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Should We Expand the Supreme Court?
Featuring: Stephen M. Feldman, Roman Buhler Moderator: Dan Greenberg
Dan Greenberg: Good afternoon. My name is Dan Greenberg, and welcome to the Cato Institute’s latest webinar, where we ask, should we expand the Supreme Court?
I want to begin by saying a word or two about our two guests, and then a word or two about our audience. We have two guests who will answer the question, should we expand the Supreme Court, in a very different way. Our first guest, Stephen Feldman, recently retired from his professorship at the University of Wyoming School of Law. Professor Feldman is the author of Pack the Court: A Defense of Supreme Court Expansion. Our other guest, Roman Buhler, is the national director of the Madison Coalition. Roman is an advocate of the Keep Nine constitutional amendment, which advocates that we write nine seats into the language of the Constitution. Roman Buhler for many years was a high-ranking congressional staffer who advised members of Congress on varied legal and constitutional issues.
I’ll be asking our two guests a number of questions, but you, the audience, also have the opportunity to ask questions. If you would like to direct any questions to either or both of our guests, you can type them in on the web page from which you’re viewing the stream, or you can type them in in the YouTube comments section. Or if you use the hashtag correctly, you can even ask them on X.
And so let me begin with a question for Professor Feldman. Professor Feldman, perhaps you could just give us a minute or three and expand on the title of your book, Pack the Court. Tell us why you favor Supreme Court expansion at this time.
Stephen M. Feldman: Well, first, thank you very much for having me on the forum to discuss this issue. I think there are two overriding issues here. One is whether Congress has the power to expand the court without a constitutional amendment. And second, if they do have the power, should Congress expand the court as soon as possible?
With regard to the first question, whether Congress has the power to expand the court: the constitutional text does not fix the court’s size, but rather leaves it to Congress. And throughout American history, particularly over the first 80 years or so, Congress changed the court’s size multiple times. So Congress has the power. But should Congress expand the court?
The most common argument against court expansion is that it would inject politics into the court. That expansion, therefore, by injecting politics, would undermine the court’s legitimacy as a judicial institution. In other words, law and politics must be kept separate. But I think that is specious with regard to the court’s size. As I already said, the size has been changed by Congress multiple times, and Congress made the change oftentimes for political reasons with regard to the makeup of the court. Throughout American history, presidents have nominated potential justices, and the Senate has confirmed or rejected potential justices, often for political reasons. And perhaps most important, with regard to the judicial process itself, constitutional interpretation and judicial decision making are always partly political. Constitutional interpretation is never mechanical. It’s never two plus two. Politics is always intertwined with interpretation.
So if that’s true, if the court has been and will always be entwined with politics, then court expansion cannot destroy the purity or integrity of the court as a legal or judicial institution. Politics is just part of that institution. And it is precisely the politics of the Roberts Court that should compel Congress to expand the court as soon as possible. This court is implementing a very conservative agenda. The court is undermining the rule of law, and it’s undermining democracy. So to protect and bolster our constitutional government, we should expand the court as soon as possible. Thank you.
Dan Greenberg: Well, I want to ask Mr. Buhler a question, but before I do that, I just want to say we’re all friends here. And so instead of addressing people by their surnames, I’ll just say it’s a pleasure to have both Roman and Stephen on the show. So, Roman, perhaps you could give us a minute or three and explain to us why you advocate the Keep Nine constitutional amendment. And to repeat, the Keep Nine constitutional amendment would write the number of justices as nine into the Constitution, right?
Roman Buhler: Well, thank you, Dan, and thank you to Cato for having me on. And thank you, Steve, for joining me in this conversation. I think we should start with the authors of the Constitution. They set up three independent branches of government. And Steve is absolutely right. For the first decades of our republic, the slave era and the Civil War era, yes, politicians did change the number of justices frequently to get the Supreme Court decisions they wanted. But I think we’ve moved beyond the slave and Civil War era. And for the last 150 years, we’ve had nine justices on the Supreme Court and a very powerful tradition that politicians should not manipulate the number to achieve political control.
