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The Iran War and the Future of US Grand Strategy
Moderator: Emily Jashinsky, UnHerd and Breaking Points
Panelists: Mark Episkopos, Quincy Institute; Arta Moeini, Institute for Peace and Diplomacy; Joshua Shifrinson, Cato Institute; Katherine Thompson, Cato Institute
Emily Jashinsky: …which we are very excited about, the topic. As you can see behind you, it is the Iran war and the future of US grand strategy. I’m tempted to put “grand strategy” in scare quotes, because I’m not even sure what that means at this point in 2026, but we’re going to get into it with our wonderful panelists here, starting on your left, if you’re watching this from the audience: Mark Episkopos of the Quincy Institute, Arta Moeini of the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, Joshua Shifrinson of the Cato Institute, and Katherine Thompson of the Cato Institute. Thank you. Of course, thank you to the Cato Institute for hosting us here today.
So I’m actually going to start—we’ll go down the line with a question off the bat here—with you, Katherine, about the topic at hand, the Iran war and the future of US grand strategy. This is the way we’ll toss it to each of you: Do you believe that the Iran war has shifted grand strategy for the US in one direction or the other? And then how does that change the future?
Katherine Thompson: That is not a small question for this time of 3:51 in the afternoon. I’ll try to be brief. I’m not going to give a very optimistic answer. I worked in the Pentagon in the Trump administration. I was there for the development of the National Defense Strategy. You probably heard in the previous panel lots of praise being lobbed on the National Security Strategy. I would love the same praise on the National Defense Strategy, even though I’m biased in terms of the direction that was set: a more prioritized direction, particularly focusing not only on the US near abroad and securing our homeland, which obviously should be priority number one just by common-sense logic, but then also the focus on the Indo-Pacific and maintaining a credible deterrent vis-à-vis China. There’s a lot in the news this week about economic security when it comes to China and dealing with a lot of diplomatic issues. I think all of that is undergirded by a credible military deterrent, given the scale of disruption that could come from a conflict in that region.
The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy said we are going to prioritize that, and we are going to prioritize that at the exclusion of other things. I thought that was a really strong defense strategy direction. Unfortunately, a war in the Middle East absolutely erodes that, and I think it’s eroded it to our incredible detriment. So I’m not optimistic about the direction of US grand strategy. I think the Iran war has definitely been a setback in that respect.
And unfortunately, I think the evidence—the last panel focused a lot on polling and the sentiments of voters. This one, I think, is much more black and white. It’s a mathematical problem. It’s an interceptor problem. It’s a capabilities problem. It’s an overstretched problem. Unfortunately, numbers do not lie, and I think we’re in a bit of a pickle, to put it nicely.
Emily Jashinsky: Well said. And by the way, I should note that for Q&A, we’re going to be taking questions from both the online and the in-person audience. The online audience can join the conversation and submit questions directly on the event web page. You can do it on YouTube, and you can do it on X as well. So with that said, we’ll go to you, Joshua. What do you think? I mean, it’s two questions: One, has US grand strategy changed with the Iran conflict? Some people would say it’s actually just a continuation of the prior policy. And how does that change—I think you’ll probably say it has changed—but how does that then affect the future of our strategy?
Joshua Shifrinson: Yeah. I think I agree with Katherine that the Iran war itself is not changing the direction of American grand strategy, with one small asterisk, which I’ll speak to in just a second. The tragedy of American grand strategy over the last thirty years is that we keep seeming to end up in high-cost, low-impact sorts of conflicts. We keep seeming to do the same thing over and over and over. And so in that regard, the Trump administration’s decision to go to war with Iran sadly fits in this long trajectory of the US mucking about in places that have very little bearing upon US national security, for very unclear strategic objectives.
Now, the one asterisk I want to offer is that I think the Iran conflict is a little different. And this is, maybe, a modicum—and I say this with all sincerity—a modicum of hope. Once upon a time, you could have imagined the US, even without taking the gloves off and staging a ground invasion, being able to coerce Iran to a fairly serious degree. I think that because of secular changes in technology and the global balance of power, this is giving middle-sized powers, even relatively weak countries like Iran, greater ability to push back upon the United States. And in that regard, if policymakers look at the situation, they might say, “You know what? There’s going to be less in the world that we can do.” I’m not terribly optimistic about that, but I do have a modicum of optimism on that.
Emily Jashinsky: Interesting point.
Arta Moeini: So obviously, I think the Iran war effectively was a culmination of two decades or more of American foreign policy that was effectively neocon, and we have talked about it. The Trump version didn’t have the nation-building element—it doesn’t really care about democracy, even though they said it at the outset. But ultimately, it was a continuation of the same primacist kind of viewpoint. But I do disagree a little bit, because when we take a step back and look at the effects of the Iran war, the structural effects are so significant. This is a historical, major-war proportions event. I’ve called it as important as the fall of the Berlin Wall. I think we are at the end of unipolarity, and the Iran war has announced it.
Grand strategy ultimately is subject to two things. One is our desire, willpower, what we believe, ideology—those kinds of spiritual questions, national questions, political questions that were discussed. The other part is what we can actually do. And I think on both of those vectors, we are going to have huge recalibration. One, in terms of the American people, the reputation of the agenda—I mean, the neocons are against the war. So even the whole moniker, the label of “neocon,” doesn’t necessarily fit anymore, if Robert Kagan comes out and says that he is against the war, or others like him. So I think, first of all, we’ve got to change the terminology. It’s a very specific group of Iran hawks with very close ties to a very specific group in Israel. It’s not even all Israelis—at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, we work with Israelis who are very much against the war, like Danny and many others. So that’s a very particular slice of a small country in itself. And that’s amplified through Fox News, boomercon, sort of environmental context, and the bots and Mark Levin and all of this. It just amplifies that one side. But that will change, because the voters want to change and the younger generation wants to change, and there is no going back, with the demographic inevitability.
The second part, though, is that even if they didn’t want to change—I think maybe it was Reid who mentioned that 72 percent of Americans were in favor of going to war, because the Bush administration had made the time and the effort necessary to basically sell the war. This administration didn’t do that, for various reasons, but the Bush administration put some effort into lying. This time they didn’t even care to lie to us.
So ultimately, even if you do have public support for the war—and this is the second part—the structural reasons won’t change. Iran is a middle power. As Josh said, it shows that America can no longer project power into these distant regions. Maritime projection of power is increasingly ineffective. Then we have the issue of prioritization and strategic environments in the multipolar, or post-unipolar, era. So it’s just impossible to do, even if you want to do it. So ultimately, I think we’re going to have a huge recalibration.
