Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

Obama Adviser Advocated War with North Korea

Matt Yglesias posts this list of members of Barack Obama’s “National Security Working Group.” Interesting to see that it includes William Perry, who wrote this in 2006, when North Korea was preparing to test a ballistic missile:

if North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched. This could be accomplished, for example, by a cruise missile launched from a submarine carrying a high-explosive warhead. The blast would be similar to the one that killed terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. But the effect on the Taepodong would be devastating. The multi-story, thin-skinned missile filled with high-energy fuel is itself explosive – the U.S. airstrike would puncture the missile and probably cause it to explode. The carefully engineered test bed for North Korea’s nascent nuclear missile force would be destroyed, and its attempt to retrogress to Cold War threats thwarted. There would be no damage to North Korea outside the immediate vicinity of the missile gantry.

[…]

We should not conceal our determination to strike the Taepodong if North Korea refuses to drain the fuel out and take it back to the warehouse. When they learn of it, our South Korean allies will surely not support this ultimatum – indeed they will vigorously oppose it. The United States should accordingly make clear to the North that the South will play no role in the attack, which can be carried out entirely with U.S. forces and without use of South Korean territory. South Korea has worked hard to counter North Korea’s 50-year menacing of its own country, through both military defense and negotiations, and the United States has stood with the South throughout. South Koreans should understand that U.S. territory is now also being threatened, and we must respond. Japan is likely to welcome the action but will also not lend open support or assistance. China and Russia will be shocked that North Korea’s recklessness and the failure of the six-party talks have brought things to such a pass, but they will not defend North Korea.

…The United States should emphasize that the strike, if mounted, would not be an attack on the entire country, or even its military, but only on the missile that North Korea pledged not to launch – one designed to carry nuclear weapons. We should sharply warn North Korea against further escalation.

North Korea could respond to U.S. resolve by taking the drastic step of threatening all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. But it is unlikely to act on that threat. Why attack South Korea, which has been working to improve North-South relations (sometimes at odds with the United States) and which was openly opposing the U.S. action? An invasion of South Korea would bring about the certain end of Kim Jong Il’s regime within a few bloody weeks of war, as surely he knows. Though war is unlikely, it would be prudent for the United States to enhance deterrence by introducing U.S. air and naval forces into the region at the same time it made its threat to strike the Taepodong. If North Korea opted for such a suicidal course, these extra forces would make its defeat swifter and less costly in lives – American, South Korean and North Korean.

President Bush did not, of course, launch airstrikes against North Korea. Rather, the North went ahead with the missile test and it failed.

John McCain might want to be careful about criticizing Obama too much for this, though: After all, it was John McCain who took to the pages of his favorite magazine in 2003 to make this argument about North Korea:

The use of military force to defend vital American security interests must always be a last resort, as it is in this crisis. But if we fail to achieve the international cooperation necessary to end this threat, then the countries in the region should know with certainty that while they may risk their own populations, the United States will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people. And spare us the usual lectures about American unilateralism. We would prefer the company of North Korea’s neighbors, but we will make do without it if we must.

Who says there’s nothing these campaigns can agree on!

Nuclear Smuggling Ring Had Advanced Plans - This Relates to Your Privacy

A year ago, in some jest, I announced a new law (as in “of physics”) on the TechLiberationFront blog. “Harper’s Law” states, “The security and privacy risks increase proportionally to the square of the number of users of the data.” This rule generalizes to all information in digital form, and the suspected release of nuclear plans to the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring illustrates this well.

It is very difficult to control digital information - on any subject and in any context. It’s like a volatile gas: once it escapes whatever container or capsule you may have enclosed it in, you’re not getting it back. (Well, you’ll still have it but you won’t be able to deprive others from having it.) Nuclear plans, bomb-making plans, and the like will be very hard to contain, and relying on control of this kind of information for national or homeland security will be an unreliable protection.

Likewise, a poor way to protect privacy is to rely on rules about how information is used after it has been collected. If you really want privacy, you must never reveal the information you want to keep private. I’ve written a couple of times where various public officials have sought to redefine privacy so that it is consistent with their having access to personal information. Can’t be done.

In close relation are the large, personal-information-intensive programs that the federal government has been trying to develop. For example, our national ID law, the REAL ID Act, would put sensitive personal information and scanned identity documents into nationally accessible databases. Yet identity security requires keeping much of this information from being public. You can’t have both.

E-Verify would use names paired with Social Security Numbers as identifiers in a national immigration background check system, yet it would rely on the inaccessibility of this information to the public for security against fraud. Can’t happen. (DHS is seeking access to Americans’ driver’s license and passport pictures, hoping to shore up this weakness, but watch for all the new problems that emerge when digital copies of the photographs on our identity documents escape into the wild.)

Harper’s Law extends to other issue areas as well, like copyright. It is very hard for copyrights in popular content to be enforced, and it will get harder. Artists and the entertainment industry are in a real bind trying to control access to information that they must also widely distribute. See Cato Unbound’s “Future of Copyright” discussion, going on now, for more interesting thinking in this area.

There you have it: advanced nuclear plans, databases of personal information, and copyright law are all peas in a pod to me.

What Do You Call the Ring in a Bull’s Nose? Perhaps “KST”?

While the country moves forward with increasing confidence in its ability to meet the security challenges posed by terrorism, the administration seems still utterly, utterly spellbound.

Take, for example, National Security Presidential Directive 59/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 24. Issued June 5th, it (take a breath … wait for it …) “establishes a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and agencies … use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals … .”

