In the past popular support for a nuclear option failed to generate significant political backing. Official policy is to rely ever more tightly on the U.S., clinging to the Washington Declaration, by which the Biden administration promised to risk the incineration of American cities to protect the ROK. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell opined “that the mechanisms that we’ve put in place … the Washington Declaration and the strategic initiatives that have been launched to underscore the added signification of American extended deterrence, particularly in situations like Korea, I think it’s given us what we need to work with now.” South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is publicly on board. So is Won Hee-ryong, a former cabinet minister running to head the ruling People Power Party: “We need to boost our nuclear deterrence against North Korean threats by ensuring the effectiveness of the declaration.”
However, burgeoning Russian-North Korean military cooperation is challenging the status quo. Observed Allison Hooker, a member of President Donald Trump’s National Security Council staff, “I think we cannot rule out the fact that South Korea continues to move, maybe more rapidly, towards its own nuclear program.” Last year, President Yoon observed that if the North Korean threat “becomes more serious, we could acquire our own nuclear weapons, such as deploying tactical nuclear weapons here in ROK.” Senior members of his party are now taking up the issue.
For instance, Han Dong-hoon, who also is running for PPP leader, contended that “we should move at least to the point of equipping ourselves with potential capabilities to go nuclear whenever we decide to do so, just like Japan is now.” He added, “The global security situation is constantly changing, so there are limitations to relying solely on our allies.” Nevertheless, fearing sanctions, he opposes moving directly to building nuclear weapons.
Assemblywoman Na Kyung-won, another candidate for party head, went further: “The history of the international community shows that only countries with the power to suppress external threats have survived. This is why we must keep all doors open and consider nuclear armament now.” She added that “even if nuclear weapons development is restricted due to Korea‑U.S. relations or international norms, we will prepare to develop nuclear weapons in a short period of time right now.”
More radical is Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-pyo, who proposed withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He asked, “Can the United States defend Seoul while risking New York turning into a sea of fire,” as threatened by the DPRK? Indeed, six decades ago French President Charles de Gaulle asked a similar question, withdrawing his nation from NATO’s integrated military command structure and producing nuclear weapons.
“Now is the time that we show our determination like de Gaulle’s,” declared Hong. He also pointed out that “Ukraine was the world’s third-largest nuclear power, but it disarmed its nuclear weapons following security assurances from the U.S., Britain and Russia and as a result, Ukraine is now facing Russia’s nuclear attack.”
Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, a potential PPP presidential candidate, contended that the ROK required “an ‘active nuclear umbrella’ or its own nuclear weapons,” since “a ‘passive nuclear umbrella’ that depends entirely on the will of the United States is inadequate.” Other officials who previously pushed the nuclear option include National Assemblyman Cho Kyoung-tae and retired general Leem Ho-young.
Hong articulated the essential flaw in the doctrine of extended deterrence, by which Washington guarantees the security of many, indeed, most of its allies through use of nuclear arms, if necessary. For what are Americans prepared to turn their homeland into a battleground? The Cold War infused such promises with greater credibility. Even more important, in the case of North Korea, the U.S. seemed safe since Pyongyang lacked both nukes and ICBMs. War would be costly, but only the Korean peninsula would be at risk.
That is no longer the case. The North is a nuclear power. It could have hundreds of nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. It is developing ICBMs along with multiple warheads. Virtually no one believes that the North will surrender its arsenal. Given the risks of military preemption, the U.S. and ROK must learn to live with a nuclear North Korea.
A Second Korean War could end with a North Korean nuclear attack on American cities. Of course, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to launch a first strike, which would guarantee his own destruction. If Washington endangered his regime, he could respond by threatening mutual Götterdämmerung. What American president would risk the American homeland for an alliance that, despite its closeness, is not vital for his or her nation’s survival?
South Koreans realize this. Yoon admitted last year, “What we call extended deterrence was also the U.S. telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything, but now, it’s difficult to convince our people with just that.”
As for Washington’s boilerplate affirmations of eternal affection and love, South Koreans should remember the toothless Budapest Memorandum, issued to encourage Ukrainians to yield their Soviet-era nuclear weapons. The Washington Declaration offers no greater assurance.
To suggest that Uncle Sam cannot be believed generates mild hysteria in Washington. The Declaration is cited as if possessing talismanic powers, able to ensure America’s continued protection of South Korea without risk. Not everyone is so sanguine, however.
A few years ago, the Hoover Institution’s Michael Auslin pointed out,