Emily Jashinsky: And Mark, finally to you, but also picking up on something that Arta just said, which was that we are not in a nation-building war now. So there’s a difference in some respect, in that at least the Trump administration isn’t projecting that, even if perhaps you have Mark Levin and the like speaking about regime change, which seems to most people to be packaged together with some element of nation building—or not. Maybe you have some thoughts on that actually. But are we entering a new era where nation building isn’t even on anybody’s agenda?
Mark Episkopos: Yeah. Of all the indictments one can level against this war, the nation-building one doesn’t quite fit. This was a mistake for very different reasons, but a great one nonetheless. I think the war itself does not mark a change, but it does lay bare the inadequacies and the misperceptions that have characterized American grand strategy for a very long time now. And it has laid bare the real problems in American force posture across the world, because we’ve seen, since February of ’26, a middle-power adversary inflict sustained, significant costs on the United States through its strike strategy on GCC partners and others, through closing the Hormuz trade in ways that we cannot easily counter. And if we could have, we already would have.
So that poses a real conundrum, I think, not just for the situation with Iran, but for thinking about American force posture in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe. I’m not going to overdraw this analogy more than I think it deserves, but certainly Taiwan has good reasons to look at this and say, “How much can the United States really protect us if worse comes to worst and we see a real escalatory spiral with China?” The eastern flank states, I think, have a very good case to make that even in the event of a conventional Russia–NATO war, NATO has significant advantages. But over the course of that conflict, the eastern flank states would be wrecked in all sorts of ways. So that creates, I think, a new kind of picture for us, where a lot of the old assumptions about how to wage war and how to win war have not panned out, have blown up in our faces. And this requires a significant recalibration of the way we think about applying force. And it’s possible that when we look back on this year, just literally this year, a hundred years from now, a couple of things jump out in terms of military strategy. And that would be [unclear] general asymmetry.
Emily Jashinsky: We’re in a very precarious moment right now, where Natasha Bertrand is reporting on dirty bombs. And in all seriousness, AI feels like it’s created a sort of precarious security situation for a lot of Americans, at the very least. So going back to you, Katherine, with this shift—does that actually coincide, or almost dovetail, this technological shift, with what we’re seeing on the global stage in terms of American hegemony? What does that mean for what a US grand strategy could even look like over the next ten years?
Katherine Thompson: Yeah. I think to me it undergirds the importance of prioritization, right? Because when we look across the globe—I agree with this assessment that we live in a more dangerous world with growing threats. Obviously the technological threats, the asymmetric threats that you talk about, are certainly present. But then you’ve also got multiple theaters of contest now, right? You’ve got Russia and Ukraine dominating the European theater. Now you’ve got the Iran war in the Middle East. And then you’ve always got the ticking time bomb of a conflict potentially breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, where the majority of economic trade and commerce, and certainly a lot of this technology, flows through. So if you’re staring down the barrel, trying to make a strategy, looking at that map, most people would cringe and jump back, right? You’d give up. Yeah, I give up. There’s probably a meme there somewhere.
But I think, to this administration’s credit, that was all true coming into office in January 2025, and they stared down the barrel of that and said, “We’re going to build a defense strategy that is prioritized for exactly that reason, because we cannot overextend.” The United States cannot be the grand savior in all of these different regions. We cannot manage all of these regional conflicts. We don’t have the resources to do it. We don’t have the expertise to do it. And it’s also just not in our interests to do it, which you heard more about from the previous panel. But from a mathematical, logical approach, we don’t have the ability to do it. So maybe we should start recalibrating some of our engagement and commitments in other theaters to compensate for that.
And it started out really strong, right? We’re going to have a relationship in the Middle East where Israel and, ideally, the Gulf states power-balance against Iran so we don’t have to deal with that. We’re going to have burden shifting in Europe. We’re going to have a stronger NATO alliance, should it continue to exist, that takes on the conventional deterrent capability and takes on more ownership there. And then we’re going to focus on the Indo-Pacific, but we’re also going to push our allies there to do more. That sounded like a really good concept. Until you get to a place where you decide to deviate from that concept. And I think that’s one of the biggest risks in all this. I’m worried about technology, I’m worried about AI, I’m worried about all of these asymmetric elements. But I’m most worried about principals and their inability to stick to their own plan. Representative Warren Davidson talked a little bit about this: the best advice in politics is do what you promise. We have that same problem in our executive branch principals who are making foreign policy: stick to what you outline. We outline a strategy, we outline a plan, so that we know what the direction of travel is, and we try not to deviate from it. And the point of doing a prioritized version of that is so that we don’t have as many commitments. We have a set of priorities that we pursue at the exclusion of other things. I think principals should stick to what they say to have an effective grand strategy. It’s a really bold strategy, Cotton—to quote. That’s an old reference at this point.
Emily Jashinsky: That’s an awesome reference. So, Joshua, how do you do that? How do you do what Katherine was just talking about, if you have principals who have all of these political incentives, you have a very war-weary population—listen, I don’t think if the Trump administration made the case more robustly and more coherently… I feel like they probably actually would have a bit more support. I don’t think they would ever have majority support for what’s happened in Iran so far. But how do you maintain a grand strategy right now with all of these different factors in the air?
Joshua Shifrinson: Yeah. You know, it’s a wonderful question. It’s actually a very deep question. There are kind of two basic theories of grand strategic coherence in general that we could enunciate. One is the domestic politics version: the voters, or some kind of elites around you, will punish you if you deviate. I think we’ve seen hints that the phenomenon can be real, vis-à-vis the midterm elections. But that’s kind of on the back end, right? It’s not really a penalty you think about ahead of time, or you may not think about it ahead of time. So there’s the domestic theory.
Then there’s also what I would call the international theory, which is to say you face a problem where the cost of deviating from what you say you’re going to do, from a strategy you think is going to work, is just so obvious that only a fool would do it. Think about the US during the Cold War. We knew what deviating from focusing on the Soviet threat meant for our security in Western Europe, for the security of democracy, capitalism—lather, rinse, repeat. And so while we certainly broadened out and engaged in certain times and places, such as Vietnam, sagacious as that was, we never really took our eye off the ball entirely. And on the occasions when we did, it was the fact that the Soviet threat seemed to be growing that brought us back home.
So to answer your question, how do you keep a grand strategy focused? Do you need something large, overt that everyone kind of agrees is a big, big problem that you’ve got to fixate on? In my opinion, that, and primarily that, is what’s going to induce circumspection and a certain degree of focus in grand strategy.
Emily Jashinsky: Arta, what is that? Is it China? Some people want it to be China. I’m not so sure. Should it be?
