Do Military Deployments Reduce Crime? Evidence from the 2025 Washington, DC, National Guard Deployment

The deployment occurred amid debate over whether the city faced an unusual crime crisis. Official statistics indicated that violent crime had fallen substantially from the prior year and that overall crime was at historically low levels. Still, the federal government argued that extraordinary action was needed to address gangs and disorder. The episode raises broader questions: Can deploying military personnel reduce urban crime, and is such an intervention an efficient use of public resources?

This study examines the effects of the 2025 deployment using administrative crime records from Washington, DC, and neighboring jurisdictions. The analysis compares changes in crime before and after the August 11 deployment in DC areas that received personnel and in nearby jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia that did not receive the deployment and serve as comparison groups. The analysis also compares the 2025 changes with those around the same date in earlier years, which helps account for seasonal crime patterns.

This analysis finds that the deployment was associated with declines in several public-facing crimes. Across the areas that received personnel, robberies fell by about 5 incidents per week, thefts by about 44 per week, and motor vehicle thefts by about 20 per week. However, the reductions in robberies and motor vehicle thefts are not robust after accounting for differential pre-deployment crime trends between deployed and comparison areas.

The effects were not broad-based. This analysis finds no detectable changes in homicides or burglaries. Assaults with dangerous weapons increased by about three incidents per week in deployed areas, although this increase is also not robust to accounting for pre-deployment trends. This analysis therefore suggests that highly visible security deployments may affect opportunistic crimes that occur in public spaces more than crimes that take place in private settings or involve established interpersonal conflicts.

The evidence is consistent with two possible explanations. First, a visible military presence may have raised the perceived chance of being caught, discouraging offenses such as robbery, theft, and motor vehicle theft. Second, the deployment may have reduced activity in public places, leaving fewer opportunities for crimes that depend on interactions between potential offenders and victims. The study cannot cleanly distinguish between these explanations.

However, several indicators point to a temporary reduction in local economic and social activity after the deployment. Restaurant reservations in DC fell by roughly 17 percentage points relative to the rest of the country immediately afterward, though the decline reversed within about a week. Metrorail and Metrobus ridership fell by approximately 17 percent and 15 percent, respectively, relative to the same period in prior years. Commuter transit, ride-hailing, and taxi trips also declined. These patterns suggest that some of the observed crime reduction may have reflected reduced mobility and commercial activity, rather than deterrence alone.

This analysis also examines why assaults with dangerous weapons increased. The increase was concentrated in nonfirearm assaults, while firearm assaults did not change significantly. Detected gunfire rose after the deployment, but gunshot-related emergency room visits did not. Taken together, these findings are more consistent with increased confrontations during enforcement, protests, or arrests than with a sustained increase in severe gun violence.

The study’s cost-benefit analysis raises substantial questions about the deployment’s efficiency. Over a 30-day period, the estimated social benefits from fewer robberies, thefts, and motor vehicle thefts totaled about $6.45 million. Estimated National Guard costs were roughly $89.86 million over the same period, implying that each dollar spent generated about $0.07 in estimated social benefits. The cost estimate excludes federal agent expenses, reduced business activity, and other possible social costs, so it understates the full cost of the intervention. Similarly, because the benefits are based on estimates that do not account for pre-deployment trends, they likely overstate the true benefits.

For comparison, the paper examines Chicago’s Safe Passage program, which employs community monitors along school routes. Using the same valuation approach, that program generated approximately $5.27 million in benefits per 30 operating days at a cost of about $3.30 million. The comparison suggests that Safe Passage was roughly 22 times more cost-effective than the DC deployment.

This analysis has important limitations. It examines only the crime categories publicly reported by DC police, cannot determine whether effects persisted after personnel left, and cannot fully separate real changes in crime from possible changes in reporting or detection. Nonetheless, this analysis’s central conclusion is that visible military deployments may reduce some opportunistic street crimes in the short run, but they appear costly, limited in scope, and less efficient than sustained, community-based public safety strategies.

Note
This research brief is based on Robert M. Gonzalez, “Do Military Deployments Reduce Crime? Evidence from the 2025 Washington, DC National Guard Deployment,” SSRN Working Paper no. 6902518, May 2026.