Even so, the PRC’s influence remains primarily economic. China’s military power is on the rise, but threatening to use it has pushed people away, in lands as diverse as Japan and Taiwan.
Ancient Chinese culture is venerable and sophisticated, but an artifact to most people, including younger Chinese. The popular culture that appeals is a mix of Western and newer Eastern, such as from South Korea, at least until the recent contretemps over the latter’s participation in the THAAD missile defense system.
Yet there never has been a greater opening for increased Chinese leadership than with the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president. Although U.S. global influence won’t disappear, Washington appears ready to allow others to set the international rules of economic engagement.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has responded by backing “openness” and “economic liberalization,” using the January forum in Davos to appeal to business and political elites around the globe. He said protectionism was like “locking yourself in a dark room.”
Although his message was welcome, many in the West observed that his government followed a very different course at home, cracking down on contact with foreign people and thoughts. Chinese people are supposed to adopt Chinese ideas, as defined by the CCP.
Indeed, the PRC’s leadership seems particularly sensitive to the lack of support for Beijing from ethnic Chinese elsewhere. In early March, Yu Zhengsheng, No. 4 in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, announced a program to attract young people in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
The government plans on organizing trips for residents of the first two “to visit the mainland on study trips and experience it for themselves” in order to “strengthen the love of both region and country among the people of Hong Kong and Macau.” Moreover, Beijing will push for increased exchanges with youthful citizens of Taiwan, currently ruled by a party long dedicated to independence. The objective will be to “build up public support for the peaceful development of cross‐strait relations.”
However, it will take more than free trips to build loyalty to Beijing. China is a land worth visiting and the Chinese people are worth engaging. But the young in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have tasted political freedom.
This concept is not a Western import. As a student, Hu Ping was sent to labor in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. On his return to the city he advocated freedom of speech, later received his doctorate at Harvard, and eventually settled in New York, where he edits the journal, Beijing Spring.
He contends that Chinese support for liberty grows out of the Chinese experience. He cites the example of Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, who was purged during the Cultural Revolution. The latter’s “concept of tolerance and freedom arose mainly from personal experience,” and not from reading Western thinkers, old or new.
Acknowledging this universal desire to determine one’s own future is necessary to appeal to younger Chinese at home and especially those in territories that recognize the importance of individual autonomy and liberty. The rising generation’s demand reflects a basic and enduring human experience. It is a powerful, unquenchable human desire.
Thus, respecting the demand for self‐government would be the most effective response to separatist sentiments. People who do not trust those who govern are unlikely to embrace the government. Beijing cannot compel genuine loyalty.
With Washington turning its back on its international role, China has an opportunity to play a larger role in shaping foreign attitudes and institutions. However, taking advantage of that opportunity requires living up to the ideals being advanced. If Beijing wants to lead, it must appeal to those determined to control their own destinies.