Arta Moeini: Yeah. I’m not so sure China is the response, or that new Cold War enemy that we all, or some people, wish it to be, partly because China is a very different country than we are. It is a civilizational state, which means something. It doesn’t mean what Marco Rubio thinks it means. It doesn’t mean that it wants to create a kind of Manichean, us-versus-them world. It doesn’t even want to fill any of the supposed vacuums that our leaving the Middle East will ultimately produce. It doesn’t have any interest in that. Actually, the contemporary Chinese government, the PRC, has learned a lot from us, especially from the version of the US of the 1950s and ’60s—the sort of “we want to go around the world, make money, and protect against other people who are ideological.” The moment that America didn’t believe that it was being [unclear]. Ideally, that’s what China has learned. And so it’s a very different kind of world that China wants to live in, which ultimately has to be a world of coexistence. And I don’t think we have any way to detract from that.
Now, that doesn’t mean that we don’t have challenges, that we don’t have technological rivalries, that we don’t have many, many issues where we don’t see eye to eye with the Chinese. But what I’m talking about is the way the hierarchy of these questions moves: you have to move from power and then to ideology, not from ideology down. And so China will share the world, because China will be a great power and we will be a great power. But regions matter, and regional powers and regional autonomy will increasingly matter. So I think this greater regionalization, the rise of the middle powers—what I’ve called multiplexity, or what [unclear] has called unstable multipolarity or lopsided multipolarity—these kinds of arrangements are going to define the post-unipolar era. And we did this volume to try to work out what an America First grand strategy would look like. Ultimately, just for us, we are continents away, our geography protects us, and we have fundamental problems that we have to address in order to even stay a great power in this new era.
Emily Jashinsky: And Mark, actually, I’m glad Arta just brought that up, because in response to Joshua I was thinking, well, if it’s not China—and I think many of us would have suspicions about whether or not to build China into this alternate Manichean power—is it something actually like America First? Does it necessarily have to be some other nation-state? Can this large, overt organizing principle of a grand strategy, one that moves a populace and also animates a coherent grand strategy, be something like America First? So I just want to toss that question to you. If you have thoughts on whether it’s China, should it be China, or should it be something that is actually more domestically centered?
Mark Episkopos: Yeah. Look, I think it should be us. It should be the United States. When a lot of us heard this idea of peace through strength, certainly you want a deterrence capability. You want to defend yourself. We are by far the safest power in the world. Really. The homeland faces very few threats, and we have very distinct geostrategic advantages over anyone who would want to directly threaten the United States. But the core of it, it seemed to me, was to talk about revitalization at home, to talk about how to restore the diminished American industrial base. And certainly there is a defense component to it, but it starts with the industrial aspect of the defense industrial base: to talk about how to strengthen our institutions, how to restore trust in the political process, the building blocks of how the United States became a great power and, in many ways, one of the most successful nations in the world. And that to me is what real strength looks like. It’s projecting a kind of confidence that I think we’ve lost over the past decades because of the culmination of these very serious internal challenges.
But to the broader question, I would address it on two levels. Strategically, as I intimated, I think the key to how to repair to a better posture is right in front of us. We have tremendous advantages. The United States is positioned to thrive in a multipolar world as an offshore balancer that allows regional groupings and local balancers to fill part of the gap that we’ve left behind. The Mecca Alliance is an example of something that can be built upon, can be expanded upon, and there are different variations of this. For example, we can do more to empower our East Asian allies, again, to act as local balancers in ways that are cheap and less threatening than trying to deter China directly. And I think all of this is pretty straightforward—“easy” is perhaps too flippant a term—if you have the political will and the political wherewithal to pursue it.
But that, I think, is where we run into very significant problems. Looking at the movement, I think we have a lot of ideas people. I’m an ideas person. Many of us here are. And that’s great. Ideas people are the core of what any movement needs in order to thrive. But you also need operators. You need people on the ground translating these ideas into concrete policy outcomes. That is an area where I think we’ve struggled, and I don’t have any easy solutions. And certainly the neocons have had decades, really, since the end of the Cold War, to build up this massive infrastructure of NGOs, allied media, and numerous other things that allow them to be very effective at what they do. Financial ties? Yes, absolutely. But what I do know is that if we want to play this game and actually win consistently—to the extent that we’re on the back foot, it’s not because our ideas are worse; it’s because the game itself is still stacked against us in ways that we’re going to have to work to overcome.
Emily Jashinsky: And let’s drill down, actually, on that note and discuss the elephant in virtually every room these days, which is [unclear] an element of US grand strategy, or the influence on US grand strategy, particularly since we’re here to discuss Iran on this panel. So I’ll start with Katherine again and just ask: I think we have some broad agreement possible here, so long as the alliance between the United States and Israel still involves the United States shielding Israel from hostile neighbors—as we’ve seen historically, and not without reason. How do we approach a multipolar—what do we all see as a multinodal, all of the different terms—how do we approach a world like that if the United States still has, if you agree with us, that kind of anchor in the Middle East?
Katherine Thompson: Yeah, I think it’s a totally fair question. I keep getting the hard questions first. So here we go.
Emily Jashinsky: And everyone else gets to refine.
Katherine Thompson: Yeah, exactly. But I would say there are two levels to it. There’s the level that we’ve all been discussing, especially in the media commentary space, which is the overall anchorage of the relationship and how it is or is not consistent with America First. To me, especially going into the administration, America First meant America First, period at the end of it—not “period, and then asterisks”: Israel, asterisk; Ukraine, asterisk; Taiwan, asterisk; NATO alliance, asterisk. Don’t put any asterisks. We have a period there for a reason.
You saw it even more with Ukraine. Before President Trump came into office for a second time, especially with JD Vance in the Senate and others, there was a coalition growing of folks that were America First–minded, America First–friendly, that would raise these concerns as we were about to deplete our stockpiles at unprecedented levels to arm Ukraine. The big question was, “Hey, guys, but America First, right? What is this? Is this going to harm us? Is this going to harm our advantage? Maybe we should think through some of these questions.” But the Washington foreign policy blob, which certainly pollutes Congress, is just on autopilot: “Oh, yeah, of course we’re going to give, and we’re not going to face any problems. We don’t need to discuss this. We don’t need to air that kind of dirty laundry out into the open.” And then as we got to the last supplemental for Ukraine—as we were getting deeper and deeper into these questions, and as the problems were becoming more and more exposed—the answer was not, “Oh, we’re not going to have enough to spread around to other theaters.” It was, “Let’s just tack on some for Israel and some for Taiwan as well. Why not? Let’s throw the whole kit and caboodle out there.” Not a great way to make decisions, in my mind, including for the US-Israel relationship.
So I think there’s that overarching level: how are we thinking about America First, and who gets an asterisk and who doesn’t? I would say nobody should get an asterisk. And I think that’s the responsiveness you’re seeing in the populace.
