The book is a worthy successor to his acclaimed debut, The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation (2019), which examined automation’s disruptions to labor and capital. Where that book looked to the future with concern, How Progress Ends looks backward with purpose. By understanding how past civilizations rose and fell on the strength or weakness of their institutions, Frey contends, we become better equipped to think clearly about the prospects for progress and stagnation in our own time.

Frey primarily focuses his historical, economic, and technological analysis on three countries: China, Great Britain, and the United States. Other countries are liberally referenced for comparative analysis, including France, Germany, Holland, and Russia in Europe, and Japan and South Korea in Asia. This review focuses on China, Britain, and America.

China / Frey highlights the Song dynasty (960‑1279 AD) as a period of Chinese innovation, resulting in the invention and commercialization of the compass, gunpowder, printing, and advanced agricultural tools. This innovation dynamism was aided by decentralized governance, which incentivized states (prior to national unification) to compete through experimentation; the establishment of a meritocratic civil service, which through an imperial examination system recognized and rewarded talent, incentivized formal learning, and encouraged technological adoption; and the development of urban market centers, which created demand for innovations that improved trade, productivity, and daily life in China.

Frey argues that after the Mongol conquest that brought the Song dynasty to a close—and especially under the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties—China’s political and institutional structures became much more centralized, stifling innovation. Why? One reason was bureaucratic conservatism, as the scholar–official class prioritized Confucian orthodoxy and social prestige was tied to mastery of classical literature, not scientific or technical skill. Another reason was the exercise of rigid state control and cultural aversion to risk, as central authorities suppressed merchant-class advancement and private enterprise, and they legally restricted overseas trade and shipbuilding. Finally, Frey uncovers a lack of intellectual pluralism, in contrast with early modern Europe where competing states and institutions allowed radical new ideas to flourish. In China, intellectual diversity was constrained by central bureaucracy and imperial edicts, limiting disruptive innovation. Ironically, Frey notes that China was, for centuries, ahead of Europe in many technologies, but by the late medieval and early modern era, it found itself overtaken. This shift, he argues, comes down to differences in institutional and political support for innovation. Frey views Chinese innovation as flourishing when institutions were competitive, open, and supportive of intellectual diversity, but fading when centralization and bureaucratic conservatism took hold. He emphasizes that history’s lesson is clear: The sustainability of progress requires more than technical ingenuity; it needs supportive social, political, and economic institutions.

Britain / Frey states that Great Britain’s rise to technological prominence was far from an inevitability, but resulted from a unique set of institutional developments, many of which were accidental and contingent.

First, Britain developed a decentralized political structure and legal institutions, thus avoiding the high degree of bureaucratic centralization seen in China. The Magna Carta (1215) and subsequent limitations on the Crown’s power led to the strengthening of private property rights and judicial independence, protecting innovators from arbitrary expropriation and encouraging investment in risky new ventures.

Second, Britain evolved toward parliamentary sovereignty and representation, operating a broad-based system of governance (at least compared to other European monarchies), and allowed interests outside the aristocracy—such as merchants and industrialists—to influence public policy. Frey views the Glorious Revolution (1688) as pivotal, ensuring a government more accountable and responsive to commercial interests.

Third, Britain exercised religious and intellectual pluralism, especially after the Reformation, and developed a tradition of relative intellectual freedom. Dissenting religious groups, denied official positions, turned their energies to commerce, industry, and science. The lack of an overwhelming state orthodoxy fostered scientific societies (like the Royal Society) and tolerance for experimentation.

Frey argues that Britain’s institutions were favorable to technological innovation. For example, the British government secured property rights, thus ensuring that landowners and entrepreneurs could profit from their investments, making it rational to devote resources to invention and development. In addition, an enforceable patent system emerged, making Britain a pioneer in legally protecting inventors’ rights, thereby making invention financially lucrative. Britain also established reliable courts and contracts that promoted large-scale investment and trade, which in turn incentivized technological improvement. Another important factor was that Britain’s relative openness allowed talented individuals from modest backgrounds to advance through technical or commercial prowess. Frey notes that many early industrialists, engineers, and inventors were not aristocrats but skilled tradesmen or dissenters. Lastly, political and economic decentralization created space for local experimentation and competition, and municipal governments, guilds, and trading companies pursued their interests, fostering dynamism in industries such as textiles and shipping. Frey concludes that Britain’s rapid rise into modern technological progress was the product of accidental, hard-won, and fragile features such as pluralism, property rights, and openness to change. Technological progress is fostered not just by ingenuity, but by the social and political frameworks that sustain it.

America / Frey argues the United States has benefited from strong foundational features such as “checks and balances” and “separation of powers” within its political system, with its multiple branches and federal structure, preventing any single federal government authority from unilaterally stifling innovation. This political fragmentation promotes debate, competition, and experimentation. The rule of law and secure property rights ensured by robust legal institutions provide inventors, entrepreneurs, and investors protection for their intellectual property and profits. This creates incentives for risk-taking and investment in new technologies. Lastly, the United States continually draws entrepreneurial and skilled talent from across the globe. Frey notes that waves of immigrants have fueled innovation, bringing fresh perspectives and skills and contributing to a dynamic culture.

