Despite the impressive success of trade liberalization, domestic industries continue to find ways to use the power of government to protect themselves from foreign competition. The practice of using domestic environmental or consumer safety regulation as a way to disguise protectionist policy has become a serious and growing problem in the United States. This regulatory protectionism harms the U.S. economy and violates our trade obligations.
A number of factors combine to explain the rise in regulatory protectionism. Economic globalization has provided Americans with access to a wide range of imported products. This has enabled consumers to demand not only high‐quality products at low cost but also products that are produced according to consumers’ philosophical or ethical preferences. Simultaneously, domestic producers seeking protection from this influx of imports must find alternative shelters now that the use of tariffs and quotas is constrained by international law and economic good sense. The consequence is a perfect storm in which social welfare activists and special commercial interests join forces to promote regulatory regimes that unfairly and unnecessarily restrict imports.
There is already a system of laws in place to prevent regulatory protectionism. The rules of the international trading system recognize that domestic laws can be just as protectionist as tariffs. Many of the disciplines of World Trade Organization (WTO) law are embedded in the rules U.S. administrative agencies follow when setting new regulations.
But the U.S. government must take its WTO obligations more seriously. Prior to implementing a new regulation, federal agencies should be required to evaluate the possibility that less trade‐restrictive alternatives could meet regulatory goals as effectively as their preferred proposal. Also, the U.S. government should not dilute or bypass the multilateral rules of the WTO through bilateral or regional negotiations that accept managed protectionism.
This paper uses a number of recent examples of protectionist regulations to show that the enemies of regulatory protectionism are transparency and vigilance. Policymakers should be skeptical of regulatory proposals backed by the target domestic industry and of proposals that lack a plausible theory of market failure. These are red flags that the proposal is the product of privilege‐seeking special interests disguised as altruistic consumer advocates.