The New Missile‐Defense Policy Won’t Make Us Safer
The following is an excerpt from an op-ed I wrote assessing the Trump administration's 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) and the impact that the document's recommendations may have on nuclear stability:
The MDR is a very ambitious document. It starts with calls for more midcourse interceptors and other existing defensive systems, then urges the development of new capabilities to defeat more kinds of adversary missiles across more stages of flight. Examples of these new systems include: laser-armed drones that could disrupt missiles before they leave the atmosphere, space-based sensors to improve early detection of missile launches, and F-35s equipped to hunt mobile missiles before they can be fired.
Supporters of a bigger and better U.S. missile defense capability argue that it improves deterrence by reducing adversaries’ confidence in their ability to launch successful attacks against the United States, its military forces, and allies. This argument has some merit, but it overlooks the negative effect missile defense has on nuclear stability when other factors are considered.
To read the rest of the article, visit Defense One: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/01/new-missile-defense-policy-wont-maker-us-safer/154295/?oref=d-river.
