Yesterday the New York Times published an op-ed by Morris Kleiner making the case for occupational licensing reform. In it, Kleiner argues that there is a bipartisan case for reform, and that the real losers of occupational licensing are consumers. Kleiner notes that occupational licensing has noble aims, to protect the health and safety of the public from those who seek to defraud them. But the actual result provides more protection from competition for those in the professions rather than protection for consumers from low-quality providers.
Thirty percent of the work force requires some kind of occupational license today compared with ten percent in the 1970s. This raises costs to consumers, especially those with low incomes who do not wish to pay for the minimum level of “quality” that licensing boards claim to provide.
Kleiner proposes to replace licensing boards with optional certification programs. All individuals could legally practice in a particular profession, but individuals could choose to undergo certification to signal the quality of their training and service provision. Cheaper, uncertified professionals could provide services to those who are more price sensitive.
Kleiner has spent his career studying the decline of labor unions and the rise of occupational licensure as the U.S. economy has shifted from manufacturing to services. In 2006 Regulation published A License for Protection in which Kleiner describes this shift. I’ve also covered his work on dental hygienist regulation here, and the upcoming Summer issue of Regulation will look at his work on nurse practitioner regulation.