America’s Prolonged Stay in Europe 

With U.S. foreign policy in flux, it is time to fundamentally rethink the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago, America’s Global War on Terror ingloriously ended with the collapse of the U.S.- and NATO-supported government in Afghanistan. Although terrorism remains an issue, the roughly three decades of American global dominance — Washington’s brief “What we say goes” era — is over. This transformation will affect more than the U.S. response to terrorism. America can no longer manage every region on earth and protect every prosperous and populous ally, including in Europe. Washington should begin shedding rather than just sharing security burdens.

Foreign policy is strongly circumstantial. When the transatlantic alliance was formed in 1949, the world was radically different: Western Europe was still recovering from World War II, Eastern Europe was occupied by the Red Army, and Joseph Stalin ruled the Soviet Union. As Lord Hastings Ismay, the first secretary-general of NATO famously explained, the alliance’s purpose was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

However, America’s presence, though initially essential, was expected to be limited. Indeed, the U.S. deployment was intended to foster allied self-sufficiency, not make Washington’s role permanent. Dwight Eisenhower, the first supreme commander of NATO, said the objective was to help “these people regain their confidence and get on their own military feet.” He explicitly rejected the U.S. being “a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions.” Yet that is what America became — and remains today. 

The Transformation of NATO

The global balance of power has shifted dramatically, and the need for a U.S.-dominated transatlantic alliance has disappeared. Instead of promoting NATO’s expansion, the Biden Administration should be plotting the alliance’s transformation. That would conveniently coincide with increased European interest in greater continental military capabilities. For decades, successive U.S. administrations discouraged member governments from developing forces separate from the alliance. Today such a shift should be Washington’s objective.

The U.S. remains the world’s most important nation — largest economy, greatest soft power, dominant military. However, America’s edge in those areas is shrinking. And its weaknesses, compounding extraordinarily bitter political divisions with equally dramatic fiscal irresponsibility, are significant. Washington cannot forever underwrite wealthy states which have other priorities, such as investing in their own welfare states, as in Europe.

Moreover, allied relationships would be healthier if more equal. American demands that European governments do more, but only in ways seen as most advantageous in Washington, have undermined the transatlantic relationship. Donald Trump’s verbal eruptions on the issue differed only in tone from the rhetoric of his predecessors. Illustrating predictable hubris, Washington long has instructed the Europeans on the sort of militaries it believes they should maintain.

A European Solution to a European Problem

The basic problem is that there is agreement neither on the degree of threat nor the most appropriate response. Many NATO members see no serious dangers, and even those nations which worry about Russia, the only meaningful military threat to Europe, still mostly rely on Washington. Consider the Baltic countries: they claim to fear aggression by Moscow but devote just a couple of cents on the Euro to defense. Do they really value their independence so little? They should spend far more and create a territorial defense that would exact a high price for Russian aggression.

The solution is simple, if perhaps expensive for European states. They should assess the risks, decide on the objectives, and create the force structure necessary to achieve the latter. The U.S. should aid them in this process, giving the Europeans time to decide on the mode of organization and address existing military deficiencies. However, Washington — and especially the present administration, known for its Atlanticist orientation — should take the lead.

The Need for European Military Independence after Afghanistan

If a further spur is needed for action, it should be the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. In August, European defense ministers gathered, complaining of a “fiasco” and “debacle.” They had no independent ability to act but were stuck relying on the U.S. In this, they had no one to blame but themselves. Europe’s military deficiencies have been long known. Recently, The Center for American Progress concluded: “European militaries have now experienced decades of decline… European forces aren’t ready to fight with the equipment they have, and the equipment they have isn’t good enough.” Some European leaders believe that the tragic embarrassment of Afghanistan will finally, after a multitude of promises and false starts, lead to genuine change. For instance, E.U. commissioner Paolo Gentiloni, a former Italian prime minister, opined, “It’s a terrible paradox, but this debacle could be the start of Europe’s moment.” That is possible but will require a serious continental approach to security not seen since NATO’s formation.

French President Emmanuel Macron famously proposed “strategic autonomy” and a “true European army” after attacking NATO as “brain dead.” That idea went nowhere. However, the European Union’s de facto foreign minister, Josep Borrell, has now suggested an “initial entry force” of 5,000 soldiers and other “new tools” like it. At least this would be progress, but still would be only a tiny first step. The British and French forces are capable, though small if the defense of Europe is the objective. In contrast, Germany has skimped on spending even as the Bundeswehr has attracted significant embarrassing criticism for its lack of readiness. Italy and Spain have large economies but little interest in creating more effective militaries. And, as noted earlier, even the Baltics and Poland spend far less than their rhetorical warnings of the alleged threat would seem to warrant. This ridiculous state of affairs exists only because Washington plays an oversize role in Europe’s defense. It is better for European states to concentrate on security issues at home. Whatever Europe chooses to do, Washington should drop its promise to intervene. 

For European governments, reliance on America has always been the easy path. However, that strategy will increasingly be a dead end. Both politics and economics are moving against Washington’s continued acquiescence to European cheap-riding. It certainly is not in America’s interest. Ultimately, it is not in Europe’s interest either.