On January 1, 2018, President Trump tweeted: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!”1 The president’s message was clear: the United States will no longer tolerate Pakistan’s policy of aiding and abetting militant groups, specifically the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network.
Pakistan reacted swiftly—and angrily. Foreign Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif blamed the United States for undermining the U.S.-Pakistan alliance,2 while the Ministry of Defense retorted that the United States ignores “cross‐border safe havens of terrorists who murder Pakistanis.”3 On January 2, 2018, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi called an emergency session of the National Security Commission, the principal federal forum for Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership for foreign policy.4 After detailed discussions, the Commission stated that it would continue cooperation with the United States because stability in Afghanistan is one of Pakistan’s core objectives, along with curbing terrorism.5 Yet, as it became clear that the United States would be suspending military aid,6 Pakistan retaliated by suspending intelligence‐sharing, specifically of human intelligence gathered from ground sources that provides crucial support to ongoing U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan.7
Trump had criticized Pakistan on these grounds before. In August 2017, while announcing his strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, he asserted that his administration intended to change the U.S. approach to Pakistan.8 The president reproached Pakistan for continuing to provide refuge to terrorist groups at the risk of regional stability, citing 20 U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the most in any region of the world, he claimed.9 The National Security Strategy, which the administration released on December 18, 2017, reinforced the president’s remarks, stating that the United States “will press Pakistan to intensify its counterterrorism efforts” while also “demonstrating that it is a responsible steward of its nuclear assets.”10
Trump is hardly the first president to call Pakistan out for sponsoring militant groups. While unveiling his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009, President Barack Obama charged that al Qaeda was planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan.11 Similarly, President George W. Bush wrote in his memoir that he remained skeptical of Pakistan’s insistence that it was acting against militant groups operating within its borders.12 Neither is Trump the first president to cut security aid to Pakistan. In 2011, the Obama administration suspended $800 million in security aid that included the provision of U.S. equipment to the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary organization based in the tribal region, and a $300 million reimbursement to Islamabad for its counterinsurgency expenditures.13
However, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is currently at an all‐time low. The Trump administration has already begun to implement a tougher approach toward Pakistan, which may include cutting military and security funding, stripping Pakistan of its designation as a non‐NATO ally, and officially labeling Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror.14 A U.S.-led campaign aims to add Pakistan back on to the terrorism financing watchlist of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body intended to combat international money laundering and terrorism financing.15In March 2018, the Department of Commerce imposed sanctions on seven Pakistani firms for engaging in illicit nuclear trade.16 Yet these policies are unlikely to change Pakistan’s behavior or deter it from sponsoring militant groups, mainly because they are based on a faulty understanding of how militant sponsorship has evolved in Pakistan.
In Washington, the conventional wisdom on Pakistan correctly links militant sponsorship with the state’s military establishment and intelligence agencies, principally the Inter‐Services Intelligence (ISI). U.S. policies to combat militant sponsorship therefore largely focus on cutting aid to the military. However, when it comes to the issue of counterterrorism and national security, Pakistan’s civilian institutions are more closely aligned with the military than Washington acknowledges.17 This civil‐military alignment is a result of the Pakistan Army’s dominance as one of the strongest institutions in the country.18 Civil institutions not only are subordinate, but also develop policies and bureaucratic routines of their own that reinforce the military’s policy of sponsoring violent nonstate actors.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations, highlighting how changes in the international order have created unrealistic expectations and divergent security calculations on both sides. The second section briefly describes Pakistan’s counterterrorism bureaucracy, providing an institutional roadmap for how civilian counterterrorism structures have facilitated the state’s policy of sponsoring militant groups. The final section explains the limitations of the Trump administration’s hardline approach toward Pakistan and presents policy recommendations aimed at finding areas for cooperation.
The tension in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship stems from two key events: the end of the Cold War and the onset of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
The Cold War altered the structure of the international system and profoundly affected Pakistan. As Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan found itself at the center of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In 1980, the United States and Pakistan supported the mujahideen,19 a group of anti‐Soviet tribal warlords funded by the United States and Saudi Arabia and directed by Pakistan’s leading intelligence service, the ISI, to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan.20 These tribal groups claimed they were conducting jihad against the godless, communist Soviets. After almost a decade of seemingly unlimited funding and arms, the mujahideen drove Soviet forces out of Afghanistan. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, so did support for the mujahideen. Pakistan now had at its disposal well‐armed, religiously motivated, Sunni‐dominated militants that were essentially unemployed after the Cold War.
Scholars disagree about how Pakistan used the mujahideen in the post–Cold War world. Some argue that Pakistan used them to bolster the anti‐Indian insurgency in Kashmir and then to gain favor with the United States.21 Pakistan’s recognition and support of the Taliban (the primary remnant of the mujahideen) as it rose to power in Afghanistan in 1996 was a way to dispel the tensions with Afghanistan over the Durand Line—the disputed border between the two countries.22 Others argue that Pakistan’s use of the mujahideen is not a byproduct of the Cold War or a half‐baked strategy to support insurgencies in Kashmir or Afghanistan. Rather, it is the focal point of the Pakistani state’s strategy of using jihad to meet the state’s geostrategic goals and bolster its security.23
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, created a state of panic within the United States.24 Two days after the attacks, then secretary of state Colin Powell famously called Pakistan’s president at the time, General Pervez Musharraf, and stated: “You are either with us or against us.”25 While Musharraf chose to side with the United States, he authorized the rescue of key Taliban members from Afghanistan, allowing them to resettle in Pakistan.26 As the U.S. war in Afghanistan has continued, U.S.-Pakistan relations have steadily deteriorated because of Pakistan’s consistent support of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network.
Pakistan is facing intense backlash against its policy of militant sponsorship, both domestically and internationally. In June 2018, the FATF, the international watchdog on terrorism financing, put Pakistan on its “gray list,” concluding that Pakistan’s anti–money laundering structure had serious deficiencies.27 Meanwhile, militant sponsorship also generates domestic political instability.28 For example, the Pakistan Army’s harsh counterinsurgency campaigns in the northwest tribal region have sparked a Pashtun civil rights movement, leading to concern in Islamabad but also abroad about the fragility of the state’s political system.29
At the same time, the U.S. war in neighboring Afghanistan continues unabated. As a candidate, Trump pledged, “I will never send our finest into battle unless necessary, and I mean absolutely necessary, and will only do so if we have a plan for victory with a capital V.”30 Yet, as president, he increased the number of troops in Afghanistan,31 and NATO soon followed.32 As of June 2018, there are 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.33 In April, the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction concluded that overall U.S. reconstruction efforts are going poorly: corruption remains rampant while the economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid, and the Afghan National Security Forces continue to lack capacity to provide security.34
The legacies of the Cold War and the GWOT continue to influence the relationship between Islamabad and Washington, and Afghanistan has been at the center of the relationship from the beginning. From the U.S. perspective, the main question that should be dominating the relationship with Pakistan is this: How can the U.S. successfully conclude its war in Afghanistan? Both states want the war to end, but each has a very different idea of what the end state should look like.
