The Need for Judicial Oversight of Domestic Intelligence Gathering

I’m always hesitant to disagree with a fellow Cato scholar, especially one with a resume as impressive as Roger Pilon’s. But I thought Roger’s op‐​ed in the Wall Street Journal yesterday on the FISA debate missed a couple of important points.


Let me start with a couple of points on which everyone in the FISA debate agrees. First, no one disputes that the president has the authority to conduct purely foreign intelligence‐​gathering without court oversight. And as Ryan Singel has ably documented purely foreign eavesdropping has always been unregulated by FISA. If the NSA wants to splice into a fiber optics cable off the coast Great Britain, bribe a Syrian telephone employee for access to the telephone network, or install eavesdropping equipment on every cell phone tower in Iraq, FISA has nothing to say on the subject.


Second, virtually everyone agrees that changes are needed to allow the interception of foreign‐​to‐​foreign communications as they pass through infrastructure in the United States without judicial interference. Indeed, the Democratic House passed legislation to that effect back in October. We would not be having this debate today if the president had not threatened to veto that legislation.


The dispute is over what safeguards are appropriate to ensure that the intelligence community’s surveillance activities here in the United States are limited to genuine foreign intelligence. Roger’s position appears to be that neither the courts nor Congress may place any restrictions on domestic surveillance activities that the president declares to be related to foreign intelligence gathering. But that’s not good enough. Without judicial oversight, there is no way to know if the executive branch is properly limiting its activities to spies and terrorists, or if they’ve begun to invade the privacy of petty criminals or even law‐​abiding individuals. This is no hypothetical scenario. The FBI conducted extensive surveillance of Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights and anti‐​war leaders in the 1960s and 1970s, which was one of the reasons Congress enacted new safeguards in the first place.


The White House complains that the process for obtaining permission from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is too burdensome. But as our own Mark Moller has explained, most of the paperwork burden that the White House now complains about so bitterly was created by the administration’s own procedures for approving FISA applications. The paperwork required by FISA itself was fairly light. And not only did the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reportedly almost never turn down an eavesdropping application, but the law also included an emergency wiretapping provision that allowed intelligence officials to wiretap first and then get a warrant afterwards.


In short, FISA gave the intelligence community plenty of flexibility to perform the domestic wiretaps they needed to keep Americans safe. But crucially, the government had to tell the court who it was spying on, so that the court could verify that the law was being followed. That’s an important safeguard that ensures that the president doesn’t exceed his constitutional authority and encroach on the privacy of law‐​abiding citizens. The Protect America Act severely crippled that protection, and it would be a serious mistake for Congress to make the damage permanent.