble together a coalition to make this case go away on jurisdictional or other narrow grounds. Justice Neil Gorsuch seems ready to join him (presumably Justice Clarence Thomas too), while Justice Samuel Alito was clearly with the government on the merits. Justice Elena Kagan was the only one on the left who raised pointed questions of Katyal; given her views on administrative law and the breadth of the immigration statute here, she’s “gettable” for some sort of technical compromise. To do so, the Court would likely have to finesse Sale v. Haitian Centers Council (1993), in which it found claims against immigration-related executive actions to be justiciable (before recognizing the executive’s broad discretion in this area).
Given that weird cases make for bad law, we can only hope that, however the Court rules, no strong precedent is set.
Jesner v. Arab Bank: Court Tightens Lid on Alien Tort Statute
This morning in Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Supreme Court split 5–4 along conventional ideological lines to confirm that it is up to Congress, not the judiciary, to decide whether and when American courts should entertain international human rights cases against foreign defendants. It thus continues the course of its 2013 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum case, about which I wrote here at the time:
Today the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously and decisively buried the misguided, decades-long hope of some lawyers and academics that they could turn the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) into a wide-ranging method of hauling overseas damage claims into American courts. All nine Justices agreed with the Second Circuit that the statute does not grant jurisdiction for our courts to hear a controversy over alleged assistance in human rights violations outside the U.S. against non‑U.S. plaintiffs by a non‑U.S. business. A majority of five justices reiterated and relied on our law’s strong traditional presumption against extraterritoriality, that is to say, presumption against applying the law to actions that take place in other countries. While parting from this reasoning, four concurring justices nonetheless endorsed a view of ATS as applicable extraterritorially only to very extreme misconduct comparable to piracy, and also as sharply limited by considerations of comity with foreign sovereigns.
It is a good day for a realistic and modest sense of what United States courts of justice can successfully do, namely: do justice within the United States.
But in Kiobel, as Kenneth Anderson noted in the Cato Supreme Court Review that year, the Court ducked the question it had originally agreed to decide: may foreign corporations be sued in U.S. courts under the ATS, or only individuals? The correct answer is that Congress, not the courts, should decide. Issues of foreign affairs are peculiarly the province of the political branches, which can weigh (and take responsibility for) the dangers of engendering friction with foreign sovereigns by extending liability (Jordan, an important U.S. ally, has for years been riled by the attempt to go after Arab Bank over handling transactions, including some in New York, that allegedly facilitated terrorist acts abroad.)
The only time Congress chose affirmatively to create such a cause of action, in a 1991 statute providing torture victims a right to sue over abuse abroad, it placed significant limits on the right, among which was providing that only individuals could be sued. Parallel restrictions should be read into other, unenumerated causes of action under the ATS, said Justice Anthony Kennedy in his opinion for the majority today; that means that unless Congress says so, the statute would enable holding individual wrongdoers liable but not imputing their liability to an organization. Writing separately in partial or full concurrence, Justices Gorsuch, Alito, and Thomas would have gone further to make clear that courts should simply not get into the business of inventing causes of action in this area, especially given the ATS’s history as an early American enactment meant to reduce rather than exacerbate diplomatic tensions.
Not too many years ago, whole sectors of American legal academia were besotted with notions of “universal jurisdiction” in which misbehavior taking place in Africa, Latin America, or Southeast Asia could be sued over in American courts — in practice, often, in certain West Coast federal courts that welcomed such suits. The Court’s retreat from that proposition has been steady and prudent. Despite the dissent by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, no one has immunized business miscreants against anything. The Court has simply made it clear that if the United States courts are to become a sort of human rights policeman to the world, it is Congress that will need to decide to fit them out for that task.
Supreme Court Hard to Predict in Important Securities Case
Investment adviser Ray Lucia conducted some seminars that ran afoul of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC fined him $300,000 and, more importantly, barred him from working in the field after an SEC administrator determined that he had misled prospective clients in a quasi-judicial proceeding that the SEC investigated, prosecuted, and adjudicated without any appreciable oversight. He made a federal case out of the rather apparent separation-of-powers violation, which culminated in today’s Supreme Court argument in Lucia v. SEC. (For more background, see here.)
The central issue in the case is whether the SEC’s administrative law judges (ALJs) are “officers of the United States” such that they have to be appointed by and ultimately accountable to the president. That question in turn turns on how much discretion they have and whether their rulings change parties’ legal rights—or, given certain precedent, how you would write a rule that distinguishes officers from mere employees.
After argument, Lucia remains hard to predict. A couple of justices (Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor) seemed dubious that the operations of a significant part of the government could be jeopardized based on what seemed to them to be legalistic technicalities. A couple of others (John Roberts, Neil Gorsuch) seemed to recognize the constitutional problem with the way administrative law judges are appointed but wonder how to write the opinion and apply the proper remedy. The rest seemed genuinely puzzled as to what to do with this case, and weren’t fully satisfied with any of the arguments presented.
