Of course, the benefits of the relationship flow both ways. Min Aung Hlaing’s Myanmar is an important arms market: The junta “wants to import more military hardware from Russia, especially fighter jets and helicopters. Russia is eager to ramp up its arms trade with Myanmar to make up for falling sales elsewhere in the region.” The resulting reign of death and destruction looks similar to the relationship between Washington and Riyadh, in which U.S. weapons makers bank high profits from underwriting Saudi Arabia’s brutal war against Yemen.
What should the U.S. and other democratic states do? One option would be to formally recognize the National Unity Government (NUG) now in exile and provide it with some of the $1 billion in frozen Burmese government assets. Cooperating governments also could direct humanitarian aid to areas of the country outside the Tatmadaw’s control, where the regime has blocked access to relief agencies.
Washington and Europeans should apply additional sanctions on the Burmese state — for instance, on jet fuel, which keeps the air force flying. Also of concern is the continued use of Western equipment in the regime’s domestic weapons production. Allied governments also should press countries that remain economic players in Myanmar, such as Australia, India, Japan, and Singapore, to penalize the Tatmadaw and other state institutions. Outside involvement has not moderated the regime’s depredations, which have worsened over the last two years.
Perhaps most important would be to engage the NUG and Burmese civil society to determine whether the Burmese people desire broader economic sanctions, which would hurt them as well as the Tatmadaw. Current targeted sanctions on individuals have only limited effectiveness. In contrast, penalizing the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, a state energy company, and a private garment industry would dry up government funds but also substantially increase hardship for those already suffering. The ultimate target should remain the military and its captive regime.
Many Burmese ask why the West has rallied to Ukraine’s defense but does far less for them. Years ago, I was asked a similar question by the ethnic Karen leadership in their fight against the Tatmadaw: Why had America intervened in the Balkans but not in Burma? Every conflict is different, and the U.S. has no security interest sufficient to warrant going to war against the Min Aung Hlaing regime.
However, Washington — and other governments concerned about the terrible repression instituted by the Tatmadaw — could, and should, do more. After all, if the Ukrainians are fighting for freedom and democracy, as oft claimed, so are the Burmese. Only the latter must resist their own government, which is violating its most basic moral responsibilities to its own people.