The launch of HealthCare.gov in 2013 was a disaster. A new report from the Health and Human Services Inspector General (IG) describes how the department mishandled the website’s construction. The department failed to follow federal contracting rules, and did not have a cohesive plan for the website. This led to cost overruns and project delays, and HealthCare.gov’s eventually rocky start.
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) was given primary responsibility within HHS for HealthCare.gov launch. For the report, the IG reviewed 60 CMS contracts for the project. These contracts were awarded to 33 different companies.
One problem with these contracts was not designating a single company as the project lead. According to the IG, CMS “missed the opportunity” to designate a “single point‐of‐contact with responsibility for integrating contractors’ efforts and communicating the common project goal to all 33 companies.” A project of this complexity needs a central command to oversee project development. CMS failed to assign one.
Another problem was that CMS only sought bids from a small group of previously‐used companies. CMS claimed this was to speed along the contracting process, but it left the agency with limited options. For instance, CMS received only four bids for one of the main contracts. Three were determined to be technically insufficient leaving CMS with only one choice, CGI Federal. In other instances, CMS only solicited or received bids from one company.
Additionally, CMS did not consider the previous contractor performance for many bids even though federal contracting rules require it. CMS did not access the main performance management database in the case of CGI Federal, which had had previous missteps with the department.
Compounding the mistakes, CMS selected contract types that put the government, not the contractor, at risk in the case of cost overruns for five of the six main contracts. Taxpayers are paying dearly for CMS’ choice. One contract grew from $58 million to $207 million. The six major contracts for HealthCare.gov grew in costs from $464 million to $824 million.
The IG summarized the findings:
When awarding the Federal Marketplace [HealthCare.gov] contracts, CMS did not meet all requirements and did not leverage all available acquisition planning tools, oversight activities, or contracting approaches to identify and mitigate risks…Because CMS did not leverage all of these tools, it operated without a comprehensive roadmap when awarding the Federal Marketplace contracts.
Construction of HealthCare.gov was a complex technical project. CMS’ mismanagement made the task even more difficult and even more expensive.