America also offers institutional support for research and development. Frey highlights the unique role of the US government in supporting technological innovation, especially since World War II. Federal agencies like the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and others have provided funding and direction for scientific research, leading to breakthroughs in computing, medicine, and more. The federal and state governments have also supported a dense network of research universities that collaborate with American industry. Frey points to the Bayh–Dole Act (1980), which allowed federally funded research to be commercialized, as a turning point in connecting academic science to market innovation. Moreover, the American patent system vigorously protects inventors, while antitrust laws prevent market monopolies from suppressing entrepreneurial companies with disruptive technologies.

Frey argues that American society celebrates inventors and entrepreneurs—risk takers—from Thomas Edison to Steve Jobs. Cultural attitudes encourage “thinking big” and accepting failure as part of the creative process. The United States offers relatively easy access to capital and a tradition of venture investing, supporting high-risk innovation in areas such as aviation, biotechnology, and computing. Federalism and local autonomy, as practiced by states and cities, has often acted as “laboratories of democracy,” testing new policies, technologies, and economic models. Frey sees this local experimentation as crucial for sustaining innovation. Political pluralism, involving diverse groups and interests competing for influence, often pushes the government to adopt policies to support new industries. His general conclusion is that America succeeded in technological innovation because of a constellation of supportive institutions: political pluralism, legal protections, open borders, dynamic funding models, and an entrepreneurial culture. Those ingredients have made American progress robust, but the country is not immune to backsliding if openness and competition are eroded.

China or America? / Frey argues that many of today’s advanced economies risk entering a new era of stagnation, despite rapid technological breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. He compares the current moment to previous periods when societies missed opportunities for broad-based progress. He views such policy issues as overly constraining regulation (especially around AI, biotechnology, and digital platforms), rising wealth inequality and populism (as technological change benefits a narrow elite, risking a backlash that could result in anti-innovation policies), corporate power concentration (dominant firms, especially in the tech industry, may stifle competition and reduce incentives for disruptive innovation), and rising risk aversion, litigiousness, and hostility as potentially slowing down the pace of commercial innovation and productivity growth. Frey argues, however, that future innovation hinges less on scientific breakthroughs than on societies’ willingness to nurture creativity and challenge vested interests, embrace risk, and remain open to new ideas and people.

For a treatise on economic history, technological change, and prosperity, Frey offers the reader a lively read, moving rather effortlessly between countries and regions, and drawing on comparisons across continents and ages. His correlations among technological prosperity, culture and institutions, and subsequent economic prosperity (or economic stagnation) are well supported across the historical record. His detected patterns of economic and institutional behavior among nations support his general concluding historical analysis. His is a book well worth the effort.

Where I have misgivings is with his historical extensions to policy recommendations concerning the current global competitive challenges between the United States and China. While Frey sees both countries as being on a path to economic and technological stagnation, he does not necessarily believe this path is assured for either country. He focuses on China’s recent developments in AI surveillance technologies as globally leading, but questions whether this sort of advancement is transferable to other industries. On one hand, he believes that the “dictator’s dilemma”—and Chinese President Xi Jinping qualifies as a dictator—results in state power inevitably retarding progress at the technological frontier, but paradoxically also argues that innovation has historically thrived in decentralized systems where the state has often played a crucial role in creating the required institutional foundations for such innovation systems to flourish, especially in democracies. Yet, China has one-party authoritarian control, no rule of law, and Xi is apparently an unelected leader for life. Realistically, I do not see the logic of how this institutional arrangement bodes well for China’s successful development and commercialization of technological innovations going forward.

Likewise, while Frey is concerned with political gridlock in the American federalist political system causing issues for technological advancement, this institutional arrangement has not historically resulted in significant roadblocks. For example, as there is growing awareness of AI technologies’ adverse effects on matters as varied as privacy, human psychology, and energy and environmental issues, they are being met with vigorous policy discussion in government. Also, his concerns about renewed concentration of economic power are being addressed by the Trump administration using federal antitrust enforcement authority against major tech companies—specifically Google (Alphabet)—for anticompetitive business practices in the tech industry, with behavioral remedies being meted out by federal judges in multiple cases. Moreover, the administration is trying to get industries to shift and scale up production of new goods and services in the United States instead of cheaper locales overseas. Lastly, Frey devotes only a little discussion to energy, but increasing its supply (especially AI and data centers) must be a policy priority.

Frey is right that the threats are real: Regulatory overreach, concentrated corporate power, rising risk aversion, and political gridlock all warrant serious attention. But he underestimates how deeply the drive to innovate is woven into America’s social, political, and economic fabric. The concerns he raises are problems to be confronted and solved, not structural limits on US prosperity. History—including the very history Frey so ably recounts—suggests that open, pluralistic societies have a remarkable capacity to adapt when the stakes are high. How Progress Ends is a rich and sobering diagnosis. The prescription, fortunately, is in our hands.