That means, roughly, “Let’s get our act together on biometrics and biometric surveillance, people!”

The directive uses a set of initials I hadn’t come across before: “KST.” This stands for “known and suspected terrorists.” As in, we’re going to “collect, store, use, analyze, and share biometrics to identify and screen KSTs and other persons who may pose a threat to national security.”

Now, to be clear, there are terrorists, and there may be some in the country - terrorist precursors, perhaps. But I don’t think there are enough of them, or enough danger from them, to merit awarding them their own initials. Even in acronym- and initial-happy Washington, D.C., these things are reserved for things of greater significance.

This reveals the thrall in which the administration is still held by terrorism. “We’re not up against a few small bands of sociopathic ideologues. No, we’re up against a movement with all the power of our ‘FBI’, ‘CIA’, ‘DoD’, and ‘DoJ’.”

I’ve posted here before about terrorism as a strategy, suggesting certain counter-strategic behaviors. Terrorists gain by drawing attention to themselves, wrapping themselves in the romance of rebellion, and being seen as legitimate rivals to their enemies. By dubbing the threat “KST,” the administration grants terrorists that legitimacy. It tells audiences ideologically and physically near terrorists that we’re still scared, which does terrorists a tremendous favor. (I, for one, am not scared; I’m embarrassed.)

On the merits, biometrics are occasionally necessary, but essentially impotent against the well-known technique of using “clean-skin” terrorists (see, e.g., 9/11, Oklahoma City). The NSPD/HSPD doesn’t appear to have a lot of substance other than to promote more ferment and federal spending on biometric surveillance technology.

A President Who Knew When to Cast Off the Neocons

I’m reminded that today is the anniversary of Ronald Reagan’s “tear down this wall” speech in Berlin:

It’s a useful reminder that while Reagan included key neoconservatives in his administration, particularly in his first term, most of them always suspected that he was a fool, incapable or unwilling to take the heels-dug-in position that would bring down our Soviet adversaries. Even in 1982, at the height of the neocons’ influence on Reagan and just five years before this speech, neocon capo Norman Podhoretz was accusing Reagan of “following a strategy of helping the Soviet Union stabilize its empire, rather than … encouraging the breakdown of that empire from within.”

I could bore you with umpteen more examples of these sorts of (neo-)conservative denunciations of Reagan, but the man knew an opportunity when he saw it, and wasn’t going to listen to the naysayers and pessimists when they told him it wasn’t so. Reagan by no means got everything right, but on the big questions, he would be a welcome respite from today’s Republican Party, which has been handed over to the neoconservatives in exchange for the mess of pottage that is our Iraq policy.

Obama Calls Chávez an “Enemy”

Today there is a long interview [in Spanish] in Chile’s El Mercurio with Barack Obama on his views for Latin America. What struck me first was Obama’s claim that he “would start conversations with our enemies in Cuba and Venezuela.” Now, I’m not opposed to his willingness to sit down and talk with unfriendly regimes—I think that’s appropriate in certain circumstances—but what caught my attention was the use of the word “enemy” when referring to Venezuela. I think that constitutes clumsy diplomacy.

The Bush administration has been rather prudent in its approach to Hugo Chávez, despite all the hot air coming from Caracas and the allegations that his government has supported terrorist organizations in the hemisphere. Bush doesn’t even mention Chávez’s name in his speeches, and that drives him crazy. Chávez needs confrontation. His recent—and thwarted—push for a new intelligence law that would have turn Venezuela into a police state was primarily based on his paranoia of a U.S. invasion.

Now that Bush is about to exit the stage, Chávez needs to pick a fight with the next president of the U.S. He recently boasted that his name was being used in the presidential campaign. By calling him the “enemy,” Obama is setting the stage for a confrontation with Chávez in the event that he wins in November. This is exactly what the strongman from Caracas wants.

Condoleezza Rice Recants

Readers may recall Condi Rice’s 2000 Foreign Affairs article in which she declared, among other things, that with respect to regimes like Iraq and North Korea,

These regimes are living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them. Rather, the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence – if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.

My own favorite 2000-vintage Riceism is still “Carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things America has to do. We don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”

But you get the idea that there is a fairly profound disconnect between the 2000 Condoleezza Rice and the 2008 Condoleezza Rice. And sure enough, the Secretary has an article in the current Foreign Affairs that serves as a broad denunciation of her earlier incarnation, and an attempt to cloak airy Wilsonianism in the guise of tough-minded realism. My friend Kara Hopkins over at The American Conservative takes the editorial equivalent of a belt-sander to the piece and is left with little more than a pile of sawdust for her efforts.

[I]n Rice’s convoluted calculus, stability, once the grail in international relations, is no longer a worthy end of itself: “Freedom and democracy are the only ideas that can, over time, lead to just and lasting stability.” To secure peace, we must first, in true revolutionary fashion, destabilize: “the process of democratization is likely to be messy and unsatisfactory.” How else to explain away the electoral successes of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood? Temporary “untidiness.” She sees this upheaval as a transitional period in a “generational” project—which means she has time to get out of town.

Realism, also overdue for a revival, fares no better in the Rice rebranding scheme. Surely no resident of the reality-based community believes that “what will most determine whether the United States can succeed in the twenty-first century is our imagination.”

[…]

Were these the delusions of a streetcorner radical, they might be silly. But coming from the Secretary of State, they’re dangerously mad–-and appropriating sound labels doesn’t make them less so.

I liked the old Condoleezza Rice quite a bit better, too.