A barge carrying almost 200 containers from Florida to Puerto Rico ran aground recently in the Bahamas after the tow line connecting it to its tugboat failed amid windy conditions. The aftermath resembled a chaotic scene from a disaster zone, rather than a well-managed link in a modern supply chain. Looters descended on the stranded vessel, pried open all but 11 containers, and helped themselves to the contents. Many of the San Juan-bound goods were stolen, and others were simply dumped into the sea.

Just days later, another U.S. barge carrying scores of containers (and at least two automobiles) from Alaska to Seattle began taking on water near British Columbia due to a hole in the vessel. Fortunately, quick work stabilized the vessel and averted another cargo casualty.

Accidents do happen. But these incidents expose a deeper and preventable weakness: vital U.S. supply chains have become overly dependent on slow, weather-sensitive barges rather than modern self-propelled ships. That’s not the result of market forces, but an outdated law called the Jones Act.

The Jones Act, passed in 1920, requires ships moving goods between U.S. ports to be U.S.-registered and—most burdensome—built in American shipyards. Insulated from overseas competition, saddled with outdated technology and woefully inefficient, these yards suffer from low volumes and prices that are approximately five times higher than those of shipyards in Japan and South Korea. Combined with ship operating costs that are more than four times those of their internationally flagged counterparts, the result often makes the use of ships in domestic commerce cost-prohibitive.

That math pushes shippers toward barges and away from proper oceangoing vessels. A deck barge capable of carrying 620 20-foot containers within Hawaii was built in 2022 for $25 million. Larger barges servicing the Puerto Rico trade cost between $30 million and $100 million. Even adding a tugboat—conservatively another $20 million—still leaves the total price far below that of a U.S.-built containership. The last one constructed in the United States, capable of carrying more than 2,500 containers, cost over $225 million.

Given such skewed economics, it is no surprise that the share of domestic waterborne cargo moved by barges has soared over the decades. Within the confines of the Jones Act, barges appear to be a bargain, but only because the law makes modern ships prohibitively expensive. On the world market, for nearly the same cost as a U.S.-built deck barge, an operator could instead buy a far more capable containership with nearly double the capacity.

Barges have legitimate purposes. They work well for slow-moving bulk commodities and calm inland waterways. But they are not ideal for long-haul ocean supply chains. They are slower, less maneuverable and more vulnerable to rough weather than purpose-built ships. Choosing barges for essential routes such as Alaska–Seattle or Jacksonville–San Juan does not reflect market preferences but the Jones Act’s distortions.

Experts have long acknowledged this. Testifying before Congress in 1968, the president of the Alaska Steamship Company—which operated barges—described the service as “slow and unreliable” and “not the most effective way to serve the people of Alaska.” More than half a century later, the Congressional Research Service echoed the same warning, noting that substituting barges for ships means moving cargo “in smaller, slower, and less reliable conveyances,” even as trucks, trains and pipelines have become faster and more efficient.

Notably, the situation is different in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Thanks to a longstanding Jones Act exemption, carriers serving the territory from the U.S. mainland can use modern vessels purchased at global prices. The result: such service is provided entirely by self-propelled ships. Shipping firm Crowley Maritime, which relies on a mix of ships and barges in the Puerto Rico trade, uses only ships for St. Thomas and St. Croix.

The benefits are obvious. Ships typically make the Jacksonville–San Juan passage in about three days; barges require five. And that assumes no adverse weather conditions that could lead to delays and diversions.

The recent barge mishaps are symptoms of a supply-chain strategy warped by a century-old law that makes the most efficient vessels unaffordable. When American companies are forced to rely on equipment that is slower, smaller and less seaworthy because federal policy artificially inflates ship prices, the resulting delays, losses and failures should come as no surprise.

America’s supply chains are too important to be left tethered—literally and figuratively—to outdated maritime policy. The lesson from Puerto Rico and the Pacific Northwest is clear: The Jones Act is not protecting U.S. commerce. It is putting it at risk.