Now, to this specific question about Israel, and to Mark’s great point, there’s the operator level of this debate. I know we heard on the last panel some of the more philosophical, ideological elements of the US-Israel relationship, but now we have to get to the operator level. What does this actually mean? Are we going to extend another MOU? Are we going to allow provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act that increase intel sharing, that increase defense tech? Are those good moves? Is anyone going to raise the question of, “Hey, hang on, we’re America First. Is this actually good for the United States? Does this actually align with our interests? Should we be pressing our partner in the region to do more on their own, in the same way that we’re pressing our partners and allies in the NATO alliance to do more and take on more burden?” These are the types of questions that, as soon as they’re introduced in the space, become almost third-rail political issues. And I think we have to change that in our operator culture.
Congress is a huge, huge problem in this respect. Congress is still living in the 1980s boomer era and the 1990s unipolar-moment era, where we can do everything and our military power is unmatched. I talk to people sometimes and I’m just like, “Look at the math. How are we arguing about this?” And the response is just like the 1990s. And I’m like, I love the ’90s, but we’re not there anymore. So I think we have to have a new conception. And I think that balance, or that question, especially at the operator level, is how we structure this. If we’re going to have a relationship with Israel—which I’m fine with; us having a bilateral relationship in the same way we have a bilateral relationship with anybody else—is that bilateral relationship working for us? And, to the vice president’s great comments, is it where our interests align, or are we doing things where our interests don’t align, that we should perhaps reassess? I think it’s ideological. I think it’s operational. And I think it has to be a major focal point of our discussion going forward.
Emily Jashinsky: And, Joshua, I’ll toss the same question to you, but also with the obvious point we all know, which is that the nuclear threat to and from Israel is not going anywhere. That’s one thing that will always have to be dealt with. Even if we realign—if it were along the lines of a Vance presidency, if we do a realignment like that—this still exists, and it will still have significant influence over our Middle East policy. Yes. So what does that look like ten years from now? Or could it?
Joshua Shifrinson: Well, so if I remember the original question that you posed, it was: can we adjust to a new multipolar world as long as the US-Israel relationship endures in its current form? I’d pitch that question just a smidge differently. Alliances and relationships tend to follow the interests, not the other way around. The current state of the US-Israel relationship is a byproduct of what Katherine said, a byproduct of the unipolar era and of our getting hooked on the sense of omnipotence. At a prior period in time, we had very few issues telling Israel to back down on certain occasions—forcing them to withdraw from Suez in ’56. We didn’t sell them Skyhawks before ’67. We held them back from attacking Iraq back in ’91. Once upon a time, the US-Israel relationship looked more like a normal relationship. And [unclear] by Barack—we still do this, we have very angry phone calls. I think it’s more, “You wouldn’t let us build how many settlements?” It’s a slightly different term.
So the punchline here is that as US interests focus elsewhere, I think the US-Israel relationship is going to shift as well. I don’t think the US-Israel relationship impedes the adjustment to a more multipolar world. What I do think is important, though, is changing the relationship to make it a more normal relationship, where we are okay telling them no. That is, on its own terms, an important thing to do. The US gets pulled into conflict. It bears political costs, it bears strategic costs, for the sake of tethering itself so closely to Israel. I happen to think that a good US relationship with Israel is in the US national interest. The current relationship is not a good one for either party.
Now, you asked the question about the nuclear issue, and I think that’s an important one. Right now, Israel is the only nuclear actor in the greater Middle East, and we have a lot of history that tells us that nuclear deterrence causes states to think carefully about what they’re going to do. I therefore don’t worry that if Iran were to get a nuclear weapon, Israel would be toast. I think just the opposite. The two of them would actually end up repairing their political relationship, their strategic relationship, and it would add an element of caution and sagacity to the relationship, and might actually create conditions where the US could reduce its presence in the greater Middle East. I know Jerusalem does not share that perspective—or Tel Aviv does not share that perspective. Understandable. If I’m the only nuclear power in a given region, it’s a great place to be, if you’re that nuclear power. Totally valid.
But this goes to my earlier point that the US and Israel don’t have the same set of interests. The US interest is in reducing its presence in the greater Middle East, focusing both at home and on other regions elsewhere. The Israeli interest, understandably, is to subsidize the Israeli security apparatus and the Israeli sense of regional—not quite dominance, but power in the region. And if that’s the case, there’s a little bit of a collision course going on. And so I understand Israel’s reluctance to countenance an Iranian nuclear weapon, just as I happen to think that Israel could very well live with an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Emily Jashinsky: That’s such a tough tension.
Arta Moeini: I mean, it is, and that’s why I also—I mean, I agree with everything. We can stop there. Yeah, no, everything Josh said was good. Now, my chapter in the volume is actually just about this issue. So a lot of people talk about what made us go to war, right? Marco Rubio comes out and talks about this, and basically the Beltway loses its mind. He was not supposed to say this out loud, and he did. And then you saw a lot of online chatter about, “Well, Israel is controlling all of us,” and there are these cabals and all that stuff. So it veers that way. But that’s why I think it’s important to have this conversation, because structurally, it’s not that any person had to change, or that Trump had to be specifically manipulated. The structural causes of the war in Iran were there thirty, forty, fifty years ago, I would say.
So when you—I actually think [unclear]. On this question, [unclear] had this position long ago, that nuclear powers have to balance each other, and that that makes for a more stable world. We have created an entire policy when it comes to the Middle East that is the opposite of that, the anti-realist position. And it serves Israel, of course, because if you have a nuclear monopoly, would you give it up? No. But a regional nuclear monopoly is fundamentally unstable. And I believe that it was a major driver of how we got into the war, given Donald Trump’s, I think, genuine fears of nuclear exchange. Trump was presented with kind of options by the operators, which was effectively either come to war against Iran or there would be a nuclear war. And these kinds of contexts, the insinuations, these kinds of things, especially if you are a boomer, make a big difference. So one of the things that we talk about is the operator part: personal is policy. But also we have to say policy is generational. And we need to move away from a certain generation that has brought a lot of disaster to specifically the past twenty-five years of American foreign policy.
So there is no beating around the Bush on the Israel question. A lot of people don’t want to talk about it, but I’m glad that we are talking about it—not because I think any of us have any ill will towards Israel as an idea, but because Israel is fundamentally doing things that are unnatural for a regional balance, and we are enabling it, underwriting it, and our entire foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere has had ideological additions, other justifications that have come on top of that. But I would say that had Israel not had nuclear weapons in the early ’70s or late ’60s, really, we would not be talking about it.
We could be like Eisenhower until Israel. No. In ’56 in Suez, we can’t do that anymore, because if you have a president who’s worried that he’s going to lose control of Israel and its nuclear arsenal—that’s why a nuclear monopoly is a problem. So again, nonproliferation, great. But if you don’t have nonproliferation, if you have one nuclear actor in a region, you at least [unclear].
