Our Enemies or Our Allies?

The New York Times reports that congressional investigators have found mounting evidence that “American taxpayers have inadvertently created a network of warlords across Afghanistan who are making millions of dollars escorting NATO convoys and operating outside the control of either the Afghan government or the American and NATO militaries.”


The Financial Times broke this story back in March. But their most startling discovery was that after nearly a decade at war in Afghanistan, Washington still has no clue as to who its true enemies (and allies) are.


Many Americans would be surprised to learn that some prominent Afghan officials are in fact saboteurs of America’s presumptuous and dangerously quixotic nation‐​building endeavor, instituting policies that feed the insurgency’s momentum in order to get more economic assistance from the coalition. America’s Ambassador to Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, said as much last November. Eikenberry warned (of course, to no avail), that Afghan President Hamid Karzai, “continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden…He and much of his circle do not want the U.S. to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further.” [Emphasis added]


Karzai knows very well that once the conflict ends, his open aid spigot will dry up. Indeed, Karzai has become notorious for replacing and undercutting people in his government who become too well‐​liked and “clean,” fearing these officials will become more popular than himself. Such double‐​gaming leads us to Karzai’s younger half brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai.


He consolidates his power base by acting as the powerful chairman of Kandahar’s provincial council, as well as relying on a mafia‐​like network of militias, many of whom demand bribes from security companies that benefit from U.S. contracts. The rise of these militia fiefdoms have profited handsomely with foreign taxpayer dollars. “You have about 30 oligarchs who have built little empires with ISAF money,” Carl Forsberg, a researcher at the Institute for the Study of War, told the Financial Times. “We are ultimately creating a shadow government.”


Lamenting America’s strategic paradox, Congressman John F. Tierney (D‑MA), chair of the U.S. House National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee said recently: “In this case, the U.S. appears to be inadvertently fueling the very warlordism and corruption that we are pressing President Karzai to curtail.”


U.S. officials say perceptions that power in Kandahar is concentrated in the hands of the Karzai family’s ethnic Pashtun Popalzai tribe fuel support for the insurgency. According to a Pentagon assessment released April 28, Afghan public perceptions of Karzai’s anti‐​corruption efforts are “decidedly negative” and extend to international forces and the international community. U.S. defense officials also find that the “exploitative behavior” of some Afghan officials contributes to the insurgency’s success.


For far too long, U.S. officials and analysts have concentrated their focus on Pakistan. As regional expert Steve Coll notes, “If you think about it, the United States is essentially waging a proxy war against its own ally. The Taliban are a proxy of the government of Pakistan. We are an ally of the government of Pakistan. We are fighting the Taliban.”


But government officials in Kabul also fit into this equation; unfortunately, this is a government that Washington still endeavors to support.