U.S. federal prosecutors are investigating Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell over his testimony regarding the renovation costs of the Fed’s headquarters. In an unprecedented video, Powell claimed that the “threat of criminal charges is a consequence of the Federal Reserve setting interest rates based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the president.”

If Powell is correct, it marks the worst politically motivated attack against the central bank in recent memory. I am an economist, not a lawyer, and cannot speak to the legal merits of the case. Instead, I will provide a range of possible economic outcomes if we are to assume this federal prosecution is engineered to erode the Fed’s independence.

The most likely outcome is that the FOMC continues to set the rate target as it has previously, albeit with extracurricular complications stemming from the prosecution.

The FOMC will release several statements and its members will give numerous speeches that explain how their decisions relate to the macroeconomic climate. They will deny that these rate decisions have anything to do with pressure from the executive branch, and both financial markets and the public alike will be inclined to believe that.

This is no credit to the Fed or the Trump administration, but rather to the strongest force in U.S. economics: reversion to the status quo. Just last year, we witnessed unprecedented attacks from the administration levied against the Fed, ranging from juvenile name-calling to the attempted firing of Fed governor Lisa Cook.

Despite those attacks, effects on monetary policy outcomes were muted. For example, Trump appointed Stephen Miran to the FOMC last September — viewed by many as a partisan appointee who would implement Trump’s vision of drastically lowered rates. In each of the three meetings since Miran’s appointment, the FOMC voted almost unanimously for a 25-basis-point (0.25%) cut to the rate target. While Miran was the lone dissenter at all three meetings, even he only asked for a 50-basis-point cut — a far cry from Trump’s wish of a 200- to 300-basis-point rate cut.

But that is no cause for complacency, especially for a U.S. economy that recently suffered its first serious bout of inflation in 40 years. With each successive attack on the central bank’s credibility, the probability of reverting to the status quo shrinks. At some point, the proverbial Rubicon will be crossed, and there may be serious cause for alarm.

The turning point is when the Trump administration’s attacks completely erode public trust in the Fed’s desire or ability to keep inflation low and stable. Macroeconomists call such a scenario “indeterminacy” — economist lingo that simply means that key macroeconomic variables such as employment, output growth and inflation have no stable resting point.

In such a situation, market participants’ expectations of inflation can dramatically alter the macroeconomy. That is, changes to consumers’ expectations of future inflation can drastically alter economic conditions now.

The amount of devastation this can cause varies. It is possible that the longstanding strength and stability of the U.S. economy buys some leeway with market participants. Or it could result in severe volatility if Main Street or Wall Street’s trust is completely eroded. The latter seems more likely now given this administration’s penchant for violating institutional norms and sensible economics.

This concern is not limited to economics textbooks. Turkey serves as a recent case study of such a scenario. The Turkish administration, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his contrarian views on interest rates, took control of monetary policy and forcibly lowered rates, thoroughly eroding the independence of the Turkish central bank.

Predictably, the results were disastrous. The Turkish inflation rate has been over 50% for most of the past three years. Consequently, the Turkish administration had to revert to sensible central banking and raise the policy rate sharply — it is currently 38%.

While the U.S. is not at banana-republic status yet, it seems foolhardy to test where that threshold lies by constantly tolerating executive overreach into monetary policy.

But it’s also the failures of the U.S. central banking system that have allowed such turmoil. The Fed is too much of a black box and sets rates in too arbitrary a manner. As a result, it is easy for opportunistic politicians to scapegoat the Fed and blame it for poor economic outcomes, even if these outcomes are the result of poor fiscal policies.

The solution is to minimize political influence by having the Fed follow a monetary policy rule when setting its interest-rate target. Doing so would safeguard the Fed’s independence and constrain politically motivated, discretionary rate cuts through more objective policymaking.