Emily Jashinsky: And Mark, do you agree with that?
Mark Episkopos: I do. Look, I think just zooming out to get to the underlying question of multipolarity, it seems to me that there is cause for optimism when it comes to the Middle East in particular, because the lessons of this operation have been so stark and the political punishment has been so severe in the midterms that it’s difficult to envision anyone trying to do something like this again anytime in the near future. And we’re seeing processes unfolding as a result of this war: GCC states and others trying to diversify away from their one-sided reliance on the United States to find other regional balancing arrangements. So there are aspects of this problem that I think can potentially solve themselves over time.
There is still the elephant in the room of how you treat Iran more like a normal country. There’s a generational element to this that’s going to be very difficult to address in the short to medium term. But a lot of us, those of us looking at European security, have made the argument that it’s impossible to build a European security architecture by keeping a country as big and vast as Russia out. I think a similar analogy applies here: Iran is too big and has too many levers to be isolated. That’s part of any sustainable security arrangement in the Middle East. And that is something that future strategists and thinkers will have to grapple with very seriously.
I do worry in the short term that you are going to see a kind of rebound effect. Yes, this particular endeavor has failed, but for a lot of neocons, I think the lesson will be not that the underlying idea is wrong, but that the execution was, and that they need to turn to other things. They need to turn back to Ukraine. We’re seeing a very big push now—I expect in January—a slew of initiatives that are trying to maximize support for Ukraine and to levy punishments on Russia. I also think we are going to see attempts to strike a much harsher posture on China in the coming months, and—
Emily Jashinsky: Still all happening between Treasury and Commerce right now.
Mark Episkopos: Absolutely, yeah. And finally, a lot of us here have worked on this issue and take it seriously: I think there is going to be a push to kill NATO 3.0, to kill this effort to rebalance the transatlantic relationship. There are people in Congress who will fight tooth and nail to keep every single rifle, every single pair of boots, in Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, in these countries. So I think the underlying telos, the underlying conviction behind this war, has not necessarily been defeated, but it has been transmuted to other causes.
Emily Jashinsky: Okay, so that’s actually a great transition to the final question I’m going to pose to the panel before we open it up to audience questions from everyone in person and also online. We’ll go in reverse order—spare you for one of the rounds—and start with you again, Mark. What should our presence in the Middle East look like in a healthy US grand strategy after Iran? We don’t know how this thing is going to end, of course, but what do you think is the best course? And we could toss in European bases as well. But what should our presence abroad, and particularly in the Middle East, look like?
Mark Episkopos: It should be greatly reduced. I think it should be greatly reduced, many of them, yes. And I’m glad you mentioned the European aspect, because if you look at this debate over our force posture in Europe, the argument that’s made time and time again is that we need to have all of these bases in Germany and other places—Italy, particularly in the Mediterranean—in order to project force into the Middle East. But then the question becomes, why do we need to project force into the Middle East? And that gets at what we are trying to achieve. So all of this is linked, to me, in this larger effort to arrive at a more sustainable global posture, which is going to involve, I think, very steep cuts. It should involve very steep cuts in Europe and in the Middle East. It should involve a recalibration of the way we look at the Indo-Pacific, though I’m a little less bullish on aggressive cuts there, but I think there are areas we can take a look at there as well.
So I see it as a larger, interconnected problem of imperial overstretch and the need to address it in the short term, before another crisis arises—perhaps not in the Middle East, because, again, the political pain has been so significant. But it’s very easy to envision an escalatory spiral on Europe’s eastern flank. And over the long term, I think the China-Taiwan issue is also one that raises a lot of cause for concern, because we currently have a president who is very reserved on these issues, but that’s not necessarily going to be the case moving forward after ’28.
Emily Jashinsky: And, I mean, we’ve probably all heard this from some folks, but there are people right now arguing that we could, in perpetuity, escort ships through the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, that it’s relatively cost-effective because of the price involved. And so why not? But that’s just kind of a hook to talk again about—we don’t know how it’s going to end, but what do you think it should look like, whether it’s the Middle East, Europe, or around the world?
Arta Moeini: Well, I mean, first of all, the war in Iran will, I think, escalate before it comes to an end. I’m concerned that we will try one more time, despite all the results of the election, despite the repudiation, despite everything. I wrote something in UnHerd right after the election saying that, because I do think that a lot of the people who are making our foreign policy don’t have a sense of geography. They haven’t looked at a map. They don’t know where even the Strait of Hormuz is. They don’t know where Qatar is. They don’t know who these countries are that are actually channeling diplomacy, and why they are doing it. They don’t understand why this whole conspiracy about Qatar controlling Washington is just preposterous. I mean, these are small little countries that are just trying to survive, in the same way that Israel wants to survive, and they’re actually learning from each other. Again, small countries have different worlds and different problems. Middle powers like Iran have different sets of issues. And great powers like China have other ones. We have to figure out where we are, where they are, and how we can actually manage all these questions.
So when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, the very fact that we keep up this blockade, and that we keep announcing and celebrating, with a lot of fanfare, sanctions on some random bank or factory or whatnot, shows that it’s not working. The Iranian stockpiles of missiles and drones continue to grow. Iran is a middle power; they can’t do exactly what Russia is doing. There is a reason that we were talking about before, Russia or Persia or Iran, that they became civilizations: there was a geographic, demographic reason that they were able to push in that direction. So that’s why I like the term “civilization,” just to differentiate between Russia and Iran as middle powers, effectively, and some of the other players.
So when it comes to the region, I think we don’t have a choice about this: we’re going to have to retire the Carter Doctrine. It has been a disaster. The Carter Doctrine basically said that we are going to be the security provider for the region, that we’re going to be there indefinitely and protect shipping routes and elsewhere and basically underwrite the security of these small states. It was a continuation, of sorts, of Wilsonianism—of “we are going to go for these smaller states and break up empires.” The new advances in technology mean that that’s impossible and unsustainable. So I think the region will come together. I think the Mecca agreement is just one example of this, but ultimately we are moving towards what I’ve called the M5, five actors, quite hierarchical because of just their size: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and I’m missing one, but an important one—Pakistan. So these five countries will come together and actually work together to make sure that no external power, whether America or China, will continue to dominate West Asia. So I think we are going to have a post-American West Asia. But we don’t have to have a post-American world if we actually play our cards right and do the right kinds of retrenchment from our bases in the Middle East, but also in Europe, that’s necessary for us to refocus back on our own continent, and on the problems closer to home that we’re dealing with, like border security and other things.