And today, there is a great debate as the country becomes more polarized. On one side of the debate are people who say we need an independent Supreme Court, a court that can say no to politicians who abuse their authority, who break the rules. And on the other side, there are people who believe that the Supreme Court should be more of an obedient ally of politicians in Washington, and that every new governing majority is entitled to its own politically obedient Supreme Court. And so we see now very serious proposals to expand the number of justices. And the Keep Nine amendment would simply codify the current number of Supreme Court justices so that politicians, whether Republican or Democrat or some future party, cannot manipulate the size of the court to achieve political control.
So, a little bit about the Keep Nine amendment. Its language is very simple. All it says is, “The Supreme Court of the United States shall be composed of nine justices, consisting of a chief justice and eight associate justices.” It was first introduced in Congress in 2020 by a Democrat. Since then, more than a thousand elected officials, bipartisan, have endorsed it across the country. The polling shows that voters would favor an amendment to keep nine justices on the court by an overwhelming 3 to 1 margin. Even among Democrats, the polling shows 50% more would support such an amendment rather than oppose it. And undecided voters in the 2026 election would have favored the amendment by an overwhelming 6 to 1 margin. So it’s a broad-based movement.
And the question is really, well, why? What are the reasons why we need to preserve an independent court and preserve the number of nine? Well, the first is fairness. Anybody knows if you rig the referees, you ruin the game. We don’t want the home team to be able to control the referee pool. The second is trust. Do we trust politicians to follow the rules all the time? Or do we want an independent Supreme Court that can say no when politicians break the rules? The third is corruption. Everybody’s worried about corruption. Well, how can you enforce laws against corruption if the very politicians that people think might be corrupt can control the courts, which are supposed to limit corruption?
Abuse of power, right? If you ask most people, can you think of a president, current or recent, who has abused power, almost everybody can think of a president. Some on the right might have a different answer than some on the left, but they can think of a president who’s abused power. Do we want a court that enables that abuse of power because it’s controlled by the politicians? Or do we want a court that serves as a check and balance on that abuse of power?
And finally, there’s democracy. How can you have a democracy when the referee that’s supposed to decide whether the rules are being enforced is controlled by the ruling party? And we see around the country that every would-be dictator tries to get control of the court by adding justices, by throwing them off. We don’t want to bring that here.
And so finally, I would just ask, do we want a Supreme Court that can say no to a would-be authoritarian who tries to overturn an election, who tries to deport people without a hearing, who tries to impose tariffs under emergency power, who wants to send troops into major cities, who thinks that birthright citizenship can be canceled by executive order, or who thinks that a president can tell the post office not to deliver mail ballots? Do we want a court that says yes to those things? Or do we want an independent Supreme Court, like the current Supreme Court, that said no when presidents try to abuse their power? That’s why we need the Keep Nine amendment: to preserve an independent Supreme Court that preserves democracy and preserves checks and balances on the abuse of power.
Dan Greenberg: Thank you, Roman. Stephen, I have a question for you. I’d also like to invite you to answer any of the concerns that Roman raised, if you like, but I do have a question for you as well. It seems to me that there might be a danger of a kind of cascade effect if we expand the Supreme Court. If we have one group of people that successfully expands the number of justices to, say, 13, you might in the future have some sort of a partisan shift in Congress, and those new members of Congress might say, well, we have a 13-member court and it’s not working out so well for us. Maybe we should expand the number of justices to 25. Can you say anything about the possibility of opening up the doors to a dynamic of continued expansion? And if you see that as a danger, what ought to be done about that?
Stephen M. Feldman: Yeah, I think that’s a really crucial question, and it’s a criticism of court expansion that’s often raised. In terms of the likelihood of a spiral of court expansion, or sort of tit-for-tat retribution, you know, if the Democrats do it, then the Republicans would do it, and vice versa, the way I’m looking at court expansion, such a spiral probably would not occur. And I’ll explain why. But it is possible. I don’t deny that it’s possible there could be a type of tit-for-tat expansion. But first, let me explain why I’d say it probably would not occur.
I don’t see court expansion in isolation. I think it has to be understood in the context of the politics that will make court expansion possible. So, as we know, in the recent election there was a blue wave, right? And so now both houses of Congress will be controlled by the Democrats, although the White House is still Republican. So there’s certainly not going to be court expansion now, right? Congress could pass a law trying to expand the court, but President Trump will never sign it. He would veto it, and the Democrats will not be able to overcome a veto. So the politics is that if the Democrats hold control of the House and the Senate in 2028 and then also gain the White House, that would be a situation where we could have court expansion, where the Democrats would control all the levers in terms of what’s needed to expand the court by statute.
