Eland provides a short treatment of the issues with a stress on the politics. This produces a good guide for the casual observers but does not pretend to be an introduction to the massive literature that oil developments have generated. Since so many subjects are covered, each is only sketched. Even so, the reader will grasp the massive folly that has governed oil policy through 2012.

History | In 82 pages, the book treats the history of oil from the rise of the industry to the situation in 2011. The coverage is necessarily selective, but the treatment gets fuller with more recent history. Thus, roughly equal space is devoted to developments up to the 1973 price spike, events from the spike through the 1980s, and events from the first Gulf War to today. A survey of conditions in 2011 concludes the section.

The basic argument that emerges is that politicians in the United States and elsewhere incorrectly believe that political influence over oil-producing countries is critical to maintaining oil supplies. This belief is demonstrated by noting the many interventions in oil-producing countries and in other aspects of oil. It is clearly true that these interventions arose and that the belief prevails among politicians that political action in oil is essential. Eland nicely points out the inconsistencies in those rationales. He observes the transformation of views from U.S. belief that imports should be encouraged to the stress since 1973 on energy independence. He notes that the rise of imports quickly led to import-restriction policies. He also contrasts then–secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s effort to promote U.S. imports of Soviet crude oil to the Reagan administration’s efforts to discourage Western European energy trade with the Soviet Union.

Among the most interesting material is Eland’s treatment of the pre–World War II embargo on oil trade with Japan that is often considered the cause of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He believes that Japan could have evaded the embargo, avoiding what would prove to be a costly confrontation with the United States. He throws in the observation that wartime Japan was so strangled by blockades that American use of the atomic bomb was unnecessary.

Overall, Eland is more certain than I that the links between policymakers’ belief in the importance of secure oil supplies and various military actions were always clear and direct. In particular, his denunciation of the ill-advised second Iraq war is longer than necessary. He is too sure oil protection was the war’s true motivation. An alternative possibility is that the Bush administration became too devoted to using U.S. power against many perceived threats.

Myths | Eland’s selection of oil myths to explode is nearly perfect, and his exposition generally suffices. My sole substantial complaint is about the at-best superficial treatment of the pressures to eliminate fossil-fuel use in order to reduce global warming. Some supporters of global-warming controls such as John Holdren blithely ignore rampant current warnings of peak oil and assert that the need to eliminate fossil fuel consumption makes obsolete concerns over oil depletion.

Eland’s first myth is awkwardly stated as “no viable market exists for oil.” His explanation of the problem is vastly preferable to that myth. He simply argues that the imperfections of the market do not justify ignoring market prices and engaging in the mindless interventions excused by reference to market imperfections, real and imaginary. He actually concentrates on refuting the central folly that it is dangerous to rely on OPEC oil.

The next myth refuted is that private oil companies are a major part of the price-rigging process. Eland then debunks the notion of peak oil. Next he attacks first the concept that oil is strategic and then that the U.S. strategic oil reserve helps stabilize the market. He turns to why energy independence is a costly response to a nonexistent problem. A terse dismissal of macroeconomic impacts follows. Eland next observes that the United States resists encouraging the lowest possible oil price. Then the political and economic power of oil ownership is denied. The final myths are that the Saud family must be protected and that European trade with Russia is undesirable. The former may neglect the growing tendency to use the autocracy of the Saudis as an excuse to reduce oil imports.

The final part of the book starts with a largely solid discussion of the basic case against political and military intervention. This is followed by listing and demolishing a familiar litany of rationalizations for intervention. The book concludes with a good summary of why reliance on the market is preferable.

Conclusion | The book is very much a political treatment of oil. As such, the economics of oil are much less well developed than desirable. Eland relies very heavily on books by generalists, of which Daniel Yergin’s The Prize unfortunately is the best. The citations to the supporting economic literature are fragmented. Even so, those interested in a good overview and specialists wanting another view of the policy debate over oil will find this book valuable.