Emily Jashinsky: So, Joshua, disentangling ourselves from the Carter Doctrine then also obviously has economic consequences that were part of the economic incentive package built into the foreign policy package. So with that in mind, what should our presence look like in the Middle East, Europe, China, after Iran?
Joshua Shifrinson: I hope we don’t have a presence in China.
Emily Jashinsky: Well, let’s hope. We don’t know. The night is young.
Joshua Shifrinson: Look, I want to come back to Katherine’s original observation, that there seems to be a broad agreement across the political spectrum that there needs to be some degree of prioritization in American grand strategy. It can be more or less explicit, but there’s a growing sensitivity to domestic needs. I think there’s a growing sensitivity to the opportunity costs, the direct costs, of American engagement in the world. And so if you take the prioritization idea seriously, it requires asking the question: okay, so what are US core interests in the world, including the role of economics, and what needs to be done to service those core interests?
Now, it’s lazy of me to say that we are an incredibly wealthy country with ocean moats and weak neighbors to the north and south, but it has the virtue of being true. And if all that is correct, then core US interests in international affairs tend to be fairly limited economically. There was a moment in time when the free flow of oil was important to US national security. That is not as pronounced these days, although disruption of the flow of oil can ding the US economy. We’re not going to be coerced or blackmailed into oblivion like we might have been at a certain point in times past.
So having said all of that, what are our core interests in the world? They are probably maintaining some kind of liberal capitalist ethos in key parts of the world. That’s not really an issue these days. That seems to be doing okay. Capitalism seems to be thriving in many parts of the world these days, although we can quibble on the margins a little bit. And preventing regional hegemony in key parts of the world. When I look at the map of the world these days, there is no prospect of regional hegemony in the Middle East. Iran is able to keep the US at bay, [unclear] a hegemony. Israel can’t establish a hegemony by virtue of not being able to take out Iran. Russia is unable to address much beyond 100 kilometers from its borders. Not a regional hegemon. China is screwed up by geography. It doesn’t have great demographics, but it’s probably a plausible contender. And I’m not staying up at night freaking out about it. I think, like Katherine was alluding to, you need to hedge against it.
So if you do that kind of core assessment of where American interests are, in light of being a rich country with weak neighbors to the north and south and ocean moats, you come to the conclusion that the US doesn’t really have vital interests in Europe and does not really have vital interests in the Middle East. Its vital interests in the Western Hemisphere are resolved by virtue of being a rich, powerful country in the West. And in the Indo-Pacific, or East Asia, you probably have some desire to hedge and maybe keep some kind of force in being, or relationships in being, just in case China turns out to be worse than my Panglossian interpretations of things seem to go. So if all that’s correct, we can basically get out of the Middle East. We can basically wrap things up in Europe and retain a lingering presence in and around East Asia without harming the US economy, without harming the values that the US holds dear, without imperiling the security relationships that are out there in the world. So, you know, I’ve just lost all funding from the defense-industrial complex, but I’m okay with that. So here we are.
Emily Jashinsky: Katherine, is that realistic?
Katherine Thompson: No, I don’t think you’re crazy in the conceptual realm. I think the natural question to me, as an operator, is: okay, how do you do this? And I think it is a very, very tough PR sell to the political powers that be. I think a couple of things need to happen.
Number one, bureaucratic incentives that entrench this posture need to be eroded. Part of that has to some degree been solved by great political appointees within places like the Pentagon and the State Department and the White House, kind of moving the trend in this direction. But you’ve already seen it: we have forces at work within our established bureaucracy that do not want this to happen. And I see my friend Kelly out there—I wrote about this for Responsible Statecraft—regional combatant commanders, our generals, have their fiefdoms. I’m certainly not going to get any love from them or the military-industrial complex when I say this. They are up on Capitol Hill lobbying the absolute crap out of members of Congress: every theater is important, we need to maintain posture and resources in every theater. And I just want one enterprising member of Congress to pull the CENTCOM commander, the EUCOM commander, and the INDOPACOM commander into a room and say, “All of you say we need to maintain the same level of posture, the same level of resourcing. Oh, and you all want more resources. Who’s right? Why?” Why are we having separate posture hearings where each of them gets to lobby for their own fiefdom, and everybody gets to say really nice platitudes, and everybody gets to put out a nice press release about how every region is important? That’s not realistic. That is not a prioritized strategy.
I think Congress has a huge piece of ownership here in fleshing this out. The legislature is where this debate should be pushed, and for too long—I’ve made comments about this before—members of Congress live in a very different world. They have a very different sort of strategic reality. I think part of the beauty of this administration is challenging that and really pushing against the framework that has dominated Washington foreign policy culture, and certainly culture on Capitol Hill. But it’s going to take some big moves like that. Whoever takes the gavel next at Senate Armed Services should do away with this: “We only want to hear from each of you one by one.” No, no, no. Everybody come in. You want resources, make the case and fight against each other. I like chaos, so I’m cool with that. I understand why Congress sometimes doesn’t, but I think from an operational perspective, we have to start pushing the boundary on some of these things in our own political system. Otherwise this is never going to happen, because, again, the goal is great, but there are too many intense, entrenched bureaucratic interests at play.
And the other thing I would say—and I wish my boss, Justin Logan, was still here, because one of the things he always harps on is that the National Defense Strategy is a great document, but documents don’t bind you. Documents don’t actually move strategy in the right direction. I agree with him on that point. Budgets do. And this is another place where Congress needs to play a much more active role. Is this Congress really going to give approval on a government funding measure that allows basically carte blanche for the Pentagon to rebuild bases if they want to, to continue to prosecute the Iran war if they want to, by providing funding to do that? Or are they going to say, “No, no, no, no, no, we have some strategic lessons we need to learn from this time out”? I think that’s a big point of contention, a big point of decision that has to come into play. But these are all very [unclear], unpopular things that we have to start on in the ecosystem that we live in: the Washington establishment, media, think tanks, Capitol Hill, the executive branch, etc. We have to make it more palatable to have these conversations.
Emily Jashinsky: That’s a great point. We’ll move to audience questions here. We have mics being passed around. Looks like we have one. And feel free to start sending questions in on the internet as well. I should also mention, please announce your name and your affiliation. We’ll start right over here.
Audience Q&A
Audience Member (Mike, Institute for Peace and Diplomacy): Yes, the Romans had a great and enduring meme: omnia [unclear]—all roads lead to Rome. In American grand strategy today, all roads lead back to America. And I would suggest that realism and restraint is not an option, a preference, or a choice. It is a survival strategy. The US is entering an unexplored period of domestic political upheaval, cultural and social, revolving around the constitutional order itself, and for this period upcoming—it’s been building for some time—we need to be able to be not merely restrained and cautious, but perhaps abstemious in our approach to world relationships, especially in the military realm. And so I would like to ask—Mark brought this up; he raised this issue very compellingly—how do we navigate this period where the US may be in a period not of chaos but of discontinuity, and the ways in which that will connect directly to our military commitments and our ability to protect ourselves? Mark, do you want to take that one?