But if they did so, they should not only expand the court. After expanding the court and changing the dynamics of the court’s decision making, they should then pass laws to protect voting rights and democracy and to stop extreme gerrymandering, basically to clean up the democratic process and make it more fair and open. I think that eliminating gerrymandering in particular would greatly decrease polarization between Democrats and Republicans, so the two parties would more likely be less extreme and would be closer together.
And if the Republicans at some point then had a total sweep, you know, somewhere down the line, whatever year it might be, where they control the House, the Senate and the White House, so they could implement court expansion if they wanted to, it would be a totally different Republican Party. It wouldn’t be the Republican Party we have today. I think we probably could agree they would probably try for court expansion if they thought they needed it. But the Republican Party that might exist at that point in time, somewhere down the road, that could control the Senate, House and presidency very well might not look at the situation and say, you know what, maybe we better expand the court. It could be a different Republican Party. But let’s just say it’s still possible. It might happen. I’m making an argument that’s largely based on conjecture.
So then we would have an expanding court, even larger than 13. And that might not be such a bad thing. First of all, many other nations, including democracies, have much larger apex or constitutional courts. The United States is somewhat anomalous in having such a small court. And if we did have such a large court, we could have panels of justices chosen, like in any of the circuit courts of appeal, where you have many judges and different panels are selected to hear different cases. And if the court expansion did at some point become a problem, like it seemed to be getting out of hand, then people in Congress, Democrats and Republicans together, could try to work out a solution. They could set a final number, maybe an even number of justices, so neither one side nor the other would have an advantage. Or, of course, many other court reforms are floating around: term limits and things like that. But again, hopefully, if there was more protection of the democratic process, there’d be less polarization, and Democrats and Republicans could work together to solve the problem of an ever-expanding court, if it did come to that. Although, again, I think that’s less likely than having it just stop at 13.
Dan Greenberg: So, Roman, let me ask you to respond to that, because what I hear Stephen saying is, it’s certainly possible that we might have a continued cycle of expansion or another episode of expansion, but maybe the new episodes of expansion really won’t be so bad. And I wonder if you would like to talk a little bit about your predictions about what might happen in the future after we have one expansion of the Supreme Court.
Roman Buhler: Well, as someone who served for 14 years as senior counsel for the House of Representatives, I think I can say that I have some practical experience with how politicians work. And I think Steve has too much faith in three areas.
I think first, he has faith that somehow, if politicians are unleashed, they will make the world more bipartisan and less partisan. If you’re a Democrat in Texas or a Republican in California, the experience of dealing with politicians there might lead you to a different conclusion. I don’t think it’s very safe to say that we are entering an era of less polarization. I think we could be entering an era of more polarization, more paranoia. And if one side has packed the court, the other side is going to be eager to respond.
I think the second area is that Steve has confidence that the future of the Republican Party is going to be more mild and less aggressive. And I think there is a strong argument that in the current environment, the Republican Party may become more partisan, more aggressive, more combative. As someone who’s watched both Republican and Democratic politics for years, it is difficult for me to imagine a Republican Party that would not respond to an expansion by Democrats by expanding the court themselves. I mean, you look at what Democrats now use as their arguments for expanding the court, and they cite past Republican abuses. I think there is a near certainty that the Republican Party, or if it’s not the Republican Party, some future opposition party, will, if the precedent is established to expand the court, if they’re frustrated with the court’s decisions, use that precedent to expand the court in the future.
And then finally, there’s the idea that at some future point, there might be a moment when Democrats and Republicans in Congress work together on a bipartisan effort. There is no better time to do that than right now, before the court has expanded, before we enter this cycle of retaliatory court expansion. And I certainly hope that happens. But if there is a time for it to happen, now is the time for it to happen. Let’s not wait a few years and risk the possibility that some future authoritarian will take Steve’s precedent and use it to establish a puppet court that could basically end democracy.
Stephen M. Feldman: Could I respond to that?
Dan Greenberg: Please.
