The Supreme Court’s “Rooker-Feldman Doctrine” bars all federal courts below the Supreme Court from exercising appellate review over state court judgments. Although the Supreme Court emphasized the doctrine’s narrowness in Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic (2005), lower courts have steadily expanded the doctrine’s scope over the past 20 years. Today, federal courts often use Rooker-Feldman to dismiss serious civil rights claims against state officials, even when lawsuits do not seek to revise state court judgments.

Michelle Gilbank alleges that state officials swore false statements to obtain custody over her daughter. As a result, Gilbank’s daughter was removed from her custody for almost two years and allegedly severely abused by her appointed guardian. When her daughter was finally returned to her custody, Gilbank filed a federal lawsuit seeking compensation from the state officials who lied to unconstitutionally seize her child. Her lawsuit did not seek to overturn the state court’s custody ruling, which had already expired. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed her case under Rooker-Feldman. A divided Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

Gilbank is now petitioning the Supreme Court to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision, arguing that it erroneously applied Rooker-Feldman to a case that does not directly challenge a state court judgment. And Cato has filed an amicus brief in support of Gilbank’s petition (with thanks to Caleb Gerbitz of Meissner Tierney for drafting the brief).

Our brief raises two points. First, we highlight other cases where lower courts have extended Rooker-Feldman beyond its limits. In child custody cases, state officials have relied on child custody orders obtained through fraud to shield themselves from damages liability. However, a damages award against a state officer cannot possibly reverse or reject a temporary state court custody judgment.

In foreclosure actions, federal courts have refused to entertain lawsuits seeking damages for illegal conduct during the foreclosure process. These courts have found that challenges to illegal conduct surrounding a foreclosure are “inextricably intertwined” with state-court foreclosure judgments, even though money damages cannot undo a judicial foreclosure. But Rooker-Feldman makes no mention of an “inextricably intertwined” test, and the Supreme Court rejected that approach to jurisdiction in Saudi Basic.

Finally, some courts have wrongly applied Rooker-Feldman to bar claims brought by individuals who were not even parties to the state court cases. Allowing ex parte or in rem state court judgments to forever decide the constitutional rights of individuals undermines the civil rights protections crafted by Congress and the Constitution. It also directly conflicts with Rooker-Feldman’s narrow role as a doctrine precluding appellate review.

Second, our brief empirically analyzes citations to Rooker-Feldman following the Supreme Court’s decision in Saudi Basic, which attempted to limit the doctrine to cases seeking “review or rejection” of state court judgments. Despite the Supreme Court’s clear directions to limit Rooker-Feldman dismissals, we found that citations to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine have increased by at least 75 percent since Saudi Basic was decided. Another academic study found a nearly 900 percent increase in district court citations to Rooker-Feldman, when comparing district court decisions five years before Saudi Basic to district court decisions five years after.

These empirical figures are confirmed by a growing chorus of judicial criticism, including by five dissenting judges on the Seventh Circuit in Gilbank’s own case. Absent prompt intervention, Rooker-Feldman will continue to expand, barring an increasing number of meritorious civil rights claims in federal court.

Gilbank’s case presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to halt the improper expansion of Rooker-Feldman and reaffirm its narrow scope. The Court should grant the petition and restore access to federal remedies for civil rights plaintiffs.