Fleeting American Public Support for Murky Wars

Calls are mounting in Congress (and among some influential opinion groups) for escalating Washington’s military intervention against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and for possible military action against Iran if the new nuclear agreement with that country falls apart.  Caution lights should be flashing about both the extent and durability of such sentiment for military action.  As I note in a recent article in the National Interest Online, this country has an unfortunate history of launching ill-considered armed crusades, often initially with enthusiastic public support.  But that support has a tendency to evaporate and turn to bitter recriminations unless certain conditions are met.  Policymakers need to appreciate that history as they consider intensifying U.S. involvement in the Middle East’s turbulent affairs.

Because most Americans believe that the United States embodies the values of individual liberty, human rights, and government integrity, a foreign policy that seems to ignore or violate those values is almost certain to lose the public’s allegiance sooner or later. That is what happened with such missions as the Vietnam War, the Iraq War and, more recently, the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan.  It is not merely that the ventures failed to achieve quick, decisive results, although that aspect clearly played a role.  It was also that the United States was increasingly seen as expending blood and treasure on behalf of odious clients and dubious causes that had little or nothing to do with the republic’s vital interests.  A disillusioned public turned against those missions, and that development created or intensified bitter domestic divisions.

To sustain adequate public support for military ventures, the objective must be widely perceived as both worthy and attainable.  Without those features, public support for a policy either proves insufficient from the outset or soon erodes, and either development is fatal in a democratic political system.

Preserving public support requires officials to make an honest assessment of the issues at stake.  Too often, both during the Cold War and the post–Cold War eras, U.S. policymakers have hyped threats to American interests.  The alleged dangers posed by such adversaries as North Vietnam, Serbia, Saddam Hussein, the Taliban, and Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad bordered on being ludicrous.  At times, it appears that U.S. officials have deliberately engaged in distortions to gin-up public support for purely elective wars.  On other occasions, officials seem to have succumbed to their own propaganda.  In either case, public support dissipates rapidly when evidence mounts that the supposed security threat to America is exaggerated.

That troubling history should reinforce the need for caution as U.S. leaders consider new military interventions, especially in the Middle East.  None of the proposed missions is likely to produce quick, decisive results—much less results with modest financial outlays and minimal casualties.  Moreover, escalating America’s involvement in the region’s myriad troubles puts the United States in a close de facto partnership with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies—some of the most corrupt, brutal governments on the planet.  Publics in the Middle East and around the world are watching, and the potential for unpleasant blowback is extremely high.  And as we saw with the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the reaction of the American people to associations with sleazy foreign clients can become one of profound revulsion.  The conditions are in place for new foreign-policy debacles, if U.S. officials have not learned the appropriate historical lessons.

Chinese Repression Threatens Economic Dynamism and Political Stability

BEIJING—China’s capital looks like an American big city. Tall office buildings. Large shopping malls. Squat government offices. Horrid traffic jams.

The casual summer uniform is the same: shorts, athletic shoes, skirts, t-shirts, sandals, blouses. Even an occasional baseball cap.

It is a country which the Communist revolutionaries who ruled only four decades ago would not recognize. True believers still exist. One spoke to me reverently of Mao’s rise to power and service to the Chinese people. However, she is the exception, at least among China’s younger professionals.

Indeed, younger educated Chinese could not be further from Communist cadres once determined to create a revolution. The former are socially active, desire the newest technologies, and worry about going to good schools and getting good jobs. Cynicism about corrupt and unelected leaders is pervasive.

If there is one common belief, it is hostility toward government Internet controls. Students have complained to me in class about their inability to get to many websites and readily shared virtual private networks to circumvent state barriers.

But such opinions are not held only by the young. A high school student told me that his father urged him to study in America because of Beijing’s restrictions on freedom.

While Chinese from all walks of life are comfortable telling foreigners what they think, sharing those beliefs with other Chinese is problematic. The media, of course, is closely controlled. Internet sites are blocked, deleted, and revamped. Unofficial intimidation, legal restrictions, and even prison time await those who criticize Communist officialdom on social media and blogs.

But increasingly globalized Chinese are aware of their online disadvantage compared to their peers in the West. Google, YouTube, and Twitter are verboten. Today Bloomberg and the New York Times are beyond reach.

Last week as BBC television began to detail official abuses my TV went black. A couple minutes later BBC was back, after the China report had finished.

While internet and media restrictions have not prevented rapid economic growth, barring the PRC’s best and brightest to a world of information is likely to dampen innovation and entrepreneurship. Moreover, those denied their full freedoms are more likely to leave home. Many of China’s wealthiest citizens have been departing an authoritarian system unbounded by the rule of law.

Repression also stultifies China’s political evolution to a more mature and stable political order. Democracy provides an important safety valve for popular dissent.

