Overlooked in this analysis, however, is the role of the Gramm‐Rudman‐Hollings Deficit Reduction Act. Most importantly, sequestration — the law’s procedure for automatically restraining spending growth if the projected deficit exceeds the target by more than $10 billion — is a powerful tool for the executive branch. Unless Congress can muster a two‐thirds vote to pass a tax increase over a presidential veto, George Bush can use a sequester to reduce the deficit without higher taxes. Congress could repeal or modify Gramm‐Rudman, but such a step would also require legislation that the president could veto. Since it is very unlikely that Congress would be able to override either veto, policymakers would have little choice but to accept the sequester or enact a budget acceptable to the White House.
Few budget experts believe sequestration is the optimal outcome of the year’s budget debate. However, as Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan stated in testimony to the Senate Budget Committee, “it is certainly desirable, 1) to a tax increase, and 2) to especially doing nothing.“1 Unlike budget agreements that rely on one‐timesavings and promises to behave more responsibly in the future, sequestration imposes real reductions in the growth rateof federal spending. Furthermore, the Bush administration could improve its chances to avoid higher taxes next year by choosing a sequester this year because sequestration would significantly lower the spending baseline Congress will use when preparing the 1991 budget.
Although many observers thought George Bush would be a weak president, he has the power to control the outcome ofthe budget debate. So long as the White House is prepared to accept a sequester rather than renege on the commitment never to raise taxes, the president’s opponents in Congress are almost powerless to stop him. A sequester strategy would be attacked, but, as will be explained, the benefits of a sequester, especially when compared with the costs of higher taxes, far outweigh the imagined liabilities.