Topic: Government and Politics

Seattle Exhibiting Costs Of Minimum Wage Hikes

Last week, Thomas Firey blogged here on how proponents of higher minimum wages tend to be selective when reviewing the academic literature. In particular, they mischaracterize it as implying that papers tend to show minimum wage hikes do not affect employment.

Right on cue, an important new NBER paper from academics at the University of Washington examining Seattle’s two minimum wage hikes since 2014 suggests significant job and hour losses as the pay floor rose.

Seattle raised its minimum wage from $9.47 to $11 per hour in 2015 and then again to $13 per hour in 2016. The report concludes:

Using a variety of methods to analyze employment in all sectors paying below a specified real hourly rate, we conclude that the second wage increase to $13 reduced hours worked in low-wage jobs by around 9 percent, while hourly wages in such jobs increased by around 3 percent. Consequently, total payroll fell for such jobs, implying that the minimum wage ordinance lowered low-wage employees’ earnings by an average of $125 per month in 2016. Evidence attributes more modest effects to the first wage increase.

The paper seems significant both as a result in its own right and in addressing why sometimes results can be so different depending on methodology.

It suggests that the disemployment effects caused by reductions in demand for low-wage labor rise disproportionately as the wage floor increases. This is logical, but often needs to be articulated given many appeals to the effects of past increases in wage floors as evidence for new much higher minimum wages (see the “Fight for 15,” for example).

Perhaps more importantly, whereas much of the previous literature examines low-wage industries (usually restaurants or retail) or teenagers as proxies for those impacted by minimum wage changes, this paper uses a comprehensive data set allowing assessment on employment for all categories of low-wage employees across industries and demographics. This suggests that previous research examining the impact on individual industries such as restaurants may have significantly underestimated the negative effects on hours worked for low-wage employees.

Of course, as with all studies, there will be disputes about methodology. The paper itself notes that it does not include companies with multiple locations, such as fast food chains, which theory suggests could bias the results in either direction. They also acknowledge that some of the “jobs lost” may have been replaced by jobs in the broader area, making their results an overestimate. Overall though, this is further evidence, adding to an already large literature, suggesting raising the minimum wage to high levels has a very high cost indeed and that the competitive model of the labor market holds.

Senate Republicans Offer a Bill to Preserve & Expand ObamaCare

Yesterday, I posted “Five Questions I Will Use to Evaluate the Phantom Senate Health Care Bill.” The phantom bill took corporeal form today when Senate Republicans released the text of the “Better Care Reconciliation Act.”

So how does the Senate bill fare with regard to my five questions?

1. Would it repeal the parts of ObamaCare—specifically, community rating—that preclude secure access to health care by causing coverage to become worse for the sick and the Exchanges to collapse?

No. The Senate bill would preserve ObamaCare’s community-rating price controls. To be fair, it would modify them. ObamaCare forbids premiums for 64-year-olds to be more than three times premiums for 18-year-olds. The Senate bill would allow premiums for the older cohort to be up to five times those for the younger cohort. But these “age rating” restrictions are the least binding part of ObamaCare’s community-rating price controls. Those price controls would therefore continue to wreak havoc in the individual market. The Senate bill would also preserve nearly all of ObamaCare’s other insurance regulations. 

2. Would it make health care more affordable, or just throw subsidies at unaffordable care?

The Senate bill, like ObamaCare, would simply throw taxpayer dollars at unaffordable care, rather than make health care more affordable.

Making health care more affordable means driving down health care prices. Recent experiments have shown that cost-conscious consumers do indeed push providers to cut prices. (See below graph. Source.)  

How Cost-Conscious Consumers Drive Down Health Care Prices

Three Lessons from the Tax Defeat in Kansas

Leftists don’t have many reasons to be cheerful.

Global economic developments keep demonstrating (over and over again) that big government and high taxes are not a recipe for prosperity. That can’t be very encouraging for them.

They also can’t be very happy about the Obama presidency. Yes, he was one of them, and he was able to impose a lot of his agenda in his first two years. But that experiment with bigger government produced very dismal results. And it also was a political disaster for the left since Republicans won landslide elections in 2010 and 2014 (you could also argue that Trump’s election in 2016 was a repudiation of Obama and the left, though I think it was more a rejection of the status quo).

