In his post this morning, “Kagan on Military Recruitment,” Cato adjunct scholar Mark Moller touches on Cato’s 2005 amicus brief in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, which he co-authored when he was with us as editor-and-chief of the Cato Supreme Court Review – a duty he performed splendidly before moving off to the legal academy. In mentioning the brief, however, Mark says that he recalls that the position it took was controversial within Cato, that it might still be, and that Cato’s legal shop might take a different view were the case presented today.
I don’t recall that the position we took was controversial within Cato, but then it was five years ago, memories fade, and much has happened in the meantime, including the filing of a brief just three months ago that nicely complements the earlier position we took. In Rumsfeld v. Fair we argued that the government could not condition a private university’s eligibility for federal grants, as the Solomon Amendment did, on the university’s giving up one of its rights, namely, its right to freedom of association. The law school plaintiffs, citing the military’s “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, sought to exclude military recruiters from campus. Pursuant to their nondiscrimination policies, that is, the law schools sought to discriminate against those they thought to be wrongly discriminating. In our brief we took no position on the policy Congress had set for the military (that question was not before the Court), nor on the rights of public universities in this matter – nor did we address the question whether Congress, under its raise-and-support-armies power, could directly order schools to admit recruiters, as the Court ultimately held.
Well we now have the public school version of that issue before us, and the Court, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. And our brief in this case, written by Cato adjunct scholar Richard Epstein, argues that a public law school – Hastings, in this case – cannot condition the receipt of benefits it extends to all other student groups on CLS’s giving up its right to freedom of association. CLS, a private student group, excludes nonbelievers from its membership, which is its right. As a public institution, we argue, Hastings must treat all equally.
Thus, the principle in the two cases is the same. Private parties, pursuant to their right to freedom of association, may discriminate, whether we agree with their grounds for doing so or not. Public institutions, which belong to all of us, may not discriminate except on grounds narrowly tailored to their functions. Unfortunately, in numerous respects, that’s not our current law. For more, see here.