Washington’s Perspective on U.S.-Pakistan Relations
Washington essentially left Afghanistan in the hands of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia after the Soviets withdrew. With respect to Pakistan, U.S. policymakers favored military dictator General Zia ul‐Haq, who had proved to be a key U.S. ally during the Cold War. But as the Soviets were preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan, Haq died in a plane crash in 1988. On the way to attending Haq’s funeral, Secretary of State George Shultz, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Richard Armitage, and Rep. Charlie Wilson (D-TX) devised a U.S. strategy for Pakistan that consisted of deepening ties with Pakistan’s military establishment and intelligence agencies while also supporting democratic developments such as general elections.35
Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan devolved into a civil war that ended when the Taliban took over and established what they called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.36 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel visited Afghanistan in April 1996 to urge the Taliban to allow Unocal, an American oil company, to build an oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Raphel emphasized that the United States wanted to ensure that Afghanistan (and potentially the United States) would not lose any financial and economic opportunities.37 In turn, Unocal began to provide economic and humanitarian aid to the Taliban.38
Sensing U.S. sympathy for the Taliban, Pakistan’s then prime minister Benazir Bhutto tried to convince Washington to publicly side with the Taliban—and Pakistan. This idea was not radical given the context of U.S. regional policy: Congress had authorized a covert $20 million budget for the CIA to counter Iran’s influence in the region.39 Even though Pakistan and Iran were not enemies—both had worked to quash the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan since the 1970s—Pakistan considered the United States a more important strategic ally.40 More significantly, Iran opposed the Taliban.41 The Clinton administration, however, refused to openly support the Taliban. In the meantime, the Taliban leadership hosted al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, a known threat to U.S security. Taking advantage of its base in Afghanistan, al Qaeda launched simultaneous attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, killing more than 200 people.42 President Clinton ordered airstrikes against al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.43 A few months after the strikes, Unocal withdrew from the oil pipeline project, effectively halting it.44 By 1999, the alliance between the Taliban and al Qaeda was clear,45 as was Pakistan’s unwavering support for the Taliban.46
In 2000, Clinton visited India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—the first U.S. president to visit South Asia since the end of the Cold War.47 Clinton’s historic visit set the tone for an improved U.S.-India relationship.48 However, the administration was inflexible toward Pakistan. Clinton publicly lauded the country for striving to be a “beacon of democracy in the Muslim world.”49 But in private he told General Pervez Musharraf, who came to power via a military coup just six months before Clinton’s visit, to restore democracy, halt militant sponsorship in Kashmir, and assist the U.S in capturing Osama bin Laden.50 The George W. Bush administration more or less maintained the Clinton administration’s policy toward South Asia until the 9/11 attacks.
In its initial months, the Bush administration hailed the war in Afghanistan as a success: the Taliban were ousted from Kabul, and their airfields and headquarters were destroyed, effectively eliminating their ability to provide physical sanctuary to al Qaeda.51 World leaders met in Bonn, Germany, to set the course for Afghan reconstruction in an attempt to avoid the neglect that had followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The Bonn Agreement was signed in December 2001, and the Afghan Interim Authority, led by Hamid Karzai (who later was elected and served as Afghanistan’s president until 2014), was given a six‐month mandate to begin forming a constitution that would lay down the foundation for an Afghan government.52 The agreement also created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO‐led force tasked with training the Afghan National Security Forces.53
Pakistan was generally in favor of the Bonn Agreement.54 Pakistani officials tried to convince the Bush administration to talk with the Taliban, but President Bush was adamantly against any such negotiations.55 Within a year of the Bonn Agreement, the Bush administration began to turn away from Afghanistan to focus on regime change in Iraq.56 The Iraq War not only took resources away from Afghanistan at a crucial moment, but also fueled instability across the Middle East.57 The discovery of the Khan Network further aggravated U.S.-Pakistan relations under the Bush administration.58 The Khan Network was essentially a black market for nuclear materials, created and led by Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadir Khan. The network helped further nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Libya until its discovery in 2004. While Khan maintained that the Pakistani state knew of these activities, the state denied all knowledge. Even though the Khan Network was dismantled, its lingering impact on nuclear proliferation remains a cause for concern within the U.S. intelligence community.59 Furthermore, U.S. (and Afghan) officials worry about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.60 Pakistan’s former minister of foreign affairs Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri (2002–2007), however, maintains that the army has strengthened its oversight over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.61
The Obama administration’s Afghanistan policy consisted of two overarching goals: defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and preventing al Qaeda from establishing a “safe haven” from which to launch another attack on U.S. territory. 62 Like the Bush administration, the Obama administration pursued a military‐centric approach. From 2008 to 2011, Obama increased the number of U.S. ground troops from 30,000 to more than 100,000 to fight the insurgency and help train and increase the capacity of the Afghan security forces.63 However, he also set a withdrawal date of December 2014 in order to dispel expectations that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was open‐ended. Obama emphasized the need for a peaceful Afghan‐led government and the importance of Pakistan in achieving that goal.64 Yet the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remained tense, especially regarding Pakistan’s tacit support of the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and the Quetta Shura (a Taliban government based in Peshawar, a major city and capital of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province).
Tensions between the United States and Pakistan reached a high point when, after nine years of searching, bin Laden was found living in a compound with his family in Abbottabad, Pakistan. U.S. Navy SEALs killed bin Laden in a clandestine raid on May 2, 2011. Officials in both Washington and Islamabad say the Obama administration did not inform Pakistan of the raid before it happened.65 In June 2011, the administration of Asif Ali Zardari (elected in 2008 after Musharraf’s downfall) called on the Supreme Court of Pakistan to investigate the events that led up to the raid. After two years, the Abbottabad Commission submitted its report, which was later leaked and published by Al Jazeera in July 2013. The report was 700 pages long, included 200 recommendations and testimonies from more than 300 witnesses, and held both the Pakistani government and the military responsible for incompetence and complicity in hiding bin Laden.66
As the trust deficit between the United States and Pakistan deepened, the Obama administration pursued negotiations with the Taliban.67 Working with Germany, the United States convinced Qatar to allow the Taliban to open a political office in Doha to facilitate peace talks.68 Direct negotiations between the United States and the Taliban, meanwhile, made Pakistan’s military establishment nervous, as officials in Islamabad have much preferred to mediate between the two.69 Ultimately, the Obama administration pursued a multifaceted policy toward Pakistan that involved temporary cuts to military and security aid, a massive development aid package, and public criticism of Pakistan as a “difficult” partner.70 For example, when members of the Senate Armed Services Committee asked Admiral James Winnefeld about the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations during his confirmation hearing to serve as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he replied, “Even though this is a difficult partnership, it is an important one.”71 Yet the administration was unable to deter Pakistan from its policy of militant sponsorship.
For those closely following the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in the context of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Trump’s hardline approach toward Pakistan is not new. Whereas frustration with Pakistan is warranted, the Trump administration’s policy is misguided, especially if the ultimate goal is to reach a viable political solution with key stakeholders, withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, and protect against potential future threats emerging from Afghanistan in particular and South Asia in general.72 Like past administrations, the Trump administration views Pakistan largely through the lens of the war in Afghanistan, which has proved to be counterproductive for fostering a cooperative bilateral relationship. Washington tends to devalue the impact that the Cold War and the mujahideen had on Pakistan’s strategic calculus. More significantly, the United States tends to blame Pakistan for the failure of the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s continued support for the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network has certainly played a significant role in sustaining the insurgency and undermining the Afghan government’s stability. Yet even if Pakistan abruptly halted all support for these militant proxies, the war would still be going badly because of various factors, including U.S. mismanagement of Afghan reconstruction, lack of coordination between U.S. troops and ISAF, and corrupt Afghani politics.73 Although it remains unclear whether efficient reconstruction efforts or improved coordination between various ground troops would positively influence the trajectory of the war, one thing is obvious: the Trump administration needs to reorient its expectations of Pakistan.
Islamabad’s Perspective on U.S.-Pakistan Relations
From Pakistan’s perspective, its relationship with the United States is still dominated by the Cold War, U.S. support for the mujahideen, and a feeling of abandonment once Washington shifted its focus elsewhere after the Berlin Wall fell. In many respects, Islamabad sees the United States as an unreliable ally that continues to ignore the myriad sacrifices Pakistan has made as a key partner in the GWOT.
