Here's Wall Street Journal editorial page editor Paul Gigot on NBC's Meet the Press:
I think the danger here is that the public begins to revolt against these kinds of security procedures. And then you risk losing public support, not just for airport screenings, but for the whole war on terror and the whole national security regime post-9/11.
The "danger" Gigot is talking about is that the government might lose control of counterterrorism policy, ceding that control back to a frustrated and increasingly restless American populace. The "War on Terror" theme supports a host of policies---most acutely, these airport searches---that are at best unexplained by the goverrnment and likely not merited by actual security conditions. As I noted in an earlier post, in seven billion domestic passenger trips over the last decade, there have been zero bombings. Yet we are to be searched like prison inmates at the whim of the TSA. That simply doesn't comport with common sense.
(Top government officials and people I know and respect sometimes say things like, "If you knew what I'd learned in secret briefings . . . ." I don't accept these assertions. Just like in a courtroom, facts not put into evidence are not facts in the public debate either. "War on Terror" secrecy policies are a failing pillar of post-9/11 security policy.)
There is not real danger in shifting from today's overreactive, fear-based security regime to one that exploits terrorism's many weaknesses to secure the country cost-effectively, confidently, and consistently with Americans' liberty and prosperity. The Cato book, Terrorizing Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is Failing and How to Fix It, contains the thinking that undergirds a new, better approach.