Stephen M. Feldman: Yeah. Roman, I appreciate your experience working for Congress, and that’s important. But I am suggesting that after court expansion, the Democrats should immediately, and there certainly is evidence that they would do this, like their introduction of the John Lewis Act back in, I think, 2021, try to clean up the democratic process and try to eliminate gerrymandering. In particular, I think gerrymandering does contribute strongly to increasing polarization. If you were a Republican in a congressional district in a very red state, what you needed to worry about, until this election, was being primaried from the right. So the party kept moving to the right. The Democrats moved to the left, but not as dramatically, I think, as Republicans moved to the right.
So what I’m saying is, court expansion needs to precede these statutory changes in the democratic process. The reason court packing or court expansion needs to precede these statutes for democracy is that the current Roberts Court could very well invalidate any democratic statutes that, let’s say, eliminate gerrymandering. It’s not entirely clear, but the record suggests that the current conservative justices are somewhat anti-democratic. We can talk about that later on. But the point is that I’m not saying that the Republicans, as they are now, will just naturally move more to the center and become less aggressive. I’m saying there will be structural changes in the democratic process once the court has changed, and then we can have those structural changes. Many of those changes have to overcome Roberts Court decisions like Rucho, which said gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable issue, meaning the court can’t touch it. We just leave it to the partisan process, and it keeps getting worse and worse.
So I’m not suggesting that there will be a moment without structural changes in the democratic process. But I think those will come after court expansion. And you said, well, why wait for the Kumbaya moment in the future? Partly it’s because we need those changes in the democratic process. And this court is not an apolitical court. This court is extremely conservative and has shown that over and over again. I think that leaving it where it is right now will have dramatic effects on the rule of law and democracy for, who knows how long, 30 years, 40 years, however long this conservative supermajority stays in place. Certainly things could change. You know, we don’t know what happens with
Dan Greenberg: Stephen, I wonder if I could ask you to expand on that, because I’m not sure I understand quite what you’re getting at. What I hear you saying is that there’s a high number of partisan judges on the Supreme Court, and a high number of partisan doctrines or decisions. And what I’m trying to figure out is whether you have a theory that a set of new justices who are added to the Supreme Court will be less partisan or less political. Is there some institutional reason to think that that’s so? Or is there some political reason to think that?
Stephen M. Feldman: Yeah. Let me respond to that. First of all, I want to come back to the point I made in my first statement in response to your opening question. I think the court is always political. Constitutional interpretation and decision making is always partly political. Now, I distinguish two types of politics, what I call politics writ small and politics writ large.
Politics writ large is when the justices basically disregard the law and have some predetermined conclusion based on their political or cultural or religious values. Let’s just call it politics. And then they are determined to get that result. And if they talk about the law, if they issue an opinion, they’re using the law just as a sort of post hoc rationalization. That is illegitimate decision making. Politics writ large is where the justices are acting as if they were, let’s say, members of Congress or state legislatures, just saying, we want to pass this law, we want to have this result.
But politics writ small is legitimate. In fact, it’s always part of constitutional interpretation and decision making, unless the justices go to politics writ large. Legitimate politics writ small simply arises from the fact that constitutional interpretation is not mechanical. It’s not two plus two. A justice’s values, political values, religious values, whatever we want to talk about, always influence the justice’s interpretation of the Constitution. That’s why justices’ interpretation, let’s say, of the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment, typically corresponds with their political inclinations. Politics is influencing their interpretation.
So, for instance, let’s take two iconic justices, Scalia and Ginsburg, on opposite ends of the political spectrum. Let’s say we have a First Amendment case, and they both read the First Amendment. Let’s say it’s the free speech clause. They read the free speech clause, and they reach opposite conclusions, right? From my perspective, neither justice is being stupid or disingenuous or lying. They are reading the same language and reaching opposite conclusions because their respective political outlooks or values influence how they interpret that identical language. So politics is always part of it.
So if the Democrats control Congress and expand the court, and there’s a Democratic president who appoints justices, I would hope that these are justices who would try to sincerely interpret the law, and when they sincerely interpret the law, including the Constitution, politics writ small comes into play, right? Their political values will influence their decisions. I would hope they would not decide cases based on politics writ large, where they simply say, I want to reach this political conclusion. I would like that for both Republican-nominated justices and Democratic-nominated justices: that they sincerely interpret the law. But politics is nonetheless always part of interpretation.