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban continues to this day. Yet, when questioned about the policy of militant sponsorship, Pakistani officials deny it and demand evidence. There is, of course, plenty of evidence. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan provided diplomatic and material assistance to the Taliban as part of its “strategic depth” policy. Strategic depth is loosely defined as the army’s strategy for maintaining influence over the Afghan government in Kabul to prevent it from backing Pakistan’s domestic insurgencies, such as the Balochi and Sindhi movements and the ongoing Pashtun movement, and to counter India’s plans for regional domination.74 Over the years, a handful of high‐level army officers and ISI agents joined the Taliban.75 An ex‐ISI agent, Colonel “Imam” Sultan Amir, advised local Taliban leaders in the 1990s.76 In 2001, just before U.S. troops were deployed to Afghanistan, the Bush administration approved an ISI plan to airlift Pakistanis in Afghanistan back to Pakistan. In the process of the airlift, the ISI also rescued key members of the Taliban, and relocated them to Baluchistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas.77 Pakistan has also continued to provide safe haven to militant groups waging jihad in Kashmir. Lashkar‐e‐Taiba (LeT), one of the most prominent anti‐India militant groups, remains active in Pakistan despite official state bans.78 Similarly, Jaish‐e‐Mohammad (JeM), the group that claimed responsibility for the attacks on Indian army bases in Pathankot and Uri in 2016, is headquartered in southern Punjab.79 While he was president, Hamid Karzai (2004–2014) continuously accused Pakistan of undermining the Afghan government by sponsoring the Taliban, who routinely attack U.S., ISAF, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) troops in Afghanistan.80
Pakistan thinks that it has borne significant costs by being an active participant in the GWOT and believes further that Washington habitually ignores these sacrifices. Pakistan currently hosts more than 1.4 million Afghan refugees, most of whom fled because of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11.81 Many Taliban escaped to Pakistan and regrouped in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the northwest, where the mountainous terrain provided the perfect cover. FATA is a majority Pashtun area that consists of seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions that are governed by Pakistan’s federal government through colonial‐era laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which have granted a measure of autonomy to the region.82 Consequently, the Pakistani military rarely intruded into FATA.83 But in 2002, under U.S. pressure, the Pakistan Army began conducting counterinsurgency operations in three of the tribal agencies—Khyber, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan—to weed out the Taliban seeking refuge there.84 The ruthless operations left thousands of Pashtuns dead, detained by military authorities, or internally displaced, while 200 tribal elders were killed. In response to the army’s operations, some Afghan Taliban members and others formed an umbrella organization called the Tehrik‐i‐Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistani Taliban, that actively targets both Pakistani security forces and civilians.85 In one particularly egregious example, the Pakistani Taliban attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar in 2014, killed more than 130 children, and issued warnings of future attacks.86 Some Pakistani officials, therefore, go so far as to blame the United States for the rise of the Pakistani Taliban.
Since 2002, terrorist groups have killed more than 22,000 Pakistani civilians.87 In response to repeated threats and attacks by the Pakistani Taliban, the Pakistan Army has continued to launch counterinsurgency campaigns in the tribal areas and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,88 also dominated by Pashtuns.89 Military authorities claimed that more than 3,500 militants were killed in the Zarb‐e‐Azb (Strike of the Sword) campaign that lasted from June 2014 to April 2016.90 Radd‐ul‐Fasaad (Elimination of Strife) is an ongoing operation that began in February 2017 and aimed at eliminating terrorist sleeper cells across the country.91 These campaigns have continued to displace thousands of Pashtuns and have resulted in numerous cases of “missing persons” and “enforced disappearances.”92 From Pakistan’s perspective, it is currently involved in two wars: the GWOT and a domestic counterterrorism war.93
Pakistan’s feelings of regional insecurity help drive its policy of militant sponsorship. Because of concerns about competing militant groups, tribal cleavages, and domestic unrest, Pakistan seeks to establish a pro‐Pakistan government in Kabul via the Taliban.94 As such, Pakistan is wary of increased Indian engagement in Afghanistan. India has a long history of supporting development projects in Afghanistan.95 Most recently, India has invested heavily in Iran’s Chabahar Port, reducing Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistani ports as a trade route to the Indian Ocean.96 From Pakistan’s perspective, Chabahar is proof of India’s scheme to encircle Pakistan.97 But India’s investment in Chabahar is also a way for India to counter China’s growing influence within South Asia.98 As longtime allies, Pakistan and China have a relatively stable relationship, and the ongoing China‐Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a multi‐billion‐dollar development project funded and led by China in Pakistan—will most likely increase China’s interest in Pakistan’s political and economic stability.99
Therefore, Pakistan’s view of its bilateral relationship with the United States is informed by both domestic security priorities and dynamic regional interests. Pakistan’s response to the Trump administration’s hardline policy consists of a combination of playing the victim and exercising restraint. Pakistan seeks to persuade the United States by arguing that its counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas have eliminated all Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network safe havens. Pakistani officials also emphasize the number of Pakistani civilians that have been killed by the Pakistani Taliban and U.S. drone strikes in the tribal region, highlighting the human costs Pakistanis have borne as a result of the U.S.-led GWOT. Pakistan has also shown restraint by keeping NATO supply routes open after Trump’s January tweet (in the past, Pakistan has closed supply routes multiple times).100 Ultimately, Pakistan does not want to be isolated from the United States and is working to prevent further deterioration in relations.
It is important that the Trump administration maintains a constructive working relationship with Pakistan in order to conclude the war in Afghanistan. But to accomplish this goal, the administration needs to adjust its expectations of Pakistan. Like all past U.S. administrations, the Trump administration’s approach is based on the notion that Pakistan’s civilian institutions will respond to pressure tactics and push back against the policy of militant sponsorship that is driven by the military establishment and intelligence agencies. But a close examination of Pakistan’s civilian counterterrorism bureaucracy demonstrates that the civilian institutions have become complicit in militant sponsorship by expanding executive powers, legitimizing the military’s overreach, and refusing to reform.
Pakistan’s Civilian Counterterrorism Establishment
Washington’s attempts to pressure Pakistan to stop supporting militants rest on a faulty assumption that Pakistan’s civilian institutions can push back on the military’s prerogatives on militant sponsorship. In fact, Pakistan’s civilian institutions simply empower the military and intelligence communities and reinforce their perspective on nonstate militants. In particular, three civilian institutions play a key role in supporting militant sponsorship: the legislature, the judiciary, and the police.
Pakistan’s anti‐terrorism legal regime consists of 16 colonial‐era criminal laws and more recent counterterrorism statutes.101 Both civilian leaders and military dictators have used the anti‐terrorism legal regime established by the legislature to increase their power and promote their legitimacy after political crises. For example, soon after gaining power via a military coup in 1999, President Musharraf used the Anti‐Terrorism Act of 1997 to discredit then prime minister Nawaz Sharif and justify his coup. The Anti‐Terrorism Act provides the foundation for Pakistan’s counterterrorism bureaucracy.102 According to the act, those charged with terrorism will be tried in special courts called Anti‐Terrorism Courts (ATCs), which operate nationwide.103 Sharif, however, had not committed any act of terrorism. Instead, Musharraf amended the law by expanding its jurisdiction to include crimes such as conspiracy, arms trafficking, hijacking, and kidnapping. Musharraf then used these amendments to build a case against Sharif, forcing the former prime minister to be tried in an ATC rather than a regular criminal court.104 Political leaders have also used anti‐terrorism statutes to expand executive and military power, providing the military establishment legal cover for questionable practices. For instance, the identical “aid to civil power” regulations for the federally and provincially administered tribal areas legalized the military’s previously unauthorized detention of civilians caught during the counterinsurgency campaigns in 2009 and 2010, many of whom are still detained without any charges against them.105
The second civilian institution that plays an important role in counterterrorism is the judiciary. In the context of counterterrorism, the judiciary’s main responsibility has been to ensure that anti‐terrorism statutes do not violate Pakistan’s constitution. However, Pakistan’s Supreme Court has routinely upheld expansive anti‐terrorism laws, citing the doctrine of state necessity.106 The doctrine of necessity is a commonly used legal principle in commonwealth countries that is used to justify otherwise illegal government action.107 For example, in 2015 the court used the doctrine to allow civilians charged with terrorism to be tried in military courts.108 The military courts were established via a constitutional amendment in 2015 after the Pakistani Taliban attacked a school in Peshawar, killing more than 130 children.109 The civilian government had responded quickly, passing a National Action Plan that included reinstating the death penalty and establishing special trial courts run by the military tribunals for “swift” justice.110 Human‐rights activists argued that trying civilians charged with terrorist acts in military courts was unconstitutional. Pakistan’s Supreme Court disagreed.111 The judiciary has also accepted the formation of specialized courts like the ATCs, fundamentally agreeing with the legislative branch that a separate court system for those charged with terrorism would be more efficient than the regular criminal justice system.112
The third civilian institution at the forefront of counterterrorism is the police. According to the Anti‐Terrorism Act, the police can use deadly force, detain suspects for up to 90 days, target militant “networks,” and confiscate the passports of suspects charged under the statute. The police also have provincial Counterterrorism Departments, Rapid Response Forces, and high‐security prisons to counter terrorist groups.113 Yet daily police activities are still governed by antiquated colonial laws that affect how the police can gather evidence.114 For example, under regular criminal laws, a confession to a police officer is not permitted in a court of law, but according to the Anti‐Terrorism Act, it is. The police often arrest a suspect under the act regardless of the crime, which in turn has overburdened Anti‐Terrorism Courts. Civilian leaders have also been reluctant to reform the police. Instead, politicians routinely interfere in police investigations, officer recruitment, officer transfers, and basic material purchases—and often use the police as personal bodyguards, especially in rural areas.115 As a result, the Pakistani police remain one of the weakest civilian counterterrorism institutions.
