Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

The Weekly Standard on Why They Hate Us

Andrew and Adam have been fileting the Weekly Standard already today, but while I’ll happily defer to them on education policy, the Standard’s blog is advancing some honest-to-goodness foreign policy nonsense that shouldn’t go unremarked.

Here they are grousing about Obama’s claim that “the continuation of a presence in Iraq as Sen. McCain has suggested is exactly what, I think, will fan the flames of anti-American sentiment and make it more difficult for us to create a long-term and sustainable peace in the world.” Now, this is so painfully obvious as to be banal, but here’s the Standard’s response:

Never mind that farm subsidies–as in the policy Obama defended vociferously while pandering to Iowans a few months back–leave the poorest people in the world starving and without jobs.

Now, farm subsidies are truly a terrible idea. But if the Standard somehow believes that we’re hated in the Islamic world because of sugar subsidies, I’ve got a bridge I’d like to sell them. The list of evidence to the contrary is too long for this forum, but here’s just a start:

“American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in some Arab societies…Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather, they hate our policies.”

-Defense Science Board, Report on Strategic Communication, 2004.

“All of our panelists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the major root cause behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations and that this point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by government officials.”

-Government Accountability Office, “U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges,” May 2006.

“[Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz also estimated the U.S. cost of Iraqi ‘containment’ during 12 years of U.N. sanctions, weapons inspections and continued U.S. air patrols over the country at ‘slightly over $ 30 billion,’ but he said the price had been ‘far more than money.’ Sustained U.S. bombing of Iraq over those years, and the stationing of U.S. forces ‘in the holy land of Saudi Arabia,’ were ‘part of the containment policy that has been Osama bin Laden’s principal recruiting device, even more than the other grievances he cites,’ Wolfowitz said.

Implying that a takeover in Iraq would eliminate the need for U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, and thus reduce the appeal of terrorist groups for new members, Wolfowitz said: ‘I can’t imagine anyone here wanting to spend another $ 30 billion to be there for another 12 years to continue helping recruit terrorists.’

-Washington Post, March 2, 2003

We could go on like this for days. Farm subsidies are dumb enough on their own, we don’t need to delude ourselves into thinking they’re what’s to blame for 9/11. In fact, if the Standard and its adherents continue with this sort of fantacism, we’re going to continue avoiding the real root of our terrorism problem, which is evident enough that the above sources and anyone else paying attention can see it all too plainly.

Chastened Much?

Philip Weiss attends an event sponsored by the Middle East Forum in New York with former Cheney aide David Wurmser and reports back. Here’s a snip from the Q and A:

What are the 3 things he would tell John McCain if he were his adviser?

“Let me just bluntly answer that. One, abandon the two-state solution statement that we have right now vis a vis the Palestinians. Two—Well, let me start with number one. Number one is an open, publicly expressed regime-change strategy in Iran. Two, an open expressed regime-change strategy in Syria. 3, abandoning the two-state solution policy we’ve had frankly since the 9/11 attacks…”

One honestly has to wonder, what would it take these folks to learn from the disaster that their bizarre theories begot in Iraq? Meanwhile, today’s Washington Post lets us know (via Eric Martin) that we should keep an eye out for a new NIE on Iraq — except, despite its no doubt being chock-full of great news about how terrific things are over there, the administration apparently doesn’t want to release a version publicly.

As terrifying as each of the presidential candidates is in various ways, it’s going to be a relief when this long national nightmare is over. We deserve, at the very least, a new nightmare.

Happy Birthday, Homeland Security!

I doubt that anyone outside Joe Lieberman’s office is happy with the performance of the Department of Homeland Security, which observed its five-year anniversary this week. To mark the occasion, CQ Homeland Security (part of Congressional Quarterly) asked me and a bunch of more important people to comment on whether creating the department was wise.

The competition for most negative response turned out to be fierce (even Michael Chertoff sounds ambivalent) but I think my entry is a contender. Here’s the first part of what I wrote:

Congress made a large but typical mistake with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security five years ago. James Q. Wilson wrote in 1995 that government reorganizations are usually driven by a perception of crisis that produces a political need to do something quick and extensive. He notes that these circumstances make thoughtful planning for the change unlikely. Reorganizations, he says, are usually victims of a facile urge to clarify lines of authority and end duplication without understanding the incentives of the organizations involved. Congress and the Bush administration followed this model in creating DHS.

The collection of comments is here.

Pentagon to China: Do What We Say, Not What We Do

This week brought the publication of the annual Pentagon report, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.” As James Fallows will tell you, this is an important document for China threat inflators, who use the report to make all sorts of lurid claims in their efforts to drag us into a Cold War with China. The report itself, while it tends to put a scary spin on things, is relatively sober.

What most irritates me about it (along with its contribution to the overheated cyberwar rhetoric so popular this year) is the implication that China is not allowed to behave like us. Here’s the final paragraph of the executive summary:

The international community has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key capabilities supporting China’s military modernization. China’s leaders have yet to explain in detail the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s modernizing military capabilities. For example, China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures, and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. The lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown.

The briefer who presented the report to the media Monday, David Sedney, echoed this bottom line:

The real story is the continuing development, the continuing modernization, the continuing acquisition of capabilities and the corresponding and unfortunate lack of understanding, lack of transparency about the intentions of those and how they are going to be employed. What is China going to do with all that?”

