On the one-year anniversary of the chaotic final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, it is crucial to learn the sobering lessons of Washington’s ill-fated crusade. The original intervention in late 2001 was a justifiable response to 9–11 and the Taliban’s role in sheltering the Al Qaeda terrorists. However, the mission quickly expanded far beyond a limited punitive expedition that could have been completed in a year or 2. Instead, U.S. policymakers embraced an open-ended, nation-building effort designed to transform Afghanistan into a modern, secular, Western-style democracy.

It was at that point that failure became inevitable. Arrogant U.S. officials and their cheerleaders in the news media mistakenly assumed that they could bring Afghanistan, an alien society in which loyalty to tribe and religion eclipsed any sense of national identity or democratic values, into the twenty-first century. With such lack of realism, only the timing of the ultimate debacle remained uncertain.

Nevertheless, officials in three administrations plugged on doggedly for nearly two decades, despite the rising cost in blood and treasure. In the process, military and civilian officials repeatedly misled Congress and the public, insisting that progress on the political, economic, and security fronts was taking place. They gave assurances that Washington’s puppet government in Kabul enjoyed the allegiance of most Afghans, and that the Taliban’s bid to regain power would fail. The abrupt collapse of that government in the summer of 2021 showed otherwise.

U.S. leaders who pursued the nation-building mission in Afghanistan made Don Quixote look like a realist. Such an impractical crusade was always hopeless. U.S. policymakers need to learn the appropriate lesson and keep America out of the nation-building business elsewhere in the world.