Pakistan’s military establishment and intelligence agencies are primarily responsible for sponsoring groups such as the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, LeT, and JeM. But the tendency of the legislature and the courts to expand the power of the executive and the military, and the police’s continued operational weakness and corruption have created a civilian counterterrorism bureaucracy that is beholden to the military and its sponsorship of militant groups. Therefore, each civilian institution involved in counterterrorism—the legislature, judiciary, and police—helps facilitate, rather than counteract, militant sponsorship.
A Pragmatic U.S. Approach toward Pakistan
Continuous U.S. support of Pakistan’s military has only exacerbated the country’s civil‐military imbalance.116 The United States needs to adopt a more informed and constructive approach toward Pakistan. The Trump administration has taken a hardline approach toward Pakistan aimed at curbing the state’s sponsorship of militant groups. This approach includes military and security aid cuts; a U.S.-led campaign to put Pakistan on FATF’s gray list; and targeting LeT, a U.S.-designated terrorist group that operates openly in Pakistan.
Cutting U.S. military and security aid to Pakistan in order to pressure the country to stop supporting militant groups has been tried repeatedly throughout the years and has largely failed to change Pakistan’s policies. At the Obama administration’s behest, Congress established the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund in 2009 to provide U.S. military equipment and combat training to Pakistan’s military and paramilitary forces for counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas.117 As Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and Haqqani Network continued, Congress discontinued the fund soon after it started—a move supported by the Obama White House.118 The Trump administration is currently withholding Foreign Military Financing, a grant and loan program used by several countries to acquire U.S. arms. Trump has also partially cut the Coalition Support Fund (CSF),119established to reimburse Pakistan for America’s use of Pakistani military bases to launch ground offensives—and later drone strikes—in the tribal areas.120 Ending financial support to Pakistan’s military establishment is a good thing because taxpayer dollars should not go toward corrupt foreign militaries, particularly those that aid terrorist groups. However, cutting off aid will not alter Pakistan’s use of militant proxies.
The United States and India spearheaded a campaign to add Pakistan to the FATF’s gray list—a list of countries that can be sanctioned because of their involvement in illicit terrorist financing. To garner some goodwill, Pakistan amended its anti‐terrorism law in February 2018 to ban the Jamaat ud Dawa and the Falah‐i‐Insaniat, charity wings of LeT, the notorious militant group that wages jihad in Kashmir with the Pakistan Army’s support.121 The FATF, however, issued a warning anyway, and eventually added Pakistan to its list in June 2018, opening the possibility of more sanctions.122
Yet sanctions rarely alter state behavior.123 In any case, adding Pakistan to the FATF gray list in the hope that authorities would stop sponsoring the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Kashmiri insurgents has already been tried—and it failed. The Obama administration also advocated adding Pakistan to the FATF’s gray list, where it remained from 2012 to 2015. During this period, Pakistan not only continued to sponsor militant groups but managed to stabilize exports and imports. Pakistan also completed its International Monetary Fund program and raised $5 billion in the international bond market.124 Being on the FATF list, therefore, hardly hindered Pakistan’s economic growth. At best, the pressure could force the government to reform its Anti‐Money Laundering Act, a currently dormant law designed to combat the financing of militant organizations and groups operating within Pakistan, with an emphasis on implementation.125 However, such cosmetic changes will not substantively alter Pakistan’s policies.
Like past administrations, the Trump administration is also trying to curb Pakistan’s sponsorship of the LeT by designating the Milli Muslim League, the political party of LeT, as a global terrorist group.126 Yet “terrorist” labels are more political than practical, and as such, will have minimal impact on Pakistan’s sponsorship of the LeT. For its part, Pakistan’s election commission has refused to register the party, preventing it from participating in the general elections (though its members are running in the elections as independent candidates).127 Despite Washington’s designation of the group as a terrorist organization, the Pakistani military continues to support the League.128
Underlying these U.S. policies is the assumption that Pakistan can be convinced to sever all ties with the Taliban and Haqqani Network. Ambassador Richard G. Olson, who served as U.S. ambassador to Pakistan from 2012 to 2015 and special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2015 to 2016, argues that the Trump administration should tell Pakistan it must cut all ties with the Taliban and the Haqqani Network in order to repair its damaged relationship with the United States.129 Yet the United States has never been able to convince Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban, the Haqqanis, or the Quetta Shura.
Many analysts worry that Pakistan will increasingly look toward China as its relationship with the United States worsens, but Pakistan’s “drift” toward China is not new. Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been influenced by South Asian regional politics, in which China is a significant actor. China and Pakistan have been allies for decades, with China often providing material and diplomatic support to Pakistan to counter India. China even played a key role in developing Pakistan’s nuclear program. However, the Sino‐Pakistan relationship, especially in its current form, should not be a cause of alarm in Washington. In recent years, Beijing has heavily invested in Pakistan through the CPEC, a multi‐billion‐dollar development project. China, therefore, has an interest in a stable Pakistan. In fact, China has been in talks with Baloch militants to prevent any attacks on Chinese workers and CPEC projects.130 Rumors that China is planning to build a naval base near Pakistan’s Gwadar port, where it signed a 40‐year lease in 2017, have been a source of anxiety in Washington, but both China and Pakistan deny any plans to build a base.131 In any case, such a military base would not necessarily pose a threat to U.S. interests.132
The United States and Pakistan may never have an ideal relationship, but they do agree on one fundamental thing: U.S. involvement in Afghanistan needs to end. To achieve this shared objective, the United States must adopt a more pragmatic approach toward Pakistan. The Trump administration should adjust its expectations with respect to Pakistan and its support for militant groups, especially the Taliban. Although the United States has been fighting the Taliban for almost two decades, no enduring resolution to the war in Afghanistan is possible without their cooperation. The Trump administration should pursue an Afghan‐led peace process that directly involves the Taliban.133 While the Taliban have so far refused to participate in Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for this fall, they have expressed an interest in negotiating with the United States. Instead of rejecting that offer, the Trump administration should try to leverage talks with the Taliban to mediate the U.S. relationship with the Afghan government, while also planning for a military withdrawal. Pakistan can be a useful partner in such an effort.
The Trump administration should seek common ground with Pakistan while acknowledging areas of disagreement. For example, protecting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from militant groups is a priority for both countries. According to Gina Haspel’s testimony during her confirmation hearing to become CIA director, the CIA remains focused on monitoring any activities between extremist groups and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which may provide a good opportunity for American and Pakistani intelligence communities to cooperate.134 Finding a feasible and lasting end to the war in Afghanistan is also mutually beneficial for the United States and Pakistan. The United States wants to ensure that Afghanistan has a stable government and that the country does not become a launching pad for another terrorist attack on the United States. However, Washington has ruled out any role for the Taliban in the Afghan government. Pakistan’s objective is to ensure a pro‐Pakistan government in Kabul, one that will assist it in deterring India, and maintains that the Taliban would be the most reliable actor. Yet the Taliban’s pro‐Pakistan tendencies are questionable at best. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Afghanistan can even have a stable government in the next few years. Ongoing U.S. and Pakistani support for an Afghan‐led peace process is a step in the right direction. The United States must come to grips with its inability to get Pakistan to stop sponsoring militants and pursue direct talks with the Taliban while the opportunity still exists.
For years, the United States has supported Pakistan’s military establishment over its civilian institutions. While Pakistan’s civil‐military imbalance is a result of numerous domestic factors, U.S. support for the Pakistan Army has aggravated it. The United States has also overlooked the ways in which Pakistan’s civilian institutions have evolved to facilitate militant sponsorship, directly or indirectly. The only way the Trump administration can have a positive relationship with Pakistan is recognize the futility of pressuring Pakistan to stop funding militants and partner with Islamabad on terms it can accommodate. A strategic reevaluation of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in order.
