Arguably the most sacred text in U.S. trade policy scripture is the antidumping law. Over the years, congressional support for a tough antidumping regime has been broad, bipartisan, and nearly absolute. Any member tempted to challenge the sanctity of the antidumping status quo and question whether it wasn’t too rigid, too unfair, too offensive, or too anachronistic would be advised to veil his weakness lest he be emblazoned with a scarlet “H” (for heretic).
That is why a recent letter from ranking Republicans on Ways and Means and its trade subcommittee (Jim McCrery of Louisiana and Wally Herger of California, respectively) to USTR Susan Schwab is more than first meets the eye. It may constitute a welcome schism in the Church of the Holy Trade Remedy Law.
While the letter is generally about the Doha Round, offering the congressmen’s opinions about the vital components of a final Doha agreement (should one ever come to fruition), it breaks new ground in the way it links the U.S. negotiating positions on agriculture, NAMA (non‐agricultural market access – or industrial tariff liberalization), services liberalization, and rules (the most prominent topic of which is antidumping). For the first time in public—to my recollection, at least—members of the congressional committee with oversight of trade policy acknowledge that the (strident, unrelenting, congressionally‐mandated) U.S. position on antidumping might be too costly.
Since July 2004, U.S. exporters have faced more AD cases abroad than U.S. domestic industries have brought against imports here, so any final result on [the] [R]ules [negotiations] must address the needs of our companies injured by dumping or subsidization but cannot hamstring our vulnerable exporters. A balanced rules outcome would ensure that the United States is not required to sacrifice ambitious market access provisions in agriculture, NAMA, and services.
By “balanced rules outcome,” the congressmen mean one that takes into account the interests of U.S. exporters that are subject or could be subject to foreign antidumping actions, as well as U.S. import‐users (55% of U.S. imports in 2006 were “intermediate goods” — inputs used by U.S. manufacturers in their own production processes), who are hurt by antidumping restrictions. And, also, by “balanced rules outcome,” they mean that the cost of a defensive agenda with respect to antidumping reform is necessarily limiting progress on the offensive agenda of opening foreign markets to U.S. exporters.
This is a linkage we have been making for quite some time. It is a positive sign that members of Congress are connecting the same dots. Perhaps this thesis should be nailed to a wall in the Capitol Building.