Mark Episkopos: Well, just because I raised the question doesn’t mean I have the answer. Look, I think there is going to have to be a very serious debate that has not taken place. And I would contend that the reaction to Iran was not that debate taking place. It was mainly a cost-of-living thing, and people reacting to the fact that things were not just getting more expensive but that there was a real scarcity. You couldn’t buy a lot of stuff, and that was shocking and led people to vote against this in this very drastic way. But that’s, I think, different from having the underlying debate about what our role in the world should be.
You mentioned all roads lead to Rome. Look, I think America is a special place in many ways and one that has a lot to recommend it. But those strengths are being suppressed by this desire to be everywhere, to do everything at once, in ways that have not benefited the average American—in ways that have, in fact, impoverished the average American, made us less safe, and hurt American interests in the long run. So these realities are here. We are dealing with them every single day. Just after 2022, some people in the Biden administration were completely shocked that we couldn’t just order China and India to participate in the sanctions regime on Russia. They thought we could just tell them, “You’d better do this,” and they would do it because they have no choice. And maybe in 1994 something like that could have worked. But we’re now in a different world, and we can either land the plane or crash the plane of unipolarity. I would rather land the plane in a controlled descent.
I think the message has to be a positive one. There is a bias—we all know this—for action, for political action. And when you tell people in DC, “Just don’t do things, don’t do stuff, just stay put,” that rubs a lot of people the wrong way. So this is not about withdrawing from the world. It’s about engaging with the world in a healthier, more productive, more constructive way that will make us all richer, safer, and benefit us over the long term. And that message has to be sold politically at various levels. There is a bureaucratic element to this that I’m not qualified to speak on, but I know a lot of people are concerned about this, and they should be, because you still have this problem of—whatever you want to call it, the blob, the deep state—an entrenched bureaucracy that sees the world in a very specific way and reacts, kind of like a virus would react to an antibody, to any challenge to that worldview. And that’s going to require a very creative approach on an interagency level, on an intergovernmental level. But how do we recalibrate our institutions to better serve what they should have always served, which is the American interest?
Emily Jashinsky: If you’re here in person, you can line up—there are mics on both sides of the room—so just head over there and we’ll take in-person questions as well. I have another question here from the internet, but does anyone want to respond to what we heard from Mark? Okay. Oh, go ahead.
Arta Moeini: I’ll just say one thing. The issue of bureaucracy, the issue of the people—that generational question is very important to address. And [name unclear], who is actually here, has a chapter in the volume, the one that concludes the book, about how to change the mindset of the elites through a different kind of education. I urge everyone to read it. But I would also say that part of that is what he calls the liberal education, the sort of liberal worldview, and the part that is kind of this globalist cognitive bias that we all have. We think that we live in the world, and the world is this one place. I keep repeating that we don’t live in the world; we live in places in the world. There is something to be said about localism and regions and rootedness, all of these things that happen to be small‑c conservative. And you don’t really hear the big, sort of Conservatism Inc. talk about it—to talk about GDP and the bottom line, the original version. Now they talk about just being very macho and bombing various countries. Either way, I think we need to change posture by changing our mindset, ultimately. And I think it’s very important to do that by having these kinds of conversations. The theory, the books, are not going to change the policies immediately, but I hope they have some sort of effect downstream, where we can actually explain and justify why it is that we’re not giving money to these kinds of projects.
That’s part of what was wrong with Trump. There was no coherence. Every day there was something different. And part of our effort—and now I’m plugging what we’re doing—is to provide that discipline: strategic discipline, mental and cognitive discipline, a discipline for actually reclaiming an America First that focuses on the American people. It shouldn’t be that difficult. It’s very common sense, and it’s also ultimately rooted in American tradition. George Washington talked about it. A lot of the things we were talking about—everyone can read ours, and then they can read the Farewell Address of Washington. It’s all about alliance entrapment. Whether we’re talking about permanent enmities with Russia, with Iran, with these countries, or permanent friendships—permanent, unqualified, unconditional support, obviously like Israel—it doesn’t change the fact that we are putting America second or third or fourth.
Joshua Shifrinson: Well, speaking of which, I’ll just say, as the only academic on the panel, I am totally in favor of reeducation camps.
Emily Jashinsky: That’s awesome. If you have a question, you can head to the microphones on the sides of the room. I’m going to go to one online question here. Speaking of permanent enmities—just before, speaking of permanent enmities—there are a couple of questions. I’ll combine them into one, about whether or not it would be in the United States’ interest, whether through the CIA or arming the Kurds or something like that, to overthrow the regime in Iran. Those are a couple of questions that we’ve had from folks online. So does anyone want to take that? Would it be worth it? Would it be in the US interest to overthrow a regime that is obviously not friendly to the United States at this point?
Mark Episkopos: Well, you know, there was a very interesting debate that took place in our camp after Venezuela, which was a much different operation, one that I think was premised on a different approach and a different outcome. We can talk about the precedent it sets and the long-term implications, but tactically, operationally, clearly it went extremely well. So I don’t know if it’s worth advising a blanket prohibition on something. I think it is fair to say—and the NSS made this point—that we must be extremely judicious in our decision to apply force, whether it be a Venezuela-style operation or a longer-term engagement. We have to be extremely sparing with American blood and American treasure whenever we do something like this. That doesn’t mean that there is never a time to do something like this. And many of us have a greater tolerance, or a greater predisposition, for actions in the Western Hemisphere. That’s a debate that I think is worth having.
It’s much more difficult to justify this kind of action halfway across the world, trying to affect variables that we don’t fully understand and that have tremendous unintended consequences. This is a country of over 90 million people. To talk about the balkanization of a country like that, and the long-term effects that a breakup of Iran would have—it’s horrific for everyone: for American interests, for other players in the region. I think for Israel, in many ways, it would be bad. So we have to look at the broader picture when it comes to steps like this.
Katherine Thompson: And I would just say—I love how Mark laid this out, because he’s basically doing what I would say needs to happen more often in our political culture, which is that we have to flesh out the second‑, third‑, and fourth-order effects. And it’s not fun, because everybody likes the slogan, everybody likes a tagline and rallying behind that. But “overthrow the regime in Iran”—there’s a dot, dot, dot that follows that. Apparently today’s my day for punctuation metaphors. Same with the people on Twitter who are talking about the Iran war right now and say, “We need to finish the job”—dot, dot, dot. Then what does that mean? If you had to put together a memo for your boss about how we’re going to finish the job, how we’re going to overthrow the regime, what would you write? What would be the suborder bullet points: step one, step two, step three, and here are all the effects you should consider before you make this decision? This is very basic logic practice. And it amazes me that so many people in Washington with so many fancy degrees don’t think that practically. I think that’s something we have to start injecting into the foreign policy political culture, because it’s so important. Mark basically just did it up here on this stage and thought through some of these elements. But it’s missing. It’s almost like we hit these taglines, we attach onto them, we write press releases about them, people give speeches about them, but we don’t follow it up.