Dan Greenberg: Roman, let me ask you to talk a little bit about that, because what I hear from Stephen is that we have this hope that the hypothetically new justices, the justices that change the number of seats from nine to 13, would carry out their role as judges in a different way, and that they would be driven by different dynamics or different incentives than the current nine justices on the Supreme Court. What can we say about the role of a court with respect to the other two branches as it gets expanded? And is there a good reason to believe that new justices are going to behave differently from the justices that we already have on the Supreme Court?
Roman Buhler: Well, first I would start by saying I applaud Steve for mentioning Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a justice that I personally admire in many ways. She said, “I would not support packing the court.” She said nine is a good number. So if we’re using Justice Ginsburg as a reference point, she did not think expanding the number was a good idea.
Predicting the future, as has been said, is really hard, especially about the future. But hoping that a Democratic president will appoint justices who are less inclined to have their views shaped by politics writ large or small, I think that’s just a hope. My view is that an independent Supreme Court is one that cannot be controlled by politicians. Politicians are a subclass of humans who have decided to spend their lives seeking power. And politicians in most countries seek control of courts. They are not particularly thrilled with independent courts that tell them no. So I think hoping that, in some way, an expanded court would be less political is a very risky assumption. In fact, more likely it would become more political. These judges would be appointed explicitly with the intention of changing current judicial rulings.
And I think as people think about this, people who are unhappy with this court’s ruling on abortion, or unhappy with this court’s ruling on the environment, or unhappy with this court’s ruling on voting rights, they have another option. They can win a majority and they can pass, as Steve suggests they might, a law outlawing partisan gerrymandering. The Constitution is very clear. Article I, Section 4 says Congress has the authority to regulate congressional elections. The Supreme Court decision didn’t say that gerrymandering was constitutional or unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said that it’s a matter for legislation. And so if Democrats want to pass a law saying gerrymandering is unconstitutional, I’m not quite sure whether the Democrats in California, who have passed a very thoroughly partisan gerrymander, would support getting rid of it, or the Democrats in New York or the Democrats in Illinois. I think that would be a pretty big fight inside the Democratic Party. But they have the power to do it. People who want to see reform can do it by passing laws, without having to undermine the independence of the court that protects democracy from authoritarians.
Dan Greenberg: So, Stephen, I do want to follow up on this just a little bit more, because it seems to me that, given what I know about the presidential appointment process of Supreme Court justices, presidents often give a great deal of thought to how their appointment power could advantage the president or the party that they share. I wonder if you would agree with me that presidents are really awfully likely to have interviews with potential justices and say, you know, the reason I’m picking you and the reason I’d really like you to serve is that I really want to make sure that you’re going to pay attention to certain legal doctrines or certain legal cases. I wonder if you would agree that presidents are really likely to winnow out potential judicial nominees and settle on the ones where they have a prediction, in some cases, that the justices they pick may not be neutral in all respects.
Stephen M. Feldman: I certainly was not saying that the justices are neutral. I’m saying the justices are political, but a good justice follows politics writ small, which means they focus on the law. They are sincerely interpreting the Constitution or other laws, but politics influences their interpretation of those legal texts. I have no idea exactly what a president says to a potential nominee for the Supreme Court. You very well might be right that the president will try to press the potential nominee on political issues. It’s also entirely possible that the potential nominee will say, I’m just an umpire, right? I call balls and strikes. I’m not political. That’s what judges do. And that is consistent with what I’m saying, in the sense that they’re not overtly political. They’re not doing politics writ large. They are sincerely interpreting the law. But that sincere interpretation is in part political.
So, yes. Would a Democratic president try to pick, let’s say, more progressive justices, or justices who seem to display a more progressive political orientation? Most likely they would. The same way Republican presidents have picked far more conservative justices. But I think it’s important to recognize that the current justices, in perhaps a disproportionate number of cases, appear to be deciding cases by politics writ large. And I can explain that.
