Over the past two centuries, the movement for women’s rights and gender equality in the United States has achieved remarkable milestones: Property and economic rights were granted to married women in the 1800s, women gained the right to vote in 1920, and sweeping civil rights reforms were implemented in the second half of the 20th century. Given these developments, progress has appeared to be steady. Yet, this process has not been a story of ever-expanding rights. We can gain insight into the complex political and economic forces that have shaped women’s labor rights by examining a striking historical reversal in the United States: the rise and fall of gender-specific, so-called protective labor laws between the late 19th and mid-20th centuries.

These protective labor laws, enacted by almost all states, imposed work restrictions on women that did not apply to men. They included maximum working hours, bans on night work, seating requirements, weight-lifting limits, and minimum wage provisions. These were presented as measures to protect women’s health and well-being, but in practice, they often curtailed women’s access to employment and economic independence. Most remained in place until the civil rights era, when anti-discrimination legislation rendered gender-specific laws unconstitutional.

Why did these restrictive measures, which were seemingly at odds with the broader trend of expanding women’s rights, receive widespread political support for decades? Our research suggests that the answer primarily lies not in social norms or gendered values but in economic incentives and shifting labor market dynamics. Particularly, these laws found support among specific segments of the population that benefited from reduced competition in the workforce.

As the US economy transitioned from agriculture to industrial production, men and women increasingly began competing for the same jobs, especially lower-skilled occupations. This overlap intensified concerns among people whose income was directly affected by competition from female workers. Protective labor legislation limited women’s employment, thereby increasing the income of households that depended primarily on male earnings.

Our research shows that a crucial force behind the rise and fall of protective labor legislation was these changing concerns about labor market competition from women. To formalize this argument, we developed a model in which women and men (single or married) can participate in the labor market and vote on protective labor legislation. In this model, two household types are key: single lower-skilled men and married couples consisting of a lower-skilled husband and a stay-at-home wife. For these groups, household income depends entirely on the male earner, who benefits from the exclusion of women from competing jobs.

Conversely, households where women contribute to family income—single working women or dual-earner couples—and households with higher-skilled men are more likely to oppose protective labor laws. Higher-skilled men benefit when women enter the workforce because women often perform roles that support and enhance the productivity of higher-skilled jobs. For these households, restricting women’s employment opportunities reduces household earnings. It follows that opposition is not strictly gendered—both men and women oppose these laws if they harm the economic interests of the household. Hence, our model implies that support for protective legislation is largely determined by the distribution of household types within the economy.

A detailed analysis of US census data confirms that the two household types favoring restrictions did constitute the majority of the voting population when protective labor laws were introduced. In contrast, when these laws were dismantled, the share of the population opposing them had regained the majority. Further analysis shows that states were more likely to pass restrictive labor laws when a larger share of their voting population consisted of households that would economically benefit from limiting women’s employment.

Additionally, we examined the role of states adopting equal rights amendments or voting to ratify the federal equal rights amendment. These amendments explicitly prohibited legal distinctions based on gender and effectively nullified protective labor laws. Our analysis shows that states were more likely to support equal rights amendments when the proportion of households that stood to benefit from eliminating gender-based labor restrictions was larger. In other words, as the composition of the electorate changed, political support for protective labor laws disappeared.

We also assessed the extent to which other factors may have shaped support for or opposition to protective labor laws for women. Our research does not find support for the claim that states where women gained the right to vote earlier were more likely to introduce protective legislation. This finding confirms that the primary reason protective labor laws were passed was not because women pushed for their own protection. Similarly, we found little support for the idea that organized labor played a decisive role in promoting these laws.

The history of protective labor legislation offers broader lessons about the relationship between economic incentives and political support for legal gender equality. For much of the 20th century, progress toward gender equality advanced when high marriage rates aligned the economic interests of men and women, especially in households that depended on dual incomes. Today, declining marriage rates combined with sustained high levels of women’s labor force participation may complicate this dynamic. Recent surveys have documented a significant decline in support for gender equality among young men in high-income countries, particularly among less-educated men. Our research suggests that a renewed divergence in the economic interests of men and women may partly explain this trend.

Note:
This research brief is based on Matthias Doepke et al., “Protection for Whom? The Political Economy of Protective Labor Laws for Women,” IZA—Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper no. 17857, April 2025.