The Chinese Communist Party’s control may not be as firm as often presumed. The oppressive establishment which most Chinese have faced for most of their lives is Communist.

Indeed, for many if not most party members, Communism is a means of personal advancement, even enrichment. President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is popular, but is widely seen as politically motivated.

Moreover, Xi has abrogated the well-understood “deal” of the last four decades, that rulers can retire and be immune from future prosecution. Will incumbents so readily yield power in the future?

Perhaps even more threatening for the CCP is the potential for an economic slowdown and consequent political unrest. Already protests are common against local governments, which tend to be ostentatiously rapacious. What if that antagonism shifts against the center?

A poorer PRC means a poorer world: China is a major supplier and increasingly important source of global demand. A politically unstable Beijing would have unpredictable effects on its neighbors.

As I wrote for Forbes online: “Since Mao’s death in 1976, the PRC has changed dramatically—and dramatically for the better. But this second revolution has stalled. Economic liberalization remains incomplete. Political reform never started. Individual liberty has regressed.”

The Chinese people deserve to be free. The Chinese nation would benefit from their freedom. The rest of the world would gain from a freer Chinese nation. Everyone desiring a peaceful and prosperous 21st century should hope for the successful conclusion of China’s second revolution.

Texas Regulators Bark Up the Wrong Tree

For almost 50 years, Dr. Ronald Hines has been a licensed veterinarian in Texas. After a spinal cord injury prevented him from continuing to provide in-person services, Dr. Hines started a website to provide advice on pet care. He never tried to be an animal’s primary veterinarian—he noted a disclaimer to that effect—and did not prescribe medication. 

After a decade of such practice without any complaints or problems, the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners charged Dr. Hines with violating state law by failing to be physically present at the location of the pets before providing veterinary services. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld this restriction on Dr. Hines’s speech because, according to the court, any speech by a professional within the scope of his profession directed toward an individual’s circumstances isn’t protected by the First Amendment. 

Dr. Hines has asked the Supreme Court to review the case and Cato has filed a brief supporting that petition, joined by the Mackinac Center for Public Policy. 

The Fifth Circuit erroneously construed the Texas regulations as governing nonspeech conduct that only incidentally impacted speech. But everything that Dr. Hines did was speech!—there was no nonspeech conduct to regulate. Even if the regulations were content-neutral restrictions that incidentally restricted speech, the restrictions should have been reviewed under heightened scrutiny—meaning that the government would need to show a strong justification for its enforcement action. But the restrictions at issue here are explicitly content-based: Dr. Hines could’ve talked about any topic he wanted, except the topic of veterinary care. 

Under the lower court’s logic, the following people would be unknowingly violating Texas law: Dr. Sanjay Gupta provides health information online; Loveline Radio provides relationship and drug-addition advice; The Mutual Fund Show provides financial advice; in addition to radio talk shows on pet care. All these people, and many others, would be expected to know and follow the detailed regulations of every single state. 

The physical examination requirement doesn’t even make sense as a matter of basic veterinary practice. It only requires that vets visit a location, not that they actually examine a particular animal. It prevents a vet’s colleague from relying on notes and records when the primary-care vet is unavailable. Dr. Hines couldn’t even tell a client that her pet’s condition sounded serious and so the owner should, say, not let the animal drink water and bring it to him right away. 

Moreover, someone who wasn’t a licensed veterinarian could have provided the same advice as Dr. Hines without a problem; the law prohibits good information from qualified individuals while allowing unqualified individuals to give bad advice. The regulation just ends up hurting the poor, who can’t afford to travel to Dr. Hines, and practically creates geographic limitations on speech. 

The Supreme Court should take up Hines v. Alldredge and protect basic First Amendment rights in the context of occupational regulation.

Senate Conservatives Seek to Rein In the Court

Late last year, Reason magazine’s crack legal correspondent Damon Root chronicled the rise of the modern libertarian legal movement in his important new book, Overruled: The Long War for Control of the U.S. Supreme Court. In it, he focused especially on the struggle that some of us have been engaged in for more than four decades to recast the terms of the debate over the proper role of the courts from “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint” to “judicial engagement” and “judicial abdication.” That shift has been crucial because it refocused the debate from judicial behavior to where it should have been all along, namely, on the proper interpretation of the law before the court.

The struggle to bring about that shift, although much further along than when it began decades ago, is far from finished: Witness hearings just two days ago before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts. Called by Subcommittee Chairman Ted Cruz in the wake of last month’s Supreme Court decisions in King v. Burwell, upholding Obamacare’s subsidies for insurance purchased through exchanges established by the federal government, and Obergefell v. Hodges, which made same-sex marriage the law of the land, the hearings were titled “With Prejudice: Supreme Court Activism and Possible Solutions.”