Pakistan has a long history of militant sponsorship. The military establishment has played a central role in Pakistan’s use of militant groups as proxies, but contrary to longstanding presumptions in Washington, Pakistan’s civilian establishment by no means serves as a check against these policies. Militant sponsorship has become a kind of whole‐of‐government principle of Pakistan’s security policy and national identity. Punitive U.S. actions to discourage it, therefore, have little chance of success. Washington should incorporate this reality into its policy and look for alternative solutions to securing a durable peace in Afghanistan that can set the stage for a U.S. withdrawal and establish a new and constructive relationship with Pakistan.
1. Donald Trump, Twitter post, January 1, 2018, 4:12 a.m., https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/947802588174577664.
2. Saeed Shah, “Pakistan Foreign Minister Says U.S. Has Undermined Countries’ Ties,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-says-alliance-with-u-s-is-over-1515155860.
3. Minister of Defense, Pakistan, Twitter post, January 1, 2018, 6:53 a.m., https://twitter.com/PakMnstrDefence/status/947843255286353921.
4. Dawn, “Pakistan Has Given Us Nothing but Lies and Deceit: US President Donald Trump,” January 2, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1380148/pakistan-has-given-us-nothing-but-lies-and-deceit-us-president-donald-trump; and Scott Neuman, “Pakistani Leaders Fire Back at Trump Tweet Accusing Them of ‘Lies & Deceit,’” National Public Radio, January 2, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/02/575025799/pakistani-leaders-fire-back-at-trump-tweet-accusing-them-of-lies-deceit.
5. “NSC Decides Not to Take Measures in Haste Post Trump Statement,” Geo News, January 2, 2018, https://www.geo.tv/latest/174935-pm-to-chair-nsc-meeting-following-trump-tweet.
6. Krishnadev Calamur, “Pakistan’s Week Keeps Getting Worse,” The Atlantic, January 4, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/us-suspends-security-aid-pakistan/549731/; Arhsad Mohammed and Jonathan Landay, “U.S. Suspends At Least $900 Million in Security Aid to Pakistan,” Reuters, January 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan-aid/u-s-suspends-at-least-900-million-in-security-aid-to-pakistan-idUSKBN1ET2DX; and Missy Ryan, Annie Gowen, and Carol Morello, “Piling on Pressure over Safe Havens, U.S. Suspends Military Aid to Pakistan,” Washington Post, January 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/feud-between-us-and-pakistan-flares-up-after-trumps-lies-and-deceit-tweet/2018/01/04/7cb457b8-f08a-11e7-97bf-bba379b809ab_story.html?utm_term=.5f05d8671fb2.
7. Farhan Bokhari, Katrina Manson, and Kiran Stacey, “Pakistan Halts Intelligence‐Sharing with US after Aid Suspension,” Financial Times, January 11, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/59969778-f6b1-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00.
8. Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia, August 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/.
9. President Trump’s statement is incorrect. From the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the following 10 are either headquartered in Pakistan or operate from both Pakistan and Afghanistan: Harakat ul‐Mujahidin (HUM), al Qaeda, Jaish‐e‐Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar‐e‐Taiba (LeT), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Harakat ul‐Jihad‐i‐Islami (HUJI), Tehrik‐e‐Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic State‐Khorasan (ISIL–K), al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). See U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
10. National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, p. 50, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12–18-2….
11. President Barack Obama, Remarks on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
12. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway Books, 2010), pp. 214–20.
13. Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Withholding Military Aid to Pakistan,” Washington Post, July 10, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/us-withholding-military-aid-to-pakistan/2011/07/10/gIQAZdJH7H_story.html?utm_term=.83ec91550339.
14. See Husain Haqqani and Lisa Curtis, “A New Approach to Pakistan: Enforcing Aid Conditions without Cutting Ties,” Hudson Institute, February 6, 2017, https://www.hudson.org/research/13305-a-new-u-s-approach-to-pakistan-enforcing-aid-conditions-without-cutting-ties; and Bruce Riedel, “Trump Is Right: Pakistan Is a Terrorist Haven. But What Will He Do about It?” Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, January 4, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/04/trump-is-right-pakistan-is-a-terrorist-haven-but-what-will-he-do-about-it/.
15. Kay Johnson and Drazen Jorgic, “Global Watchdog to Put Pakistan Back on Terrorist Financing Watchlist: Source,” Reuters, February 23, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants-financing/global-watchdog-to-put-pakistan-back-on-terrorist-financing-watchlist-sources-idUSKCN1G70X7.
16. Drazen Jorgic, “U.S. Sanctions Pakistani Companies over Nuclear Trade,” Reuters, March 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa-sanctions/u-s-sanctions-pakistani-companies-over-nuclear-trade-idUSKBN1H20IO.
17. This paper stems from my dissertation, for which I conducted fieldwork in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi throughout 2015. The primary data consist of in‐person interviews, parliamentary debates on anti‐terrorism legislation, terrorism‐related case law, local think tank reports, unclassified statistical information and presentations, and local language newspaper articles. I conducted 92 interviews, 60 percent of which were anonymous, while the rest were on the record.
18. See Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Books, 2007); Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); and C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
19. Mujahideen is the plural of mujahid, a person who is conducting jihad, which is loosely defined as struggle in the name of Islam.
20. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden: From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); and Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
21. Robert G. Wirising, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); International Crisis Group, “Kashmir: The View from Islamabad,” Report no. 68, December 4, 2003, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/kashmir/kashmir-view-islamabad; and Stephen P. Cohen, Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2004).
22. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 187.
23. Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 79–118; Fair, Fighting to the End; Stephen Tankel, “Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan’s Approach to Islamist Militancy,” Journal of Strategic Studies (June 2016): 1–31; and S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 111–41.
24. Before 9/11, the only other large‐scale attack on U.S. soil was Pearl Harbor in 1941, which killed more than 2000 Americans and resulted in the United States’ involvement in World War II.
25. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Free Press, 2006), p. 201. Various high‐level U.S. officials were involved in convincing Pakistan to participate in OEF. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. Maleeha Lodhi and the director general of the ISI Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed in Washington, while U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain met with Musharraf in Islamabad. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin, 2008), p. 27; Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 204–7.; and CNN, “Bush Administration Puts Pressure on Pakistan,” September 13, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/13/pakistan.us.bush/.
26. Seymour M. Hersh, “The Getaway: Questions Surround a Secret Pakistani Airlift,” New Yorker, January 28, 2002, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/01/28/the-getaway-2; Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 327.
27. The first time was in 2008, while the second time Pakistan was on the list from 2012 to 2015. See Usman Hayat and Shahid Karim, “Pakistan on FATF’s Grey List: What, Why, and Why Now?” Dawn, July 6, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1418143.
28. Abbas Nasir, “The Good and Bad Taliban,” Al Jazeera, July 30, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/good-bad-taliban-mullah-omar-malik-ishaq-150730070225207.html; and Thomas E. Ricks, “The Long‐Term Dangers for Pakistan of Believing in ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban,” Foreign Policy, September 29, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/the-long-term-dangers-for-pakistan-of-believing-in-good-and-bad-taliban/.
29. Abubakar Siddique, “New Nationalist Movement Emerges from Pakistan’s Pashtun Protests,” Gandhara, April 11, 2018, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/new-nationalist-movement-emerges-from-Pakistan–pashtun-protests/29159389.html; and Sahar Khan, “Pashtun Protests Reflect Pakistan’s Tensions with U.S., Afghanistan,” Axios, April 16, 2018, https://www.axios.com/pashtun-protests-reflect-pakistans-tensions-with-us-afghanistan-59a00747-5833–4bb9-a15a-5117697be90d.html.
30. Ryan Teague Beckwith, “Read Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Speech,” Time, April 27, 2016, http://time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/.
31. Alex Ward, “Trump Is Sending More Than 3,000 Troops to Afghanistan,” Vox, September 17, 2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/19/16227730/trump-afghanistan-3000-troops-mattis; and David Welna, “Defense Secretary Mattis Sends More Troops to Afghanistan with Hopes to End War,” All Things Considered, National Public Radio, March 14, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/03/14/593609862/defense-secretary-mattis-sends-more-troops-to-afghanistan-with-hopes-to-end-war.
32. Robin Emmott, “NATO to Send More Troops to Afghanistan after U.S. Shift,” Reuters, November 7, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-afghanistan/nato-to-send-more-troops-to-afghanistan-after-u-s-shift-idUSKBN1D71E0.
33. Council on Foreign Relations, “War in Afghanistan,” Global Conflict Tracker, June 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/war-in-afghanistan.