I do want to also emphasize that Roman seems to have great faith in this court upholding future congressional enactments that might bolster democracy. And I agree, Congress has the power to do so. That’s my interpretation of the Constitution. But if we just look at the history of the Roberts Court, and actually going back further, ever since Clarence Thomas was appointed to the court, the court has been diminishing congressional power. It has been striking down many congressional enactments, and more progressive or Democratic enactments in particular tend to get struck down by this court more than in past decades. So I don’t necessarily agree that, oh, well, this court will give the best interpretation of the Constitution and say Congress, of course, has the power to eliminate gerrymandering. Even if they did say so in one of their recent opinions, that doesn’t mean they’re actually going to uphold a congressional act. I do not have faith that they would do so. And that’s why I think that we need court expansion, with more progressive justices who would recognize more congressional power than the current set of justices.
Dan Greenberg: Roman, I want to ask you a question about this idea that’s been raised, that it’s just a fact of necessity that presidents and justices are going to pay attention to politics writ small. I wonder if you could talk about a different idea I have, which is that the goal should be that we really ought to have an independent Supreme Court, a court that will be careful about picking sides and can’t be viewed as a wholly partisan actor. Because I think justices don’t really view themselves as partisan actors, at least in some cases. Can you talk a little bit about the danger of expanding the court as a way to jeopardize the court’s independent status, and how we should understand that?
Roman Buhler: Sure. Dan, I really applaud Steve because he talks about a couple of things. He talks about the court as an institution that considers politics. And for sure, there are lots of political considerations that go into picking justices and confirming justices. The court has to deal with issues that most people believe are political now. They try to deal with that in a legal framework. But politics certainly interacts with the way that the Supreme Court operates. But there’s a big difference between a Supreme Court that is involved in considerations of politics in its composition and the confirmation process, and a Supreme Court that is independent from the political actors.
The danger that the authors of the Constitution saw was that an executive or a member of Congress would abuse their power. And I think Steve and most others would concede that there is always a risk that a politician will abuse power. And I think, in recent history, and I don’t have to specify which president, because different parties might apply these labels to different presidents, a lot of people would concede that in recent American history we’ve seen the abuse of presidential power, we’ve seen the abuse of congressional power. And so the Supreme Court must be independent if it is to say no to the abuse of power.
And I think there’s one other point that needs to be made about a lot of the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, and that is that the Supreme Court has actually expanded Congress’s power in many ways. The court has said that executive agencies do not have the authority to expand their power and jurisdiction on major questions unless Congress has given them the authority. That’s a challenge to Congress, but that problem can be solved by Congress. If a new majority decides they want to give the EPA the authority to regulate carbon, they can do it. The Supreme Court never said the EPA doesn’t have the authority to regulate carbon. They just said that Congress hadn’t given it that authority. So Congress can give them that authority. Congress can give agencies the power to do what Congress wants them to do, but it has to be done specifically. And when the court reins in the authority of the agencies and the president to make wildly different interpretations of laws than Congress has intended, the Supreme Court is actually strengthening Congress’s power. And that’s what an independent branch of government can do: it can strengthen congressional power.
Imagine a Supreme Court that was handpicked by a president and a ruling party to basically rubber-stamp any executive authority, any agency action that the president wanted. That’s a dangerous concentration of power. And I think the proof in the pudding is that the Supreme Court has actually said no to the expansion of presidential power, even in an era where this president probably wants more of it.
Dan Greenberg: Stephen, I have an easy question for you and a hard question for you. The easy question is pretty simple, and here it is. Do you favor expansion for any other reason than to change the way the court will rule? Which is to say, is there some other characteristic of the court, or some other process of the court, that you want to positively affect, or is your advocacy of court expansion driven by the fact that you would like to see the court behaving and issuing decisions in a different way than it currently does? That’s the easy question.
Stephen M. Feldman: You want me to answer that first?
Dan Greenberg: Okay.
Stephen M. Feldman: Yeah, I don’t deny that I’d like to see the court change direction in terms of outcomes. But I think I’m also saying, and I hope I’ve been saying this clearly, that the current court is undermining the rule of law and undermining democracy. I think if we had different justices, the decision making would be more principled and sincere in terms of sincerely interpreting the constitutional text and other legal texts. I think this court has gone beyond politics writ small, which again I think is legitimate, to politics writ large.
