The Trump administration released its new National Security Strategy outlining its foreign policy plans.

Justin Logan, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies: “The authors should be congratulated for challenging themselves to ‘evaluate, sort, and prioritize’ US interests, and to avoid ‘laundry lists of wishes or desired end states.’ They dodged the usual ‘Christmas tree’ problem, in which special interests vie to ensure their respective ornaments get a prestigious place on the tree. The strategy also conveys important truths, such as that Europe should ‘stand on its own feet… taking primary responsibility for its own defense,’ and that ‘the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy… are thankfully over.’ As ever, though, translating these rhetorical commitments into policy will be a struggle, particularly in the case of a president who is unlikely to be bound by the broad principles laid out in the document.”

Jon Hoffman, Research Fellow: “The 2025 NSS includes an encouraging vision for US Middle East policy. It recognizes the limited strategic importance of the Middle East and that the region should no longer consume American foreign policy. However, the chief obstacle to such policy change has never been a lack of viable alternatives—it remains a matter of political will. The past four presidents—two of which were Donald Trump—ran on a platform of less US involvement in the Middle East, yet pursued policies rooted in continuity, not change. Washington remains entangled, trying to micromanage the region’s affairs. This approach will not realize the stated objectives of this NSS. Whether Trump has the political will to fundamentally change course in the Middle East remains to be seen.”

Brandan Buck, Research Fellow: “The contradictory impulses within the 2025 NSS amount to a veneer of ‘America First’ laid over a strategy of continued global hegemony. Although the document repudiates the liberal idealism that fueled the ‘forever wars’ and drew the United States into the internal politics of distant nations, it nevertheless embraces the central postwar assumption that America must remain the global arbiter of peace and security. The NSS thus attempts to square an impossible circle: it promises to prioritize American interests while preserving a global order that requires constant U.S. management, intervention, and attention.”

Benjamin Giltner, Policy Analyst: “Though there are major points to criticize in the National Security Strategy—such as its insistence on the creation of a Golden Dome for the American homeland and its suggestion of Europe being in civilization decline due to migrants—the document is right to note that Europe should ‘stand on its own feet’ and take ‘primary responsibility for its own defense.’ Given America’s fiscal constraints, China’s rise in East Asia, and America’s limited interests in Europe, this is a welcome sign from the Trump administration. Europe has the capabilities and economic resources to deter a potential Russian ground invasion. Following this guidance, the United States should begin withdrawing US ground troops from Europe to encourage European nations to take charge of conventional deterrence on the continent and deploy their combined forces in an effective manner. Doing so would increase the chances for peace in Europe, and would allow the United States to redirect its funds from its troop deployments toward its more pressing concerns.”

Evan Sankey, Policy Analyst: “The new National Security Strategy defines economics as the “Ultimate Stakes” of US competition with China. Like the Biden administration, it stresses the combined economic scale of our allies and partners is a key asset that should be harnessed to maintain America’s economic edge. Its treatment of the military problem hits the right notes on increasing burden sharing by allies, but focuses US resources on Taiwan and the First Island Chain, areas where China has the advantage of proximity. These measures rest uneasily with the “balance of power” principle articulated early in the document: that the US does not seek domination for itself, only to block domination by rival powers. Striving for “military overmatch” on China’s doorstep sounds suspiciously like a bid for US dominance. If so, it will be an expensive and risky endeavor. The strategy wisely says we will maintain good relations with countries with non-democratic governing systems but does not articulate an agenda for addressing any of our political problems with China, which are the ultimate source of tension in the relationship.”

If you would like to speak with them further, please reach out to Madison: mmiller@​cato.​org.