I would love to see somebody write a “finish the job” memo and an “overthrow the regime” memo. I’ve said this about Ukraine, especially when the tagline was “as long as it takes.” If someone’s writing a memo to tell me how to do that, I’d love to read it. I’m going to commit the mortal sin of being on a panel like this and say I don’t have all of the answers. I’m not going to pretend I have all the answers to those questions. But I think we have to start pressing in the space and saying, “You’ve got to show more work, and you’ve got to show more logic,” because a tagline is no longer enough and it’s not going to be acceptable. That’s also kind of what our elections show. But in the thought leadership space, we have to start pressing more on that point.
Emily Jashinsky: Okay.
Joshua Shifrinson: Can I just jump in to say what’s remarkable about the “overthrow the Iranian government” conversation? I agree with everything that’s been said thus far, but what’s remarkable is that you don’t even need to go deep on this one. You just need to look at the last twenty-five years and go: How’d Iraq go? Oh, that was bad. How did Afghanistan go? Oh, yeah, that was also bad. How’d Libya go? Also not great. Syria, how’d that go? Oh, also not great. And yet for some reason we think this time it’s going to be better. What’s that Broadway show? “Maybe this time”—they’re just singing it every night. I don’t understand the logic here. You don’t need a PhD—you probably shouldn’t have a PhD—to do this kind of work. And yet people are just unwilling to reflect on live history, very recent live history.
Arta Moeini: And let me just add one thing, because all of those countries, all those examples that Joshua gave, are different types of states that don’t even compare to the level of a middle power. So everything he said, with the caveat of times a hundred. The idea that we can even do it, the idea that serious people can get into a room, get some sort of memo from Israeli intelligence, and say, “Tomorrow the Iranian government is going to collapse”—the level of disconnect with reality was just so bewildering. And you see that all the time in this city. Especially since I became an exile academic and ended up at a think tank, all you see is policymakers who don’t want to think outside of inherited wisdom or conventional wisdom. So in response to your question, I would use a kind of tagline: just stop trying to overthrow any regime, especially outside of your own sphere of influence. You can’t have a global sphere of influence, and you can’t do it with middle powers.
Emily Jashinsky: [Unclear] wants to overthrow Mexico and Canada. I was just going to make the Cuba joke. So let’s go right here in the middle.
Audience Member (Stephen Snyder, unaffiliated): The topic of political polarization has gotten a lot of discussion of late in terms of the American public, but I think a lot of the polarization is actually between the public and policymakers, in the sense that the public wants more money spent domestically, whereas policymakers continue to want to send money overseas for the international order. And I thought in that context it was interesting when the groypers came up in the last panel, and some of the political radicalization that has come out of the Iran war. So my question is: if foreign policy is not reformed, what are the risks of political extremism domestically growing?
Emily Jashinsky: That’s a great question. We have about three minutes left. So who wants to start?
Mark Episkopos: Well, I guess, look, as Justin said in the last panel, foreign policy is in many ways an elite game among, frankly, not a lot of people in this town, and they have a completely different outlook on what their incentive structure is, what they see as success, and what they’re trying to achieve, than the average American—not even the average rural American, but the average person living in Seattle or San Francisco. It’s a completely different mindset, because you’re enmeshed in this game, which is, I think, unhealthy for you morally and psychologically. But that’s a different question. It warps you in many ways, and there is no easy way around this, because you can’t democratize foreign policy in any meaningful sense. You can’t have a referendum whenever it’s time to make a big foreign policy decision. That just doesn’t work. It is about changing the strategic culture in Washington, and that’s extremely difficult if you consider all of the financial incentives, all of the pipelines of how this works, the revolving doors between the think tanks and the USG. All of us, of course, want the results as quickly as possible, and a lot of us are working on that. But I’m afraid that some of this is just going to have to take time, as we continue to bang our heads against the wall and come across failure time and time again and run up the tab time and time again. There’s only so much failure before the bill comes to you and you have to change your approach. We don’t want it to come to that, but these solutions—some of them are pretty far out, simply because of all the [unclear].
Arta Moeini: And I would just say, very quickly, in response to the question: I think it is actually getting worse, because since 2012 at least—people have been voting, since 2008 with Obama, people have been voting to change the foreign policy establishment’s priorities, not because they care about foreign policy much, but because they want a different kind of domestic politics. I remember a Texas Republican president who campaigned against nation building—and an Arkansas governor, too. And we can go further back, to Ross Perot. We can go back to the end of the Cold War. The Cold War ended; our politics didn’t change. So I think the American people have been very clear over and over again that they want normalcy in their day-to-day life, but they want change when it comes to accountability in Washington. They want change when it comes to this. They want change when it comes to their policies. So when they keep voting for different parties and they get the same results, how is that going to change their attitude about democracy? I do believe that the reason we are seeing—in the last panel, someone brought up the online movements—the reason we see more extreme rhetoric is because the system is functioning the way it’s supposed to: people vote, but then we get the same kind of actors in the same roles doing the same things over and over again. So that needs to change. And I think soon.
Emily Jashinsky: Any closing thoughts? Joshua? Katherine?
Katherine Thompson: I’ll just say, very briefly: Congress has the opportunity to do something. We have to start capitalizing on some of these opportunities. Congress has a moment where the power has shifted. There’s been a more foreign policy–focused mandate delivered to the Democrats. We don’t have to be polarized. Democrats could be the ones to say, “Look, we’re going to rise above it. We’re going to be the adults. We’re going to try to work across the aisle on this. We’re going to try to find allies and not make this all about Donald Trump and TDS every single day of the week.” I hope some of them will make that choice so that we can have a more adult dialogue in our political conversation and try to get to more measured solutions, because they’re going to require bipartisan support. But it’s just been this cycle, as Arta is saying, where no party has decided, “We’re going to be the adults this time.” And I think, at least on foreign policy decision making—it doesn’t have to be on every domestic issue where there’s disagreement—somebody’s got to cry uncle and say, “Look, we’re going to do it this time.”
Emily Jashinsky: Well said. Well, this is going to conclude our panel. Thank you so much to all of our wonderful panelists. Thank you to Cato. Thank you to all of you. Please join us for a reception one floor down in the Policy Center. We appreciate you all, and thanks so much.