Fed Toys with Ratcheting Up the Credit Crunch

When the Basel I accords, mandating higher capital‐​asset ratios for banks, were introduced in 1988, they were embraced by the administration of President George H.W. Bush. With higher capital‐​asset ratios came a sharp slowdown in the money supply growth rate and — unfortunately for President George H. W. Bush and his re‐​election campaign — a mild recession from July 1990 through March 1991.


Now, we have Basel III and its higher capital‐​asset ratio requirements being imposed on banks in the middle of a weak, drawn‐​out economic recovery. This is one of the major reasons why the recovery is so anemic.


How could this be? Well, banks produce bank money, which accounts for roughly 85% of the total U.S. money supply (M4). Mandated increases in bank capital requirements result in contractions in bank money, and thus in the total money supply.


Here’s how it works:


While the higher capital‐​asset ratios that are required by Basel III are intended to strengthen banks (and economies), these higher capital requirements destroy money. Under the Basel III regime, banks will have to increase their capital‐​asset ratios. They can do this by either boosting capital or shrinking assets. If banks shrink their assets, their deposit liabilities will decline. In consequence, money balances will be destroyed.


So, paradoxically, the drive to deleverage banks and shrink their balance sheets, in the name of making banks safer, destroys money balances. This, in turn, dents company liquidity and asset prices. It also reduces spending relative to where it would have been without higher capital‐​asset ratios.


The other way to increase a bank’s capital‐​asset ratio is by raising new capital. This, too, destroys money. When an investor purchases newly‐​issued bank equity, the investor exchanges funds from a bank account for new shares. This reduces deposit liabilities in the banking system and wipes out money.


We now learn that the Fed, using the cover of the Dodd‐​Frank legislation, is toying with the idea of forcing foreign banks that operate in the United States to hold billions of dollars of additional capital (read: increase their capital‐​asset ratios).


This will make the credit crunch “crunchier” and throw the U.S. economy into an even more vulnerable position. The last thing the Fed should be doing is squeezing the banks and tightening the screws on the production of bank money.