But there is one piece of good news for my statist friends. The tax cuts in Kansas have been partially repealed. The New York Times is overjoyed by this development.

The Republican Legislature and much of Kansas has finally turned on Gov. Sam Brownback in his disastrous five-year experiment to prove the Republicans’ “trickle down” fantasy can work in real life — that huge tax cuts magically result in economic growth and more, not less, revenue. …state lawmakers who once abetted the Brownback budgeting folly passed a two-year, $1.2 billion tax increase this week to begin repairing the damage. …It will take years for Kansas to recover.

And you won’t be surprised to learn that Paul Krugman also is pleased.

How Many Libertarians Are There? The Answer Depends on the Method You Use

There has been debate this week about how many libertarians there are. The answer is: it depends on how you measure it and how you define libertarian. The overwhelming body of literature, however, using a variety of different methods and different definitions, suggests that libertarians comprise about 10-20% of the population, but may range from 7-22%.

Notes: This estimate comes from an analysis I ran on the 2012 American National Election Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey (EGSS) 2.  Furthermore, if one imposes the same level of ideological consistency on liberals, conservatives, and communitarians/populists that many do on libertarians, these groups too comprise similar shares of the population.

In this post I provide a brief overview of different methods academics have used to identify libertarians and what they found. Most methods start from the premise that libertarians are economically conservative and socially liberal. Despite this, different studies find fairly different results. What accounts for the difference?

1) First, people use different definitions of libertarians

2) Second, they use different questions in their analysis to identify libertarians

3) Third, they use very different statistical methods.

Let’s start with a few questions: How do you define a libertarian? Is there one concrete libertarian position on every policy issue?

What is the “libertarian position” on abortion? Is there one? What is the “libertarian position” on Social Security? Must a libertarian support abolishing the program, or might a libertarian support private accounts, or means testing, or sending it to the states instead? A researcher will find fewer libertarians in the electorate if they demand that libertarians support abolishing Social Security rather than means testing or privatizing it. 

Further, why are libertarians expected to conform to an ideological litmus test but conservatives and liberals are not? For instance, what is the “conservative position” on Social Security? Is there one? When researchers use rigid ideological definitions of liberals and conservatives, they too make up similar shares of the population as libertarians. Thus, as political scientist Jason Weeden has noted, researchers have to make fairly arbitrary decisions about where the cut-off points should be for the “libertarian,” “liberal,” or “conservative” position. This pre-judgement strongly determines how many libertarians researchers will find.

Next, did researchers simply ask people if they identify as libertarian, or did they ask them public policy questions (a better method)? If the latter, how many issue questions did they ask? Then, what questions did they ask?

Five Questions I Will Use to Evaluate the Phantom Senate Health Care Bill

Rumor has it that tomorrow is the day Senate Republican leaders will unveil the health care bill they have been busily assembling behind closed doors. So few details have emerged, President Trump could maybe learn something from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell about how to prevent leaks. Even GOP senators are complaining they haven’t been allowed to see the bill.

Here are five questions I will be asking about the Senate health care bill if and when it sees the light of day.

  1. Would it repeal the parts of ObamaCare—specifically, community rating—that preclude secure access to health care for the sick by causing coverage to become worse for the sick and the Exchanges to collapse?
  2. Would it make health care more affordable, or just throw subsidies at unaffordable care?
  3. Would it actually sunset the Medicaid expansion, or keep the expansion alive long enough for a future Democratic Congress to rescue it?
  4. Tax cuts are almost irrelevant—how much of ObamaCare’s spending would it repeal?
  5. If it leaves major elements of ObamaCare in place, would it lead voters to blame the ongoing failure of those provisions on (supposed) free-market reforms?

Depending on how Senate Republicans—or at least, the select few who get to write major legislation—answer those questions, the bill could be a step in the right direction. Or it could be ObamaCare-lite.

Towards a Private Flood Insurance Market

The federal-government-managed National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is $25 billion in debt, stokes moral hazard, and entails a regressive wealth transfer that favors coastal areas. The NFIP is set to expire at the end of September, offering policymakers an important chance to rethink the program. The House Financial Services Committee is considering the Flood Insurance Market Parity and Modernization Act Wednesday, the current version of the bill takes important steps in moving the U.S. towards a private flood insurance market. Private insurance would improve upon the NFIP by ending transfers from the general taxpayers to the wealthy and the coasts and by limiting moral hazard.