And maybe it’s time for me to give some examples where I think that they’re doing this. For instance, the incredible number of decisions on the shadow docket, or emergency docket, where the court decides some important issues without full argument and without issuing a full opinion, so they don’t give any reasons. Oftentimes a disproportionate number of those decisions favor President Trump. Or their overruling of long-standing precedents, precedents that have been on the books for decades, where the current conservative justices often exhibit disdain for prior justices, as if, no, they didn’t know what they were doing, and their decisions deserve no respect. So, cases like Dobbs overruling Roe on a right to choose; overruling Humphrey’s Executor on having independent agencies; overruling what Roman was just talking about, the Chevron doctrine, so there’s no deference to administrative agency interpretations of their enabling statutes. There are many instances where this court just does not seem to respect precedents that have been on the books for years. That doesn’t mean they can never be overruled. But there’s an incredible pattern of disdain for the justices of the past.
Dan Greenberg: So, Roman, I’d be pleased to have you respond to that. Although I guess I will point out, Stephen, that it seems to me, if I ask myself how we know whether it’s a good time to expand the court, your answer is that we know it’s a good time to expand the court when the justices on the court currently are just doing bad work, when they’re just being bad or subpar justices. And I’m puzzled as to how one distinguishes that sort of judgment from one’s political views generally. But that’s a different issue. Roman, would you like to respond to anything Stephen said?
Roman Buhler: Well, first of all, I think it’s interesting that he has raised the issue of the shadow docket. We do not need an expanded court to establish procedures that require justices to issue opinions in cases that are decided on what he now calls the shadow docket. That may be a reform that should be adopted, but it does not require destroying the independent Supreme Court to correct what might be improper procedures on the shadow docket.
And the second thing is long-standing precedent. I grew up in an era when one of the great long-standing precedents of the Supreme Court was Plessy v. Ferguson, which legalized segregation. And it was a blessing, one of the great moments in American history, when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education overturned Plessy. So just because the Supreme Court has done something in the past doesn’t make it right.
And when we talk about Dobbs, look, if people disagree with the Dobbs decision, Congress is perfectly free to pass an abortion rights bill. They don’t need to pack the court. Talk about Humphrey’s Executor, which gives the president the unlimited authority to fire any government policymaking official. I’m not sure I agree with that decision, but that is a principled position that some of the justices have had for more than a generation. And if people really disagree with the decision, if they believe that Congress ought to be able to, with the president signing a law, create offices whose occupants the president can’t fire, there is a perfectly good remedy, which is a constitutional amendment reinterpreting the Constitution. To say that the Supreme Court is somehow illegitimate because it decided that executive branch officials should be accountable to the chief executive: you can disagree with the policy, but I don’t think the court is illegitimate because it made that decision.
And we talk about Chevron. Here is one of the great cases in American law that restricts the absolute power of the president’s appointees to make law without the consent of Congress. And I personally think that was a great decision. Now, people disagree with it. There are certainly legislative ways that they can deal with it. But most importantly, if you think that the federal agencies ought to have the authority to, for example, regulate the water in every ditch in America, you don’t pass a law saying navigable waters are regulated and then try to expand that to ditches on a farmer’s farm. Pass a law that says every ditch is a federally regulated waterway, and then let’s see what the American people think about that. An enormous amount of criticism of this court has basically been because this court has tried to restrict the authority of unelected bureaucrats to do things that Congress never intended. I don’t think that makes the court illegitimate. People can disagree with the policy, but personally, I think that’s a great decision.
And so, really, we come back to the fundamental question: do we want a Supreme Court like a president’s cabinet that will do the president’s bidding when the president wants it, and if they don’t, they can be replaced or outvoted? That’s the road we go down. And I heard Stephen, and I admire him for saying this, that he doesn’t mind a Supreme Court of a large number of people. Well, look at Venezuela, with 30-plus justices, right? The president didn’t like the court saying no. So the president and his ruling party simply added justices until they got a court that would say yes. And I think the real question for Americans is, do we want a court that always says yes, or do we want a court that has the power to say no when politicians break the rules or abuse their power?
