At the end of last month, the Romanian defense ministry announced that roughly 700 US troops would be withdrawn from its borders. Though some American senators expressed alarm over this withdrawal, the number of troops is negligible in the balance of forces between NATO and Russia on the European continent. Nevertheless, even if the United States were to withdraw all its ground forces from Europe, European countries have sufficient capabilities to deter a Russian ground invasion.

And they should. Europe is rediscovering the reality of international politics that effective statecraft will require its own efforts to deter Russian aggression.

The question is, what should they do to deter Russia? Though the war in Ukraine has proven Russia’s weaknesses, history is littered with cases of defeated armies learning from their mistakes and reconstituting themselves to become more formidable fighting forces.

First and foremost, European nations must define their military objectives. These objectives should include deterring Russia from attacking NATO territory and minimizing escalation should Russia decide to do so.

To achieve these twin objectives, European members of NATO must decide on the sort of doctrine they wish to implement, a crucial task. Allied European nations should implement a “defensive doctrine,” which would involve deploying enough European forces to dissuade and counter any Russian temptations to invade. Such a doctrine would also be far preferable to the alternative of a “deterrence doctrine,” which requires adopting just enough military capabilities to punish an attacker. For Europe’s purposes, this would be insufficient to the task of deterring Russia, which has shown a willingness to accept mounting casualties.

NATO Needs to Take Five Steps to Deter Russia

With a defensive doctrine in mind, a European-led NATO and US policymakers should take five steps to create an effective conventional deterrent against Russia to empower our European allies.

First, US policymakers should begin withdrawing their ground troops from the continent. Though European nations in NATO have the military capability to counter potential Russian aggression, these countries still defer to the United States for their security. On the grand strategic side of things, the United States has bigger fish to fry with its domestic problems, the Western Hemisphere, and a rising China. By withdrawing American ground troops from Europe, US policymakers will incentivize European nations to take their security into their own hands.

Second, European countries should increase their defense spending. This does not mean just adhering to 5 percent spending pledges. Adhering to these simplistic defense spending-to-GDP percentages actually limits Europe’s defense spending, as it shifts focus from achieving genuine security needs to meeting arbitrary spending targets. NATO must undo this farcical norm in defense spending and focus on goals that tangibly secure Europe against a Russian incursion.

Third, allied European nations should improve their military’s ability to mobilize and deploy quickly in the event of a Russian attack. This means improving their infrastructure to transport equipment and personnel eastward, train more troops, and improve command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Should Russia attempt to invade a NATO country, its European members must be ready to deploy their troops to fight as quickly as possible.

Fourth, European NATO members should deploy light defenses to the Baltic. With Russia and Belarus to its east and the Baltic Sea to its west, the Baltic states have little room for heavy armored units and weapons to be stationed in the region. Instead, deploying light defenses—light infantry units, artillery, anti-tank weapons and traps, and air defense capabilities—would slow down Russia’s advancing attack through urban warfare. While not ideal for the Baltics, it is the best option given the region’s geographic situation.

Finally, partnered European nations should deploy heavier military capabilities—tanks, armored infantry vehicles, armored and mechanized brigades, aircraft, and medium- and long-range air defenses—throughout Germany and Poland. These weapons and military units would accomplish two goals: prevent a deep Russian penetration from Belarus into Poland, and serve as operational reserves should Russia attack the Baltic states. To accomplish both objectives, a European-led NATO should deploy these forces in a checkerboard-like pattern through Germany and Poland, with each acting as an island of resistance.

Europeans’ reluctance to rearm against Russia is understandable. War is one of the most depraved features of humanity, and few ordinary citizens want to leave their families and friends to risk their lives for another nation’s defense. And there is an understandable fear that the continent’s remilitarization will lead to militarism and a return to the oppressive regimes and wars that once plagued the continent.

Yet every nation requires the means to protect its freedom and its citizens. A stronger European NATO does not mean Europe will become infatuated with militarism and goose-step down the Champs-Élysées again. By implementing these measures, peace can be maintained on the rest of the European continent.