The war in Ukraine is stuck, and has been stuck for years. Despite the media frenzy over the upcoming U.S.-Russia summit in Alaska, there is little reason to expect a breakthrough, barring a dramatic change in the U.S., Russian or Ukrainian positions.

When President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet on Friday, Aug. 15, observers should keep expectations low. Any progress would be welcome.

Since February 2022, the conflict has been a slow, grinding war of attrition in which Russia has gradually seized more and more Ukrainian territory. Russia’s military progress dampened its incentives to escalate the conflict, an early source of U.S. concern.

For example, in the fall of 2022, the high-water mark for Ukraine on the battlefield, U.S. intelligence estimated that there was a 50% chance Russia would reach for nuclear weapons if its forces in southern Ukraine were facing collapse. Were Russia losing today, the risks for Americans would be higher.

Putin’s Will vs. Trump’s Way
While Russia’s progress has limited the risk of escalation, it has also increased Moscow’s willingness to continue fighting. Since beginning his second term, Trump has tried to find a way to end the war, but the Kremlin has not shown much willingness to moderate its demands.

Putin has insisted on Ukraine renouncing aspirations to join NATO or allow NATO forces on its territory; conceding Russian sovereignty over the four provinces it annexed in 2022; the demilitarization of Ukraine; and the “denazification” of the country, by which it means dramatic reforms to how it governs itself domestically.

Putin has also rejected a temporary ceasefire that doesn’t engage on these issues.

The debate over the what to do next often obscures more than it reveals. One hears reference to Ukrainian victory or Russian defeat without defining what those terms mean or what their implications would be.

Does Ukrainian victory or Russian defeat mean Kyiv regaining all territory inside its internationally recognized borders? That isn’t going to happen.

Could Ukraine losing territory but keeping its sovereignty and military ‒ without NATO membership ‒ be portrayed as success? Many security scholars believe that such armed neutrality is the best that can be achieved for Ukraine.

Don’t Forget Zelenskyy’s Intransigence
This is where Ukraine’s intransigence comes in. Even though Ukrainian public support for continuing the war has cratered, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is using the Ukrainian Constitution as a firewall against concessions.

As amended in 2019, it both prohibits the Ukrainian government from ceding any territory and somewhat clumsily commits it to pursue membership in NATO. In rejecting Trump’s suggestion that there be land swaps as part of a settlement, Zelenskyy pointed at the constitution’s provision against giving up territory, arguing that “no one will step back from this, nor will anyone be able to.”

The Ukrainian president’s willingness and ability to end the war probably has less to do with high-minded constitutional principles and more to do with his own political survival. At this point, the war has produced total destruction in Ukraine, the evisceration of its territory, and all the ruinous human and economic costs of the war ‒ but without any U.S. security guarantees. Zelenskyy knows this would be a disastrous legacy, so he has a powerful incentive to obtain something he can portray as a benefit of the war.

The question is whether Kyiv’s position on the battlefield can sustain Zelenskyy’s intransigence on the political issues, with or without more U.S. support. There are worrying signs that it cannot. Ukraine faces an array of manpower issues along the 600-mile front. Key towns seem to be in jeopardy. Time is not on Ukraine’s side.

As always, the Europeans are doing everything in their power to keep the United States at the center of the war in Ukraine ‒ and as the central provider of regional security. They called a virtual meeting with Zelenskyy and Trump two days before the Putin summit, and proposed a plan for Ukraine that would involve potential NATO membership in exchange for Kyiv conceding that it lost territory.

After the meeting on Aug. 13, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Council President António Costa indicated Trump committed that the United States would participate in security guarantees for Ukraine.

However, Trump has previously resisted European pleas for U.S. security guarantees to Ukraine, and make no mistake: That is just what NATO membership would be. With two consecutive U.S. administrations revealing that Washington does not perceive an interest in Ukraine worth fighting Russia over, such a commitment would be inherently incredible.

In the coming days, avoiding any traps laid by the Europeans, the Ukrainians or congressional hawks is essential. From a U.S. perspective, patience and low expectations are the right course for talks with Russia.

Above all, Trump must avoid backing into a reboot of the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy, which involved an endless flow of weapons and hoping for a miracle.

America’s resources for and interests in the war in Ukraine are limited. Trump’s policy should reflect that.