Expanding and modernizing the military for unclear reasons, huh? Are the authors of this stuff completely blind to hypocrisy? The United States spends over $75 billion a year on research and development alone to modernize the military, never mind procurement. The non-war defense budget has grown 37% since Bush took office. And we are far from transparent. Do we not hide about a tenth of our regular defense spending behind a veil of secrecy? I’m confident we’re not giving the international community thorough briefings on our full surveillance capabilities. What about intentions? We’re vaguer than the Chinese. We explicitly justify our defense capabilities based on uncertainty. The Pentagon’s slogan could be, “Hey, it’s expensive, but you never know.” Will we defend Taiwan if China attacks it? Will we bomb Iran? Join in Sudan’s civil war? I study the U.S. defense establishment for a living, and I don’t know our intentions. No one does.

Maybe we should cut back on the lectures and let the Chinese run their own affairs.

The Fierce Urgency of Shame

Last week’s decision by the Air Force to spend up to $100 billion over the next 30 years on an airborne fuel tanker built by a partnership of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) – rather than by Boeing – offers a teachable moment about an ugly, age-old truth regarding American politics. To wit, well organized political constituencies – and the politicians that cater to them – are perfectly willing to rip off the country for a buck and a vote.

The United States Air Force reports that the Airbus airborne fuel tanker outperforms the Boeing airborne fuel tanker on all five relevant selection criteria. So the issue is quite simple: Should the Air Force buy the best plane possible for the United States military, or should the Air Force buy the best plane possible for some politically well-connected investors and workers and force the military to operate sub-optimal weapons systems as a consequence?

The fact that well organized interest groups – namely, Boeing Corporation and the workers that would be employed by the tanker contract – are unconcerned with the injury they would do to both U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. military in the course of making a few extra bucks should not surprise. It’s a story that could be retold dozens of times over. The fact that Boeing and the workers associated with Boeing wrap themselves up in patriotic garb in the course of hobbling America’s military abroad is what truly grates.

I don’t know whether the military really needs a new airborne fuel tanker, whether a new airborne fuel tanker is a good buy for the taxpayer, or whether the Airbus model really outperforms the Boeing model (and given the track record of military procurement bureaucracies, it’s not unimaginable that the Air Force might have gotten this wrong). I do know, however, that if the military is going to buy one, its decision about what model to buy ought to be based on pure, unadulterated merit – leavened by a concern for getting the best performance bang for the contract buck given the limited resources of the American taxpayer.

Any other consideration forced on the military is a raw declaration that our military’s fighting power should suffer for somebody’s pay check. Those making that argument while boasting about their love for country ought to be deeply ashamed.

Note to the idealists: Both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton have expressed opposition to the Air Force decision. Now, either they know something about the technical details of the Airbus and Boeing airborne tankers that has escaped the Air Force’s attention, or the promise of a “new politics” is as empty as one might expect.

Chapman Kneecaps McCain

Libertarian columnist Steve Chapman has written what is to date the definitive takedown of John McCain’s various delusions about Iraq. As is Chapman’s wont, it’s a great column overall, packed with substance. Here’s the gist:

McCain portrays himself as uniquely clear-eyed about the war. In fact, those eyes have often been full of stars. When Army Gen. Eric Shinseki forecast that more troops would be needed for the occupation, McCain didn’t fret. Shortly before the invasion, he said, “I have no qualms about our strategic plans.” As the online magazine Salon reports, he predicted the war would be “another chapter in the glorious history of the United States of America.”

He brags now that he criticized Donald Rumsfeld’s handling of the occupation. But McCain didn’t declare “no confidence” in him until a year and a half after the invasion. And let’s not forget the day he took a stroll through a Baghdad market, guarded by attack helicopters and 100 soldiers in full combat mode, to prove how safe Iraq was. The following day, 21 Iraqis were abducted from the market and murdered.

[…]

The point of the surge was to catalyze rapid progress that would facilitate our departure. But now the Pentagon says that come July, we’ll still have more troops than the 132,000 we had before. When Lt. Gen. Carter Ham was asked if the number will fall below 132,000 by the time Bush leaves office, he replied, “It would be premature to say that.”

McCain says the current “strategy is succeeding in Iraq.” His apparent definition of success is that American forces will stay on in huge numbers as long as necessary to keep violence within acceptable limits. We were told we had to increase our numbers so we could leave. Turns out we had to increase our numbers so we could stay.

Five years after the Iraq invasion, we’ve suffered more than 30,000 dead and wounded troops, incurred trillions in costs and found that Iraqis are unwilling to overcome their most basic divisions. And no end is in sight. If you’re grateful for that, thank John McCain.

As has always been the case, men like John McCain define leaving as losing and staying as success. If we stay in Iraq for 100 years, that’s “success.” If we leave, ever, we’ve lost.

I’d only add to Chapman’s column that, before the war, media darling St. John of Arizona was one of the most naive proponents of the “greeted as liberators” school of thought, assuring Larry King on September 24, 2002 that “I believe that the success will be fairly easy.” Five days later, McCain was back on CNN, assuring the American people that “I believe that the United States military capabilities are such that we can win a victory in a relatively short time. And I, again, I don’t think it’s, quote, ‘easy,’ but I believe that we can win an overwhelming victory in a very short period of time.” And so forth.

McCain’s claim to straight-talking rectitude on Iraq today is based solely on the fact that the Washington narrative has been changed as a result of The Surge. It’s almost as if it was designed to have just such an effect.