Beijing has effectively wiped out independent, investigative journalists. Those attempting to cover the country’s Covid crackdown were detained and sometimes quarantined. The human-rights bar has been destroyed, with lawyers disbarred and/or imprisoned. Independent NGOs such as the Unirule Institute have been shut down.
Even cooperation between Chinese universities and their foreign counterparts is carefully scrutinized now, and many speaking invitations extended to foreigners must first be approved by Beijing. The government has emphasized “patriotic education,” meaning unabashed indoctrination. Religious persecution has greatly intensified, with the government treating CCP doctrine as sacred scripture and expressing its desire to rewrite the Christian Bible.
Torture is common. So are televised confessions, including by foreigners, meant to discredit dissenters’ criticism of PRC practices. Such admissions are procured through threats of harsher punishment and maltreatment of relatives. Beijing has engaged in “hostage diplomacy,” arresting Westerners to win the release of its own citizens. The regime is building an intensive surveillance state. The so-called social-credit system, though not as pervasive as sometimes asserted, monitors citizens’ behavior and has been used to punish those who do not faithfully follow regime dictates, including political dissidents. Some analysts charge that the Chinese government continues to practice “organ harvesting” in its prisons.
The PRC has also imposed especially oppressive regimes in three unique geographic areas. Tibet has long suffered under rule designed to suppress Tibetan culture, grow the Han Chinese population in the region, and strengthen Beijing’s political control. With passage of the Hong Kong National Security Law in June 2020, the central government effectively destroyed the traditional British civil and political liberties that underpinned the “one country, two systems” model that had previously set the city apart from the mainland. In Xinjiang, Beijing has incarcerated a million or more people, mostly Uyghurs but some of other nationalities too, in reeducation and forced-labor camps. Washington and several other governments have termed these actions genocide, since they constitute an attempt to kill a culture (though not a people). The hardship suffered by Xinjiang’s Uyghurs has been enormous, as even the United Nations recently recognized.
Although Beijing’s violations do not directly threaten the security and liberty of foreign peoples and states, they reinforce the regime’s worst external practices. A regime so unconcerned about life and dignity at home will not respect the rights and interests of those in other societies.
Defending human rights is a shared responsibility. Private groups should organize to highlight abuses, embarrass criminal perpetrators, and press for change. Governments also should advocate for the freedom of people in other countries — while recognizing the practical difficulties and trade-offs in doing so.
Hypocrisy, evidenced by American policies toward Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other human-rights hellholes, undercuts Washington’s credibility. Moreover, U.S. leverage is limited. Official criticism brings international public attention but rarely changes foreign practices. Elsewhere, progress is most likely when objectives are modest. Narrowly targeted measures, especially those aimed domestically — barring suppliers from using forced labor, for instance — are most likely to achieve positive results.
Alas, results typically fall as stakes rise. Sanctions applied to entire foreign populations — usually in hopes of indirectly weakening governments and/or pushing people to revolt — punish the innocent and rarely work. Targeting specific perpetrators of human-rights abuses through laws such as the U.S. Magnitsky Act punishes the worst offenders but does little to change government policy in the places where the abuses occurred.
Indeed, human-rights abuses have continued for years in countries under foreign sanction. For instance, former Hong Kong chief executive Carrie Lam, a CCP hand puppet, was left unable to find a bank after Washington threatened financial penalties against any institution doing business with her. But Lam did not fly to Beijing, confront Xi, and demand that he allow democracy in Hong Kong. And even if she had done so, the PRC would not have relaxed its policies.
Unfortunately, repression is essential to China’s political system. It is how CCP officials, from Xi on down, retain power, perquisites, wealth, status, and everything else that sets them apart from the rest of the Chinese population. Human-rights abuses go to the very nature of the CCP’s control. For most authoritarian regimes, self-preservation comes first, so they are unlikely to make fundamental political changes even under great foreign economic pressure. Beijing is unlikely to yield, except at the margins, despite sanctions.
Of course, Washington could continue piling on tougher penalties. But the U.S. already is using its economic influence against Beijing in many areas. The Trump administration initiated a trade war of dubious effectiveness. The Biden administration has escalated the economic battle with China over control of the world’s most advanced technologies. Chinese investments in U.S. enterprises long have been restricted. Assorted human-rights penalties have been applied to Chinese entities involved in North Korea, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Russia.
Yet ironically, the very proliferation of sanctions reduces their effectiveness. The greater the demands, the more the PRC would have to transform itself to comply, the less likely the demands are to be met. Moreover, multiplying sanctions today leaves fewer options for discouraging other disfavored behavior tomorrow. Washington might do better tempering its ambitions and concentrating on a smaller number of high-priority targets.
One positive though indirect approach is to undermine Chinese repression by breaching foreign information barriers. Broadcasts into foreign nations have traditionally been a weapon in America’s fight against tyranny, not without problems but still useful. Today, governments should also target barriers to online access.
One strategy is to use trade laws and negotiations to challenge Internet restrictions. Another is to work with private activists to break through or circumvent foreign controls. Such efforts should seek to empower oppressed peoples and increase hope for the long-term transformation of authoritarian systems.
With Xi’s consolidation of power, Beijing’s assault on the Chinese people’s freedom will continue. Indeed, Xi has become the new Mao, only more disciplined and determined to assert the PRC’s power abroad. Americans and other people of goodwill must respond firmly but thoughtfully, with a commitment to helping the Chinese people gain control over their nation’s future.