None of the justices seemed particularly interested in the “removal power” aspect of the case, which the United States raised in its brief and Cato also covered in our brief. But all were troubled by the potential ramifications of ruling one way or another, because so many federal decisions could potentially be affected.
However this ends up, the case shows two things: (1) the importance of appointing judges and justices who take constitutional structure seriously, because that’s the ultimate guarantor of liberty, and (2) the incredible and unaccountable sprawl of the administrative state.
A decision is expected by the end of June.
Wisconsin’s Butter Scheme Is Udderly Cheesy
Minerva Dairy, based in Ohio, is America’s oldest family-owned cheese and butter dairy. It has been producing artisanal, slow-churned butter in small batches since 1935. They have gotten along by selling via their website and regional distributers in several states. This model has worked fine everywhere except Wisconsin, which requires butter manufacturers to jump through a series of cumbersome and expensive hoops to sell butter inside the state.
Of course, Wisconsin is America’s Dairyland, with many large dairy producers who naturally want to limit their competition. At the behest of these large producers, the state requires every batch of butter sold in the state to be “graded” by a specifically state-licensed grader—all of whom live in Wisconsin, except for a handful in neighboring Illinois—who must taste-test every single batch. Because Minerva’s butter is produced in multiple small batches over the course of each day, the law would effectively require the dairy to keep a licensed tester on-site at all times, which is cost-prohibitive. The state admits that the grading scheme has nothing to do with public health or nutrition, but claims that its grades—based largely on taste—inform consumers.
The fact that Wisconsin is trying to shape the taste of butter isn’t even the most absurd part of this case. The criteria used to grade the butter are a ludicrous mad-lib of meaningless jargon not even the state’s experts understand. The law purports to identify such flavor characteristics as “flat,” “ragged-boring,” and “utensil.” (All commonplace terms spoken by consumers in dairy aisles across the nation, certainly.) This terminology hearkens to a freshman—not even sophomore—term paper on the semiotics of postmodern agrarian literature. To claim that a grade calculated with reference to meaningless nonsense serves the purpose of informing anyone illustrates the danger inherent in judges’ dutifully deferring to government rationales for silly laws that burden people who are just trying to make an honest living.
Our friends at the Pacific Legal Foundation represent Minerva in a lawsuit that challenges the butter-grading law on grounds that it burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, and also hurts small dairies’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. Minerva lost at the district court when the judge applied a toothless “rational basis” test to the law in question, giving little weight to the serious concerns described above. Must the judiciary rubber-stamp every legislative folly?
Because laws that abrogate constitutional rights warrant meaningful judicial oversight, Cato filed an amicus brief in Minerva Dairy v. Brancel to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Wisconsin’s law directly burdens the right to participate in the state’s butter market, and thus their economic liberty, for no sane or rational reason. There are simply no benefits to consumers that come from forcing producers like Minerva to pay considerable sums to have an irrational process deposit a random letter on product packaging. It curdles the mind to argue otherwise.
USA Today: Local Police Acquiring Less Military Gear from Feds
Over the weekend, USA Today reported that state and local law enforcement have acquired far less military equipment this year than they had at this point last year. This decline came in spite of President Trump’s executive order last August that removed some administrative hurdles to getting some of that equipment that had been implemented by the Obama Administration. The story contains a number of plausible explanations for the decline, including decreased demand from local departments and certain items not being available. There may be several factors at play in what appears to be a dramatic decrease in acquisition, but whatever the underlying reasons, the reduction is the latest evidence that much of the pro-police rhetoric and actions of the Trump Administration are less about improving police efficacy than they are about promoting the administration’s hollow posturing.
Recall that local police aren’t always jazzed about aggressive enforcement of federal immigration policy. Police who depend on the trust of the community to solve crimes and intervene in personal crises have been vocal about Trump’s impact on local crime enforcement. There are troubling signs that domestic violence and sexual assault are being underreported in Latino communities because of the distrust the administration is sowing between those communities and law enforcement. Over-the-top actions, such as raiding courthouses and seizing victims seeking protection and justice, erode public safety by enabling abusers and rapists to prey on their victims without fear of arrest or criminal charge. The cruel irony is that so much of this damage is done under the guise of restoring “law and order.”
Time will tell whether this decrease in military gear acquisition represents a genuine shift in local police priorities or is simply a lull that may end at the first sign of potential unrest in American cities. But some critics may take comfort that making it easier for police departments to attain new weapons of war didn’t automatically lead them to do it. Hopefully, the growing evidence that police militarization is detrimental to public safety and harmful to community relations is starting to sink in with local police, even if Washington isn’t listening.