Drug Trafficking and the Homicide Epidemic in the Caribbean Basin

The Caribbean region has experienced extraordinarily high homicide rates, despite vast differences between countries in commonly cited causes of violence, such as per capita income and political institutions. As a result, the true causes of violence remain poorly understood, and evidence does not support popular explanations such as inequality or a culture of violence. Most studies supporting these conclusions either fail to account for changes in these factors over time or focus solely on the recent past. But violence in the Caribbean basin has changed dramatically in recent decades in both absolute and relative terms. In the early 20th century, homicide rates in the Caribbean basin were lower than in the United States and much lower than in the American South, standing at only 25 percent of current rates. Since the 1970s, most countries in the Caribbean basin have experienced explosive episodes of violence, which cannot be explained by slow-moving factors or deep-seated cultural issues.

My research explores an alternative explanation for the Caribbean’s homicide epidemic: drug trafficking. In illegal markets, violence is a common method for resolving disputes, and police statistics from the region usually indicate that drug trafficking is the primary cause of violence. For instance, one study suggests that 75 percent of violence in Puerto Rico is related to drug trafficking. However, because the drug trade is illegal and difficult to track, proving that it is the main cause of violence in the Caribbean region is challenging. Additionally, both drug markets and violence could be driven by another factor, such as poverty.

My research circumvents the need for drug data by examining a sudden shift in drug trafficking within the region: the 1973 Chilean coup. This event abruptly redirected cocaine trafficking from Chile to Colombia and transformed many Caribbean locations into key points along shipping routes between South and North America. My research uses US vital statistics data from 1953 to 1983 to compare homicides in Puerto Rico with those in a weighted combination of the bottom half of US states ranked by median household income. Most of these states are in the American South and are not major points along drug trafficking routes. Florida is excluded due to Miami’s outsized role in the drug trade.

Puerto Rico serves as a valuable case study because of its comprehensive homicide data, which are more complete than any other Caribbean territory. Additionally, shortly after the Chilean coup, it became a key gateway to the United States for narcotics originating from Colombia. Furthermore, since becoming a territory, Puerto Rico’s culture has converged with that of the United States, and both share many factors affecting violence, such as economic conditions and federal gun laws. These characteristics make Puerto Rico suitable for comparison with US states.

My findings reveal that the onset of large-scale drug trafficking increased homicides in Puerto Rico by 5 per 100,000 inhabitants—about a 50 percent increase—in the decade following the coup relative to the states used for comparison. The initial escalation of violence was concentrated near the capital, San Juan, coinciding with the surge in drug trafficking through the city’s port. The localized nature of this rise in violence casts doubt on claims that its cause was general economic or cultural changes. In fact, the surge in violence does not strongly correlate with changes in unemployment, economic growth, poverty, or inequality. Notably, poverty and inequality had been declining for decades before and during this escalation in violence.

Additional evidence suggests that my findings for Puerto Rico can generalize to the rest of the Caribbean. Violence increased in the 1970s in the US Virgin Islands, Jamaica, and The Bahamas around the same time as it did in Puerto Rico. These locations were also key points along drug shipping routes. Furthermore, drug cartels expanded into the eastern Caribbean in the 1990s to traffic drugs to Europe, which aligns with homicide trends in Trinidad and Tobago, the most populous country in the region. In the 1980s and 1990s, its homicide rate was typically below 10 per 100,000—similar to that of the US—but by the 2000s, as cocaine seizures skyrocketed, the rate had more than quadrupled, usually exceeding 30 per 100,000. Taken together, these findings suggest that drug trafficking is a primary driver of the homicide epidemic in the Caribbean basin.

Unfortunately, it remains unclear what policies could effectively address this issue. Some evidence suggests that drug legalization can lower homicide rates, as seen in Mexico following the legalization of marijuana in parts of the United States. However, there is little global political will to legalize cocaine, heroin, or other hard drugs. Additionally, efforts to crack down on trafficking in one area often merely shift trade routes elsewhere. Moreover, once drug gangs become entrenched in an area, disrupting drug markets can paradoxically increase violence. Despite these challenges, public policy should focus on reducing the violence endemic to drug trafficking.

NOTE
This research brief is based on Brian Marein, “Drug Trafficking and the Homicide Epidemic in the Caribbean Basin,” September 22, 2025.