Private insurance functions as a market-driven regulator of risk. Private insurers devise premium payments to accurately reflect risk, forcing economic agents to internalize the risk they choose to assume. For instance auto insurance premiums depend both on a driver’s performance as well as other factors that correlate with risk, such as age or area of the country.

The enactment of the NFIP in 1968 reflected a belief that a centrally planned insurance program could better fulfill the regulatory function of insurance than the private market. Government-managed insurance could, it was held at the time, “limit future flood damages without hampering future economic development” and “prompt an adjustment in land use to reduce individual and public losses from floods,” reported a Housing and Urban Development study integral to the program’s design.

However, the NFIP’s fifty-year record shows why the reasoning behind the creation of the program was misguided. The NFIP is beset by many design flaws, especially in terms of how premiums are priced. About 20% of all NFIP policies are explicitly subsidized and receive a 60-65% discount off the NFIP’s typical rate. These subsidies are in no way a subsidy to poor homeowners but instead relate to the age of a property. They turn out to be wildly regressive.

Even the 80% of the NFIP’s so-called “full risk” properties are not priced accurately. For instance, despite their name the full risk rates do not include a loading charge to cover losses in especially bad years, so even these insurance policies are money-losers in the long run.

Jeff Sessions Misunderstands Drugs and Crime

Attorney General Jeff Sessions writes in Sunday’s Washington Post:

Drug trafficking is an inherently violent business. If you want to collect a drug debt, you can’t, and don’t, file a lawsuit in court. You collect it by the barrel of a gun. 

Sessions correctly understands a major source of crime in the drug distribution business: people with a complaint can’t go to court. But he jumps to the conclusion that “Drug trafficking is an inherently violent business.” This is a classic non sequitur. It’s hard to imagine that he actually doesn’t understand the problem. He is, after all, a law school graduate. How can he not understand the connection between drugs and crime? Prohibitionists talk of “drug-related crime” and suggest that drugs cause people to lose control and commit violence. Sessions gets closer to the truth in the opening of his op-ed. He goes wrong with the word “inherently.” Selling marijuana, cocaine, and heroin is not “inherently” more violent than selling alcohol, tobacco, or potatoes. 

Most “drug-related crime” is actually prohibition-related crime. The drug laws raise the price of drugs and cause addicts to have to commit crimes to pay for a habit that would be easily affordable if it were legal. And more dramatically, as Sessions notes, rival drug dealers murder each other–and innocent bystanders–in order to protect and expand their markets. 

Homicide rates 1910-1944

We saw the same phenomenon during the prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s. Alcohol trafficking is not an inherently violent business. But when you remove legal manufacturers, distributors, and bars from the picture, and people still want alcohol, then the business becomes criminal. As the figure at right (drawn from a Cato study of alcohol prohibition and based on U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975], part 1, p. 414) shows, homicide rates climbed during Prohibition, 1920-33, and fell every year after the repeal of prohibition. 

Tobacco has not (yet) been prohibited in the United States. But as a Cato study of the New York cigarette market showed in 2003, high taxes can have similar effects:

Over the decades, a series of studies by federal, state, and city officials has found that high taxes have created a thriving illegal market for cigarettes in the city. That market has diverted billions of dollars from legitimate businesses and governments to criminals.

Perhaps worse than the diversion of money has been the crime associated with the city’s illegal cigarette market. Smalltime crooks and organized crime have engaged in murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery to earn and protect their illicit profits. Such crime has exposed average citizens, such as truck drivers and retail store clerks, to violence.

Again, to use Sessions’s language, cigarette trafficking is not an inherently violent business. But drive it underground, and you will get criminality and violence. 

Sessions’s premise is wrong. Drug trafficking (meaning, in this case, the trafficking of certain drugs made illegal under our controlled substances laws) is not an inherently violent business. The distribution of illegal substances tends to produce violence. Because Sessions’s premise is wrong, his conclusion–a stepped-up drug war, with more arrests, longer sentences, and more people in jail–is wrong. A better course is outlined in the Cato Handbook for Policymakers.