As the title suggests, committee conservatives, in the majority, remain focused on what they see as the Court’s activism. Their witnesses were two professional friends of mine, former Chapman Law Dean and now Professor John Eastman and Ethics and Public Policy Center President Ed Whelan. Nominally representing the liberal activist side was Duke Law Professor Neil Siegel.

I say “nominally” because Professor Siegel took pains early in his testimony to expose problems with the very idea of judicial activism. If defined in opposition to judicial deference, he said, many of the recent decisions of the Court’s “conservatives” would have to be called “activist.” But if the term is defined as engaging in legal infidelity, then we’re arguing not about activism or restraint but about whether the judge read the law correctly.

That’s right. In fact, “judicial engagement” emerged in libertarian thought mainly in opposition to calls from conservatives like Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia for courts to be more deferential to the political branches. But it was animated by the contention that the basic problem with conservative deference was its misreading of the law. In particular, under our Constitution, as Bork put it, majorities were entitled to rule in “wide areas” simply because they were majorities, even if in “some areas” minorities were entitled to be free from majority rule—to which many of us responded that that had the law exactly backwards, turning the Constitution on its head.

But having put his finger on the real source of the differences between the activist and restraint schools, Siegel then went on to illustrate why conservatives called the hearings in the first place, arguing that the Court got it right in both King and Obergefell. In King, Siegel said, Chief Justice John Roberts was right to ignore both the text at issue in the case and the rationale for that text and instead “to read the statute in context and as a whole.” Those, of course, are the kinds of words that enable courts to reach almost any conclusion they wish—to engage in the “activism” conservatives rightly condemn. On reading the law correctly here, credit the conservatives.

Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep

This is a very interesting development—one that’s been coming for a long time: Your car is a computer, some cars can be hacked, and now we know they can be hacked in dangerous ways.

The correct public policy response is implicit in this very good Wired article describing the whole thing. “Automakers need to be held accountable for their vehicles’ digital security,” writer Andy Greenberg says, quoting auto hacker Charlie Miller thus: “If consumers don’t realize this is an issue, they should, and they should start complaining to carmakers.”

That’s two very important consumer protection systems in a couple of brief sentences: In one, carmakers suffer lost sales if their cars are hackable or perceived as such. The market feedback system—including the article itself—causes automakers to work to make their cars less hackable.

How Drones Encourage Dumb Wars and Corrode Democratic Government

My article in this week’s Washington Examiner magazine argues that because U.S. wars seem so cheap, they tempt us into making war too casually. I explain that while this tendency isn’t new, recent technology breakthroughs, which allowed the development of drones, have made it worse. We now make war almost like people buy movies or songs online, where low prices and convenience encourage purchase without much debate or consideration of value. I label the phenomenon one-click wars.

If we take occasional drone strikes as a minimum standard, the United States is at war in six countries: Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, with Libya likely to rejoin the list. In the first three, U.S. military action is exclusively the work of drones. Regular U.S. ground forces are present only in Iraq, where they avoid direct combat, and Afghanistan, where they mostly do.

There’s something remarkable in that combination of militarism and restraint. How can we be so willing to make war but so reluctant to take risks in making it?

My explanation starts with power. Wealth, technological prowess, and military might give the United States unique ability to make war around the world. But labor scarcity, liberal values, and our isolated geography that makes the stakes remote  limit our tolerance for sacrificing lives, even foreign ones, in war. This reluctance to bear the human costs of war leads to reliance on long-range technology, especially airpower.

Airpower, despite its historical tendency to fail without help from ground forces, always offers hope that we are only a few bombs away from enemy capitulation. The promise of cheap, clean wars is always alluring. They would let you escape the choice between the bloody sacrifices war entails and the liberal values it offends. 

Jared Bernstein Tilts His Tax Facts

Former Obama administration economist, Jared Bernstein, argues for higher taxes in a New York Times op-ed yesterday. His piece begins:

Like it or not, the campaign season is upon us, and that almost certainly means somebody is going to try to buy your vote with a tax cut — even though average federal tax rates are already low in historical terms, our tax code remains tilted in favor of the wealthy, and our children, neighborhoods and infrastructure desperately need public investment.

I tried to use my imagination and think of how a thoughtful and intelligent liberal like Bernstein might conceive of tax policy. But I could not come up with any scenario under which this statement might be considered true: “our tax code remains tilted in favor of the wealthy.”   

The plain fact of the matter is that the federal tax system is highly graduated, or what liberals call “progressive.” Lower-income households pay much smaller shares of their income in taxes than do higher-income households.

In his article, Bernstein uses data from the respected Tax Policy Center (TPC), as I do here. The first table shows TPC estimates of average federal tax rates (total taxes divided by income) for U.S. households (specifically, “tax units”) in five income groups.

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