34. Congress created the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2008 and tasked the office with conducting independent and objective oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. SIGAR submits a quarterly report to Congress, as mandated by law, which summarizes U.S. reconstruction efforts, including U.S. commitments, expenditures, and revenues. The second quarterly report of 2018 was released on April 30 and summarizes Afghanistan’s reconstruction effort from January 1 to March 31, 2018. See SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2018, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018–04-30qr.pdf. Also see James Clark, “The War in Afghanistan Is (Still) Going Terribly,” Task and Purpose, May 1, 2018, https://taskandpurpose.com/war-afghanistan-continues-go-terribly/.
35. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 169–79.
36. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 11–13.
37. Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 305, and Rashid, Taliban, p. 45. Also see “Statement by Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,”March 7, 1995, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/raphael.htm.
38. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 15. According to Steve Coll, Pulitzer prize–winning journalist, it was reasonable for the Taliban to view Unocal as an arm of the U.S. government. See Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 364; and Rashid, Taliban, p. 179.
39. Rashid, Taliban, p. 46.
40. For more information on the Pakistan‐Iran relationship in the context of Baluchistan, see Ahsan Butt, Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy against Separatists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), p. 73; Chris Zambelis, “A New Phase of Resistance and Insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 7 (July 2009), https://ctc.usma.edu/a-new-phase-of-resistance-and-insurgency-in-iranian-baluchistan/; Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015); and Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “Iran‐Pakistan at the Crossroads?” The Diplomat, July 9, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/iran-pakistan-at-the-crossroads/.
41. In 1998, Iran nearly went to war with the Taliban for killing 11 Iranian diplomats and a journalist. See Douglas Jehl, “Iran Holds Taliban Responsible for 9 Diplomats’ Deaths,” New York Times, September 11, 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/11/world/iran-holds-taliban-responsible-for-9-diplomats-deaths.html.
42. CNN, “1998 US Embassies in Africa Bombings Fast Facts,” August 9, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/index.html.
43. Oriana Zill, “The Controversial U.S. Retaliatory Missile Strikes,” Frontline, PBS, August 1998, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/retaliation.html; and Al Jazeera, “Taliban Oil,” October 8, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2016/10/taliban-oil-afghanistan-161004085739050.html.
44. Los Angeles Times, “Unocal Pulls out of Afghan Pipeline Project,” December 8, 1998, http://articles.latimes.com/1998/dec/08/business/fi-51711.
45. Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1999): pp. 22–35.
46. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001), pp. 348–49; Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity,” 13, no. 3 (July 2001), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701.pdf; and Michael Rubin, “Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (March 2002), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-is-responsible-for-the-taliban.
47. By 2000, no U.S. president had visited India in 22 years, Pakistan in 30 years, or Bangladesh since its independence in 1971. See Richard Haass, “Clinton Should Try to Cool South Asia,” Brookings, Opinions, March 17, 2000, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/clinton-should-try-to-cool-south-asia/; and Rudolph and Rudolph, “The Making of US Foreign Policy for South Asia,” p. 705; Kux, The United States and Pakistan, pp. 356–58.
48. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh met 14 times in seven countries between June 1998 and September 2000. Talbott has documented his experiences in detail in a memoir. See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2004).
49. President Bill Clinton, speech to Pakistani people, Pakistan TV, March 25, 2000, https://www.c-span.org/video/?156234–1/speech-pakistani-people.
50. Talbott, Engaging India, pp. 200–205.
51. RAND, “Operation Enduring Freedom: An Assessment,” Research Brief, RB-9148, 2005, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9148/index1.html.
52. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re‐Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, December 22, 2001, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
53. International Security Assistance Force, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.
54. Shahid Hussein, “Pakistan Welcomes Bonn Agreement,” Gulf News, December 5, 2001, https://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/pakistan-welcomes-bonn-agreement-1.431752.
55. Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin, 2018), pp. 140–41; and Riaz Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 106–8.
56. David Kilcullen, Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 18–19; Coll, Directorate S, p. 135. Also see Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement One Year Later,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/12/05/afghanistans-bonn-agreement-one-year-later.
57. The Iraq war led to the creation of the Islamic State of Daesh (ISIS). See Zachary Lamb, “Islamic State,” CFR Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islamic-state; Zach Beauchamp, “18 Things About ISIS You Need to Know,” Vox, November 17, 2015, https://www.vox.com/cards/things-about-isis-you-need-to-know; and Mehdi Hasan, “Blowback: How ISIS Was Created by the U.S. Invasion of Iraq,” The Intercept, January 29, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/01/29/isis-iraq-war-islamic-state-blowback/.
58. William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, “A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network,” New York Times, February 12, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/world/a-tale-of-nuclear-proliferation-how-pakistani-built-his-network.html; Ester Pan, “Nonproliferation: The Pakistan Network,” CFR Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 7, 2005, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nonproliferation-pakistan-network; and William Langewiesche, “The Wrath of Khan,” The Atlantic, November 2005, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/304333/.
59. During her Senate confirmation hearing to become the director of the CIA, Gina Haspel stated that the CIA continues to monitor any links between Pakistan’s nuclear scientists and extremist groups. See Gina Haspel, confirmation hearing, Senate Intelligence Committee, May 9, 2018, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-nomination-gina-haspel-be-director-central-intelligence-agency. Also see Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz, “The Long Shadow of A. Q. Khan,” Snapshot, Foreign Affairs, January 31, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018–01-31/long-shadow-aq-khan; and Sahar Khan, “How Haspel’s CIA Could Improve U.S.–Pakistan Relations,” Axios, May 24, 2018, https://www.axios.com/how-haspels-cia-could-improve-uspakistan-relations-eb12b1ca-11d1-4928-b8ce-49f292083c56.html.
60. Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, “The Ally from Hell,” The Atlantic, December 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/308730/; Abubakar Siddique, “How Safe Is Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal?” RadioFreeEurope.com, August 19, 2012, https://www.rferl.org/a/how-safe-is-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/24681549.html; and Rahmatullah Nabil, “The World Must Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” New York Times, August 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/opinion/the-world-must-secure-pakistans-nuclear-weapons.html.
61. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations Including Details of the Kashmir Framework (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 596–608. Also see Ikram Junaidi, “Quality, Capacity, Safety of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Better Than India’s,” Dawn, December 28, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1304890.
62. “Obama’s Address on the War in Afghanistan,” New York Times, December 1, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html.
63. Danielle Kurtzleben, “CHART: How the U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan Have Changed under Obama,” NPR, July 6, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/07/06/484979294/chart-how-the-u-s-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-have-changed-under-obama.
64. Dave Philipps, “Mission Ends in Afghanistan, but Sacrifices Are Not Over for U.S. Soldiers,” New York Times, December 31, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/01/us/mission-ends-but-sacrifices-are-not-over-for-us-soldiers.html.
65. CNN, “Death of Osama bin Laden Fast Facts,” April 15, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/death-of-osama-bin-laden-fast-facts/index.html; Husain Haqqani, “What Pakistan Knew about the Bin Laden Raid,” Foreign Policy, May 13, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/13/what-pakistan-knew-about-the-bin-laden-raid-seymour-hersh/; and Ahmed Rashid, “Sy Hersh and Osama bin Laden: The Right and the Wrong,” The New York Review of Books, September 29, 2016, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/09/29/sy-hersh-osama-bin-laden-right-and-wrong/.
66. Asad Hashim, “Leaked Report Shows bin Laden’s ‘Hidden Life’,” Al Jazeera, July 8, 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/07/20137813412615531.html.
67. The Obama administration had begun leaning toward talking to the Taliban in 2010. See Coll, Directorate S, pp. 447–49.
68. Matthew Rosenberg, “Taliban Opening Qatar Office, and Maybe Doors to Talks,” New York Times, January 3, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/world/asia/taliban-to-open-qatar-office-in-step-toward-peace-talks.html; and Christoph Reuter, Gregor Peter Schmitz, and Holger Stark, “How German Diplomats Opened Channel to Taliban,” Spiegel, January 10, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/talking-to-the-enemy-how-german-diplomats-opened-channel-to-taliban-a-808068.html.
69. Coll, Directorate S, pp. 578–79.
70. Dawn, “Obama Signs Kerry–Lugar Bill into Law,” October 16, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/913807; and Stephen D. Krasner, “Talking Tough to Pakistan: How to End Islamabad’s Defiance,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (January/February 2010): 93.
