To Avoid the Worst, US Must Abandon Pretense of North Korean Denuclearization

The unfortunate reality is that the North is a nuclear power, with at least dozens of nuclear weapons now and the potential to acquire as many as 240 over the next few years — an estimate, admittedly controversial, that would place it in the top ranks of secondary nuclear powers, ahead of Israel, Pakistan, India and the U.K.

Even Kim Jong Un’s smaller arsenal has already challenged the existing security order in Northeast Asia. South Korea and Japan feel increasingly vulnerable and face substantial domestic pressure to upgrade their armaments, including possibly adding nukes. U.S. extended deterrence had a modest cost when the DPRK was a non-nuclear power, but as its arsenal grows and its long-range weapons put the homeland at risk, are Americans prepared to risk everything for Seoul or Tokyo?

Instead of grappling with the collapsing foundation of existing policy toward the North, U.S. and South Korean policymakers have adopted an ostrich policy. Talks, concessions and agreements with North Korea remain linked to denuclearization, most famously “complete verifiable irreversible denuclearization/​dismantlement,” or CVID.

This approach crashed and burned after the Hanoi summit, and Kim Jong Un has repeatedly said he will not talk to U.S. or South Korean officials. His sister, Kim Yo Jong, is a non-stop insult machine, pouring scorn on Washington’s and Seoul’s attempts to engage.

As the Kim regime stokes tensions, launching a record number of missiles this year and even flying a drone over Seoul, it’s time for the U.S. to face the reality that North Korea is a nuclear state and make serious efforts to engage Pyongyang outside the narrow objectives of CVID.

He Sanctions Chimera

There are advocates of military action to stop North Korea, seemingly including President Donald Trump at one point, but most policymakers recognize that the opportunity for preventative war against Pyongyang, if ever truly present, has passed. 

There was a time when the DPRK only held the city of Seoul hostage with conventional weapons. Today the entire South, along with Japan and American territories, such as Guam, would be at risk of nuclear attack. There is evidence that the North long ago decided to respond violently to what it viewed as provocations to maintain its reputation and dissuade foreign escalation. 

Hoping Pyongyang would exercise restraint and not respond to a limited strike is a pipedream, given allied talk of decapitation and multiple U.S. regime-change wars.

Sanctions are the go-to solution for most policymakers. For instance, former Trump National Security Council member Anthony Ruggiero argued that sanctions should be strengthened: “The Biden team should use [its] diplomatic capital to implement U.S. sanctions.” The DPRK may be the fourth-most sanctioned nation, but there always seem to be more screws to tighten.

But international sanctions have not prevented North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and missiles. And no additional economic coercion can match the level of isolation the North has imposed on itself for nearly three years since the pandemic began.

Targeting Beijing to force Chinese cooperation also isn’t likely to work. North Korea is but one of many sharp U.S. disagreements with China, which isn’t inclined to do any favors for Washington. 

Alas, reinforcing a policy that has failed for years is a dead end. Contrary to the assumption behind economic sanctions, serious countries do not abandon existential political ends to relieve economic pain concentrated on powerless publics. 

The excuse for the consistent failure of sanctions — on Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Syria, Russia and North Korea — is that they are not strong enough. A policy that its advocates admit has proved impossible to implement effectively anywhere on Earth is a chimera, not a serious option.

Hoping and Praying

Rather than yield, the Kim dynasty has consistently returned pressure for pressure. In September Kim Jong Un went further than either of his predecessors and declared North Korea to be an “irreversible” nuclear weapons state that may use weapons for non-defensive purposes.

Sure, he could still change his mind. But faith and hope are poor foundations for foreign policy. All that is left is reality and diplomacy. Pyongyang seems less likely to engage in provocative behavior only when engaged in negotiation with the U.S. This requires convincing the North to negotiate, which appears unlikely so long as America demands denuclearization.

It is simply too late for Washington to expect the DPRK to unilaterally disarm for the sake of nonproliferation. Only one country, South Africa, has done so, and its circumstances were unique. The U.S. doesn’t ask this if any other nuclear power — not Israel, India, Pakistan, China or Russia, much less NATO allies France and the U.K.

Some U.S. officials also worry that accepting the North as a nuclear power would disturb Seoul and Tokyo. What should bother these governments is the fact that the DPRK possesses both nukes and missiles. Washington officials can huff and puff and insist on denuclearization, but the DPRK will still have the means to hit its neighbors with nuclear weapons.

That’s why the issue of extended deterrence has become a hot topic in both Seoul and Washington even though the U.S. remains formally committed to CVID. If the allies can’t come up with a serious denuclearization strategy, the U.S. should try a better approach.

A Better Path

The U.S. could treat the North as a nuclear state without declaring it to be one, then push arms control steps that are both independently valuable and consistent with denuclearization. However, first Washington must convince Pyongyang to negotiate.

To demonstrate its seriousness, the Biden administration should indicate that sanctions relief is available for the right deal. The administration might point to some specific restrictions it would be willing to suspend or relax in exchange for meaningful arms control steps. 

Finally, a small sweetener or two could be offered — for instance, ending the ban on travel to North Korea and opening liaison offices. The former is an unnecessary symbolic afront; the second would serve U.S. interests by creating a window into the DPRK.

Kim should be told that Washington is committed to building a working relationship with Pyongyang, leading to lower tensions on the peninsula, a diminished military confrontation between North and South Korea, the DPRK’s return to the international marketplace, Pyongyang’s entry into regional institutions and a normal relationship with America. 

Part of any opening would be a dialogue over human rights, with improvement necessary to fully integrate the North in the international system. Obviously, even if everything went smoothly this is an ambitious and long-term agenda. 

However, there is no chance of such a result absent diplomatic engagement, which today is nonexistent.

Of course, nothing might come from such a program. Kim might have his own timetable. He might believe that waiting will enhance his leverage. But Washington won’t know until it tests Pyongyang’s receptivity to talks that are not solely about denuclearization. 

In any case, it would be better for Washington to abandon the pretense that it is working toward CVID. The DPRK appears set on becoming a formidable nuclear power in the not-too-distant future. Admitting the obvious would give the U.S. the best opportunity to prevent the worst.