According to The Atlantic’s David Frum, Colombia’s outgoing president, Ivan Duque, is a misunderstood statesman. Ungrateful voters, he argues, fail to recognize Duque’s brilliance and thus assign him “an approval rating in the low 20’s.”
Frum cites Colombia’s vaccination policy, a 10-year work permit granted to Venezuelan refugees, and the country’s current economic growth as examples of “a record of policy success unmatched in recent South American history.” Which is why Duque, as Frum learned during the president’s recent visit to Washington, D.C., “is as baffled as anyone else” by his enormous unpopularity, which he blames on social media and “polarization.”
Frum mentions Colombia’s vibrant flower and avocado export sectors. He might have also noticed the expert cherry-picking in Duque’s narrative.
Take the case of his pandemic policy. Yes, the vaccine rollout was successful, but it came after some of the longest, most draconian and destructive lockdowns in the world. These had elements that are constitutionally unfathomable in the United States, such as the requirement of official permission to travel across municipal boundaries. Inevitably, Duque’s lockdowns caused much greater economic harm than necessary, with over half a million small businesses destroyed in 2020 and a 6.8 percent drop in GDP, a slightly higher figure than the World Bank’s average for Latin America.
The lethal mix of Covid-19 and the government’s dismal, authoritarian response boosted unemployment, which reached a whopping 15.9 percent in 2020 (up from 10.5 percent the previous year), while informal laborers made up 49 percent of the work force. Duque could have tackled these problems by relaxing Colombia’s notoriously rigid and onerous labor laws. He did not. Instead, he decreed an outrageous 10 percent increase in the minimum wage for 2022, thus contributing to persistent, two-digit unemployment levels— making Venezuelans’ work permits largely obsolete— and to a new wave of inflation. In 2021, he added to inflationary pressures by increasing tariffs on textile imports, thus benefitting his cronies at the expense of Colombia’s poorest consumers.
Duque’s government likely would respond that inflation is a global phenomenon. But so too is the commodities boom, which is why Duque can hardly take credit for today’s growth, buoyed as it is by oil, Colombia’s main legal export, as well as the coal and coffee sectors.
During his 2018 campaign, Duque promised to cut taxes and wasteful spending. But far from trimming the bureaucratic monster he inherited, he enlarged it by creating two new, unnecessary ministries: Science and Sports. He also kept a wealth tax that was set to expire and had to backtrack on proposed VAT hikes on food items, with a convoluted devolution scheme for poor citizens. His tax rises gave the far left a perfect excuse to launch the violent national strike that paralyzed the country between May and June of 2021. Duque’s weak response and inability to uphold the rule of law helped to unleash nation-wide chaos.
Can Duque blame his misfortunes on the pandemic? Not if you consider how he squandered the first year and a half of his presidency. Upon taking office, he did nothing to reduce the fiscal deficit or debt levels, which had already surpassed the dangerous threshold of 40 percent of GDP. Once gross general government debt approached 60 percent of GDP in 2021, Fitch downgraded Colombia’s credit ratings to junk. While debt soared, the Colombian peso plummeted, losing over a third of its value against the dollar since Duque took office. Other emerging markets have fared similarly, but Duque failed to take any measures to protect Colombians’ purchasing power from devaluation, such as allowing dollar-denominated bank accounts.
In 2018, Duque succumbed to aggressive student protests and increased the education budget, which was already the largest government sector despite paltry results. Similarly, he set up a “basic income” scheme and, to this day, prides himself on the amount of welfare handouts he has distributed. Elected on a fiscally conservative platform, he governed as a tax-and-spend social democrat, thus isolating his voter base even before the pandemic began. From the outset, he sought to please the leftist commentariat, which despised him all the more for his ideological towel-throwing.
Beyond Duque’s few positive measures—some VAT tax holidays and an FTA with Israel— his only redeeming achievement was his defeat of Gustavo Petro, a 21st Century Socialist, in the 2018 election. But as Petro prepares for his inauguration on August 7— in no small part due to Duque’s deserved disapproval among voters— even that victory has lost most of its significance.