71. “Advance Questions for Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, Nomination for the Position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” July 2011, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Winnefeld%2007–21-11.pdf.
72. Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, Fort Myer, Arlington, VA, August 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/. The chance that the U.S. homeland remains vulnerable to attacks from Afghanistan is actually low. Yet policymakers have consistently engaged in threat inflation. See Benjamin H. Friedman, “Alarums and Excursions: Explaining Threat Inflation in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, eds. Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller (Washington: Cato Institute, 2014), pp. 281–303.
73. On U.S. mismanagement of Afghan reconstruction, see Phil Hegeseth, “Inspector General Reveals DoD Can’t Verify Where $3.1 billion Was Spent in Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, March 31, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/03/inspector-general-reveals-dod-cant-verify-where-3–1-billion-was-spent-in-afghanistan.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+LongWarJournalSiteWide+%28FDD%27s+Long+War+Journal+Update%29; and Clark, “The War in Afghanistan,” https://taskandpurpose.com/war-afghanistan-continues-go-terribly/. On lack of coordination between U.S. troops and ISAF, see Gopal Ratnam, “Poor Planning, Coordination Cited in Afghan Intervention,” USIP analysis and commentary, United States Institute of Peace, December 16, 2015, https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/12/poor-planning-coordination-cited-afghan-intervention. For corruption within Afghan domestic politics, see Javid Ahmad, “Mafia Politics Threatens Afghan Security as Much as Insurgency Does,” The Hill, January 4, 2018, http://thehill.com/opinion/international/367414-mafia-politics-threaten-afghan-security-as-much-as-insurgency-does.
74. See Fair, Fighting to the End, pp. 103–35; Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity,” p. 24.
75. Husan Haqqani, “From Key Pakistani General to ISIS Terrorist ‘Killed’ in Jihad, the Chilling Saga of Shahid Aziz,” The Print, May 27, 2018, https://theprint.in/opinion/from-key-pakistani-general-to-isis-terrorist-killed-in-jihad-the-chilling-saga-of-shahid-aziz/63221/.
76. Rubin, “Who Is Responsible for the Taliban?” Colonel “Imam” was killed by the TTP in 2011. See Jane Perlez, “Onetime Taliban Handler Dies in Their Hands,” New York Times, January 24, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/asia/25pakistan.html; and Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Implications of Colonel Imam’s Murder in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 4 (April 2011): 18–20, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-implications-of-colonel-imams-murder-in-pakistan/.
77. Hersh, “The Getaway”; Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 327.
78. C. Christine Fair, “The Milli Muslim League: The Domestic Politics of Pakistan’s Lashkar‐e‐Taiba,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, May 7, 2018, https://www.hudson.org/research/14305-the-milli-muslim-league-the-domestic-politics-of-pakistan-s-lashkar-e-taiba. Also see Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar‐e‐Taiba (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
79. Saba Imtiaz, “Militancy in Pakistan and Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Security Program Carnegie Fellow, New America Foundation, August 2014; Saba Imtiaz and Declan Walsh, “In Pakistan, a Charity Project Points to Official Tolerance of Militants,” New York Times, January 28, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/world/in-pakistan-a-charity-project-points-to-official-tolerance-of-militants.html; and Saba Imtiaz, “Pakistan’s Perpetual Militant Feedback,” Foreign Policy, January 25, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/25/pakistan-india-azhar-pathankot-jaish/.
80. Karzai suspected as early as 2003 that Pakistan was continuing to sponsor the Taliban and Haqqani Network. See Coll, Directorate S, p. 198.
81. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Pakistan,” http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/pakistan.html; and “Pakistan’s Afghan Refugees: A Timeline,” Express Tribune (Pakistan), October 5, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1193771/pakistans-afghan-refugees-timeline/.
82. Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier (New York: Viking, 2009), pp. 43–54; Zahid Hussein, “Pakistan’s Most Dangerous Place,” Wilson Quarterly (Winter 2012): 15–21, https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/winter-2012-lessons-of-the-great-depression/pakistans-most-dangerous-place/; and Foreign Policy and New America Foundation, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” April 19, 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/19/the-battle-for-pakistan-militancy-and-conflict-in-pakistans-tribal-regions/.
83. Shuja Nawaz, “The Pakistan Army and Its Role in FATA,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 1 (January 2009): 19–21, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-pakistan-army-and-its-role-in-fata/.
84. Zafar Abbas, “Pakistan’s Undeclared War,” BBC News, September 10, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3645114.stm.
85. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik‐i‐Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 2 (January 2008): 1–4, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/CTC%20Sentinel%20-%20Profile%20of%20Tehrik-i-Taliban%20Pakistan.pdf.
86. BBC, “Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar School Attack Leaves 141 Dead,” December 16, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30491435.
87. South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000–2018,” http://www.satp.org/Datasheets.aspx?countries=pakistan. (Data Sheets accessed on July 6, 2018.)
88. Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,” RAND, 2010, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf; and Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 3 (March 2009): 7–10, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss3-Art3.pdf.
89. Counterinsurgency campaigns targeting the Pakistani Taliban began in 2009.
90. Express Tribune, “490 Soldiers, 3500 Militants Killed in Operation Zarb‐e‐Azb So Far: DG ISPR,” June 15, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1123356/1-dg-ispr-addresses-press-conference-afghanistan-pakistan-border-clashes/.
91. Mehmood Ul Hassan Khan, “Operation Radd‐ul‐Fasaad and Its Parameters of Success,” Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies, April 27, 2017, https://ankasam.org/en/operation-radd-ul-fasaad-parameters-success/; and Hannah Johnsrud and Frederick W. Kagan, “Pakistan’s Counter‐Militant Offensive: Operation Raddul Fasaad,” Critical Threats, American Enterprise Institute, August 25, 2017, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/pakistans-counter-militant-offensive-operation-raddul-fasaad.
92. Amnesty International, “Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan,” ASA 33/018/2008 (2008), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA330182008ENGLISH.pdf; Reema Omer, “Forgotten Justice,” Dawn, September 25, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1285903; and Umer Farooq, “How War Altered Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Snapshot, Foreign Affairs, October 6, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2017–10-06/how-war-altered-pakistans-tribal-areas.
93. Sahar Khan, “Pashtun Protests Reflect Pakistan’s Tensions with U.S., Afghanistan,” Axios, April 16, 2018, https://www.axios.com/pashtun-protests-reflect-pakistans-tensions-with-us-afghanistan-59a00747-5833–4bb9-a15a-5117697be90d.html.
94. Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan,” New York Times, June 24, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25islamabad.html.
95. Rani D. Mullen, “India in Afghanistan: Understanding Development Assistance by Emerging Donors to Conflict‐Affected Countries,” Changing Landscape of Assistance to Conflict‐Affected States: Emerging and Traditional Donors and Opportunities for Collaboration, Policy Brief no. 10, Stimson Center, August 2017, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/India%20in%20Afghanistan%20Understanding%20Development%20Assistance%20by%20Emerging%20Donors%20to%20Conflict-Affected%20Countries_0.pdf.
96. Shoaib A. Rahim, “Capricious Afghanistan–Pakistan Trade: Who Wins?” The Diplomat, May 25, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/capricious-afghanistan-pakistan-trade-who-wins/.
97. Dawn, “Trade Route Linking Chabahar Port with Afghanistan a Security Threat,” May 31, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1261792.
98. Harsh V. Pant, “India–Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port: Choppy Waters,” CSIS Briefs, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/india-iran-cooperation-chabahar-port-choppy-waters; Stimson Center, “Strategic Competition in Southern Asia: Arms Racing or Modernization?,” event, Washington, May 17, 2017, https://www.stimson.org/content/strategic-competition-southern-asia-arms-race-or-modernization; and Max Bearak and Brian Murphy, “To Sidestep Pakistan, India Embraces an Iranian Port,” Washington Post, May 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/24/to-sidestep-pakistan-india-embraces-an-iranian-port/?utm_term=.6d345746961c.
99. For a detailed analysis on CPEC, see Arif Rafiq, “China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Barriers and Impact,” Peaceworks no. 135, United States Institute of Peace, pp. 24–29, file:///H:/My%20Documents/PA/Pakistan–State-sponsored%20Militancy/Arif%20Rafiq–CPEC.pdf.