Dan Greenberg: Professor Feldman, we actually have two questions that raise an international perspective, and I’m reminded of them by something that Roman just said. We have a question that says, “History shows us that packing the courts is the end of the rule of law for your country. It is how free Venezuela was lost, and many other countries. Your rights are over. Whatever political power is in control can simply add justices until they have enough to take away any right they wish.”
I also want to ask you, though, Stephen, here’s a question about Poland. The question is, “I’m wondering if either of the speakers has been following the saga of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, which provides an excellent example of what happens when ruling majorities start packing the key national tribunal charged with interpreting the Constitution.” And I wonder if you have a view about whether historical experience of court expansion might affect your judgment and might affect your predictions about what is likely to happen in the American context.
Stephen M. Feldman: Yeah, I think those points are important, but I actually think they cut the other way here. It is absolutely true, from my perspective, and I’m not a comparativist, meaning I’m not an expert in the constitutions or constitutional decisions of other countries, but I have read some, as far as I know, it’s absolutely true that there have been authoritarian rulers in other nations, like Venezuela and Poland, who have attempted to capture the apex or constitutional court. So they’ve done court packing to favor the authoritarian right. They do it because it’s good for an authoritarian to have a legal veneer justifying their actions. If they can capture the constitutional court, the apex court, and that court then just rubber-stamps the authoritarian’s actions, it makes it look more legitimate, even if it isn’t.
Okay, I agree that’s happened. But in our current context in the United States, it is this Roberts Court that is undermining the rule of law and weakening democracy. So what we need to do is to have justices who are more principled, who will sincerely interpret the Constitution. And yes, if they are appointed by Democrats, their political values will probably influence them, for instance, to interpret congressional power more expansively, or, let’s say, to recognize religious freedom, or interpret religious freedom, in a way that’s more equal for non-Christians, rather than what this current court is doing, which seems to be favoring Christians over non-Christians. The problem with this court is that, as it is currently constituted, it is undermining the rule of law and democracy. So, sure, in other contexts where an authoritarian comes in and wants to capture the court, they’re going to use court packing to do that. We are in the opposite situation. We need to change this court to protect the rule of law and democracy, not to undermine it.
Dan Greenberg: Roman, I do want to ask you. It seems to me that one large theme of the hour that we’ve just had is that it really is very difficult to predict the future. And I wonder if you could say something about any reasons we might have to conclude that court packing or court expansion is going to have either a positive or a negative outcome. I wonder how you understand our limited ability to predict the future, and how you look at the likeliest consequences of court expansion.
Roman Buhler: You know, I heard a judge say once that being a judge is tough because half of the audience in the courtroom goes out of the courtroom saying justice was served, and the other half goes out saying, we were robbed. And courts exist to make difficult decisions. If we had consensus on what courts should decide, we might not need courts, but we need them precisely because every once in a while, politicians don’t follow the rules. And so when you talk about protecting the rule of law, the rule of law is distinct from the rule of the king. If the king can decide what the law is, then there really isn’t any more rule of law. There’s the rule of the king. And that’s why we have courts that we want to be independent, that can say no to a king. And we recently had hundreds of thousands of people attend or support No Kings rallies. Well, if you don’t want kings to rule America, then you need a court that can say no.
And if you disagree with the decisions of this court, and there are many people that do, the right solution is to win elections and pass laws, and if you win enough elections, the court does change. This court is appointed by politicians, it’s confirmed by politicians, but it takes time. And so the balance is between having a court that represents the will of the people writ large over a generation, as opposed to the will of politicians right now who want to control the court. That’s where we are. And I worry that if we don’t pass the Keep Nine amendment to prevent politicians from manipulating the size of the court, we can’t predict the future down the road. One day there is going to be another president who wants absolute power. And if that president can manipulate the size of the court to get that court to say yes, we will regret it. Our democracy will be threatened, the rule of law will be threatened, and every one of our constitutional rights that depends on a court being able to say no to politicians who want to abuse them, every one of our constitutional rights, is at risk.
Dan Greenberg: Stephen Feldman, Roman Buhler, thank you both very much for appearing in this webinar. Politicians don’t always follow the rules, but I have to follow the rules and bring this to an end. I do want to apologize to all our listeners because we had a lot of questions come in. I apologize we could not get to all of them, but the video recording of this event will be available on Cato’s website should you wish to watch it or watch it again. Thank you all very much for coming today.