Two articles in today’s Wall Street Journal deal with the housing sector. They complement each other. Journal reporters note that “Industry Speeds Recovery, And Housing Slows It Down.” The story notes that that “ground-breaking for new homes and applications for building permits both plunged last month.” Meanwhile, U.S. industrial output showed strong growth in May.

Bravo for both numbers, which are inter-related. The headline (over which reporters have no control) reflects conceptual confusion. U.S. industrial production is strong at least in part because construction of new homes is weak. The bloated home sector is no longer absorbing a disproportionate share of economic resources. The new homeowners tax credit has mercifully expired, ending that bit of misguided stimulus.

David Wessel’s article, “Rethinking Home Ownership,” further clarifies the reallocation of resources taking place in the U.S. economy. Beginning in the 1990s, the federal government adopted a number of policies to stimulate home ownership. As Wessel makes clear, it was a bipartisan effort. Home ownership rates rose from around 65% to a peak of 69.4% in 2004. It was an unsustainable policy, a true asset bubble.

Home ownership rates have now fallen back to where they began, or even below. The experience of the 1990s and early 2000s in housing demonstrates why government stimulus is not a permanent source of demand, nor the path to sustainable economic growth. Lest we forget, the folly of these programs is measured not just in housing numbers, but in shattered dreams and hopes and ruined lives. And the terrible financial crisis to which these programs contributed