100. Sahar Khan, “After Kabul Hotel Attack, Pakistan Should Make Clear Where It Stands,” Cato at Liberty (blog), January 23, 2018, https://www.cato.org/blog/kabul-hotel-attack-opportunity-pakistan.
101. All 16 laws are listed in chronological order: (1) the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860; (2) the Explosive Act, 1884; (3) the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; (4) the Explosive Substance Act, 1908; (5) the Punjab Arms Ordinance, 1965; (6) the Qanun‐e‐Shahadat Order, 1984 (also known as the Evidence Act or Evidence Order); (7) the Anti‐Terrorism Act of 1997; (8) the Anti‐Money Laundering Act, 2010; (9) the Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, 2011; (10) the Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013; (11) the National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013; (12) the Protection for Pakistan Act, 2014; (13) the Constitution (Twenty‐First Amendment) Act (Act 1 of 2015); (14) the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act (Act II of 2015); (15) the Constitution (Twenty‐Third Amendment) Act, 2017; and (16) the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act, 2017. The statutes in italics are procedural in nature, whereas the others are substantive laws that define crimes and list punishments for offenses not covered under the ATA.
102. The Anti‐Terrorism Act, 1997, http://www.molaw.gov.pk/molaw/userfiles1/file/Anti-Terrorism%20Act.pdf.
103. Huma Yusuf, “Pakistan’s Anti‐Terrorism Courts,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 3 (March 2010), https://ctc.usma.edu/pakistans-anti-terrorism-courts/.
104. Charles Kennedy, “The Creation and Development of Pakistan’s Anti‐Terrorism Regime,” in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, eds. Satu Limaye et al. (Honolulu: Asia‐Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 400.
105. Dawn, “New Regulations Give Legal Cover to Detentions in Tribal Areas,” July 12, 2011, https://www.dawn.com/news/643548.
106. Sahar Khan, “Selective Activism: The Role of Pakistan’s Judiciary in Counterterrorism,” Pakistan Politico, July 9, 2018, http://pakistanpolitico.com/selective-activism-the-role-of-pakistans-judiciary-in-counterterrorism/.
107. Mark M. Stavsky, “The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan,” Cornell International Law Journal 16, no. 2 (Summer 1983): 341–94, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=cilj.
108. Sahar Khan, “Pakistan’s Military Courts: The Army’s Newest Political Tool,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, no. 11 (Summer 2016): 15–23, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160701_npfp_summer2016.pdf.
109. Declan Walsh, “Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead,” New York Times, December 16, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world/asia/taliban-attack-pakistani-school.html.
110. “National Action Plan, 2014,” National Counter Terrorism Authority NACTA Pakistan, https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/.
111. Reema Omer, “Objection, Your Honour,” Friday Times, August 14, 2015, http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/objection-your-honour/.
112. Khan, “Selective Activism.”
113. National Internal Security Policy 2014, https://nation.com.pk/27-Feb-2014/text-of-national-security-policy-2014–18.
114. The laws are the Police Act of 1861 and Police Rules 1934.
115. International Crisis Group, Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, Asia Report no. 102 (Washington: ICG, 2005).
116. Aqil Shah, “Getting the Military out of Pakistani Politics: How Aiding the Army Undermines Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 69–82, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011–04-15/getting-military-out-pakistani-politics.
117. Rebecca Williams, “PCF and PCCF—Similar but Different,” Budget Insight, A Stimson Center Blog on National Security Spending, October 12, 2009, https://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/12/pcf-and-pccf-similar-but-different/. For a brief history of U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, see Richard F. Grimmett, “U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan,” CRS Report RS22757, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2009, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22757.pdf.
118. Julian Pecquet, “Congress Axes Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund,” The Hill, March 22, 2013, http://thehill.com/policy/international/289803-congress-axes-petraeus-backed-pakistan-counterinsurgency-fund. Congress also discontinued the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), which was established together with the PCF in 2009, in April 2013. See Dawn, “US Ends Counter‐Insurgency Assistance,” April 13, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/802216.
119. Anwar Iqbal, “US to Withhold $255m from Another Fund after CSF Cuts,” Dawn, December 31, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1379904/us-to-withhold-255m-from-another-fund-after-csf-cuts.
120. Sahar Khan, “What Is the CSF and Why It Serves U.S. Interests in Afghanistan,” Cato at Liberty (blog), January 5, 2018, https://www.cato.org/blog/what-csf-why-it-serves-us-interests-afghanistan; and C. Christine Fair, “A New Way of Engaging Pakistan,” Lawfare (blog), April 11, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-way-engaging-pakistan.
121. Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Anti‐Terror Law Amended to Ban UN‐Listed Groups, Individuals,” Dawn, February 13, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1389042; and C. Christine Fair, “Jamaat‐ud‐Dawa: Converting Kuffar at Home, Killing Them Abroad,” Currents Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, November 4, 2017, https://www.hudson.org/research/13874-jamaat-ud-dawa-converting-kuffar-at-home-killing-them-abroad.
122. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “After FATF Grey‐Listing, Pakistan Faces EU Black‐Listing Threat,” Economic Times, March 5, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/after-fatf-grey-listing-pakistan-faces-eu-black-listing/articleshow/63161750.cms; and Michael Kugelman, “Now That It’s Headed to the Grey List, Pakistan Faces Real Economic Risks Too,” The Print, February 26, 2018, https://theprint.in/opinion/now-headed-grey-list-pakistan-faces-real-economic-risks/38036/.
123. Adam Taylor, “Do Sanctions Work? The Evidence Isn’t Compelling,” Washington Post, August 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/02/do-sanctions-work-the-evidence-isnt-compelling/?utm_term=.189ac50970dc.
124. Uzair Younus, “How Will Being on the FATF Grey‐List Actually Impact Pakistan?” The Diplomat, March 1, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/how-will-being-on-the-fatf-grey-list-actually-impact-pakistan/.
125. For information on Pakistan’s anti‐money‐laundering laws, see Zafar Azeem, “Pakistan’s Anti‐money Laundering Laws,” Business Recorder, June 28, 2012, https://fp.brecorder.com/2012/06/201206281206530/.
126. Madeeha Anwar, “US Designates Pakistani Party Milli Muslim League as ‘Terrorist,’” Voice of America, April 3, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-designates-pakistan-party-milli-muslim-league-terrorists/4331538.html.
127. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, “U.S. Adds Pakistan’s Milli Muslim League to Terror List,” April 3, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-milli-muslim-league-u-s-terror-list/29141811.html.
128. Fair, “The Milli Muslim League.”
129. Richard G. Olson, “How Not to Engage with Pakistan,” New York Times, January 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/opinion/pakistan-trump-aid-engage.html?_r=3.
130. “China in Talks with Baloch Militant to Secure CPEC Projects, Says FT,” Dawn, February 20, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1390520; and Shazar Shafqat, “CPEC and the Baloch Insurgency,” The Diplomat, February 8, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/cpec-and-the-baloch-insurgency/.
131. “America’s Decision to Freeze Military Aid to Pakistan Won’t Work,” The Economist, January 13, 2018, http://media.economist.com/news/asia/21734461-pakistan-has-more-leverage-over-america-other-way-around-americas-decision-freeze.
132. John Glaser, “Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward‐Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 816, July 18, 2017, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa_816.pdf; and John Glaser, “A Naval Race with China Is Unnecessary and Will Likely Backfire,” Arizona Daily Star, June 18, 2018, https://tucson.com/opinion/national/john-glaser-a-naval-race-with-china-is-unnecessary-and/article_5574f5b4-c381-5d74-b095-5006dfcf6c7f.html.
133. In October 2017, the Trump administration declared the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Qatar, as a failed Obama administration initiative. The announcement, however, did not gain much traction and has since disappeared. See Sameer Lalwani, “Putting Peace out of Reach,” U.S. News and World Report, October 27, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/world-report/articles/2017–10-27/closing-the-taliban-doha-office-will-harm-us-aims-in-afghanistan.
134. Sahar Khan, “How Haspel’s CIA could improve U.S.–Pakistan relations,” Axios, May 24, 2018, https://www.axios.com/how-haspels-cia-could-improve-uspakistan-relations-eb12b1ca-11d1-4928-b8ce-49f292083c56.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twsocialshare&utm_campaign=organic.