Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

A Blow Against the Flat Earthers Conspiracy Theorists

Reading through Bill Kauffman’s Ain’t My America, I’ve learned that John Randolph believed that with respect to his political opponents, “it is a mere waste of time to reason with such persons. They do not deserve anything like serious refutation. The proper arguments for such statesmen are a strait-waistcoat, a dark room, water, gruel, and depletion.”

This is probably good advice particularly for dealing with the deniers and fantasists who choose to ignore the fact that Saddam Hussein wasn’t in league with al Qaeda. I don’t know whether the Weekly Standard is running a Laurie Mylroie Contest for Weapons-Grade Conspiracy-Mongering or what, but somehow the delusion that the war was a good idea because Saddam was working with al Qaeda to plan an attack on us has cropped up again.

That said, with the passion of a younger man and the pen of a better writer, my friend Spencer Ackerman has taken up the cudgels on behalf of reality. Spencer apparently still has his files dealing with this topic; many of us threw ours away when it became plain that no self-respecting author would stand for the idea of a Saddam-al Qaeda axis.

Spencer takes aim at Stephen Hayes, the Lyndon LaRouche figure of the conspiracy cult. Here’s Spencer on the latest mumbo-jumbo from Hayes:

About as close as anything could come to linking Saddam to Al Qaeda was a memo from one Saddam’s intelligence services “written a decade before Operation Iraqi Freedom.” It says: “In a meeting in the Sudan we agreed to renew our relations with the Islamic Jihad Organization in Egypt.” That organization would eventually merge with Al Qaeda in the late 1990s, long after the apparent meeting in Sudan. It also says that for a time in the mid-1990s, Saddam and Al Qaeda had “indirect cooperation” by offering “training and motivation” to some of the same terror organizations in that country.

Out of this thin gruel, Hayes attempted to make a meal in the Standard’s pages this week. He lifted as many bullet points from the report as he could that, out of context, seemed to bolster his theory. He then went about attacking reporters who accurately wrote that the study found no direct connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda. Hayes tacitly promised his readers that history will ultimately vindicate him, writing that “as much as we have learned from this impressive collection of documents, it is only a fraction of what we will know in 10, 20 or 50 years.” And he expressed puzzlement that an administration with an obvious credibility problem had not “done anything to promote the study.”

It would be genuinely perplexing if an administration that has every possible interest (its legacy, its current popularity, the judgment of its most basic principles in history’s ledger) in advancing this argument simply refused to promote “facts” that help argue for their policy views. The most obvious explanation why they haven’t seems to be that they aren’t “facts”–that Stephen Hayes is cobbling together disparate pieces of raw intelligence to paint a picture that doesn’t represent reality. (Which would not be unprecedented in his corner of the political ring.) But other theories are hereby solicited.

Dispensing with Hayes, Spencer leaves us with this:

At the risk of belaboring the point, it should be obvious that if Saddam Hussein was as important to Al Qaeda as Hayes has erroneously and deliberately written for years, then Al Qaeda should be reeling years after the destruction of his regime. Instead, according to a mid-2007 warning from the National Counterterrorism Center, Al Qaeda is “Better Positioned to Strike the West.” Never once does Hayes, in all the thousands of words he has written on the “connection,” reckoned with this basic strategic problem. In essence, he asks every U.S. soldier and Marine in Iraq to be the last man to die for a debater’s point.

I wish I’d come up with that last line. If you’re wondering about what’s brewing in the danker corners of the conspiracy-mongering fever swamps, Spencer climbs down into the muck so you don’t have to. But it’s sad that we still have to have this discussion at all. We don’t give equal time to flat-earthers anymore.

Oy, Hillary

Matt Yglesias, reading Dana Milbank in the Washington Post, notes that Hillary Clinton’s campaign apparently believes that U.S. support for Israel should be unconditional.

According to Clinton adviser Ann Lewis (Barney Frank’s sister): “The role of the president of the United States is to support the decisions that are made by the people of Israel. It is not up to us to pick and choose from among the political parties.” Lewis said this at a United Jewish Communities event in response to Obama’s wild notion that he should not be captive to the Likud line.

I am not up on what level of rhetorical fealty to Israel is standard these days, but this is too much. Ours being a representative government, the president shouldn’t even unconditionally support the wishes of the American people, but that would at least be the right country.

Some reporter really ought to ask Clinton if this is her position. According to Ann Lewis, if Bibi Netanyahu comes back to power and decides to give up on the two-state solution, permanently reoccupy Gaza, displace a bunch more West Bank Palestinians in favor of Jewish settlers, and bomb Iran, Clinton would say, “We stand with you Israel! Here’s your $3 billion in annual military aid and your arms buys, and don’t forget to ask for a Security Council veto if you need one!”

In general, the United States shouldn’t tell our foreign friends what to do, but we also shouldn’t back them no matter what they do. If you take our support, you should take our advice.

John McCain, Determined to Fight al Qaeda Wherever It Isn’t

Matt Yglesias links to this astonishing gaffe from the presumptive Republican nominee:

Speaking to reporters in Amman, the Jordanian capital, McCain said he and two Senate colleagues traveling with him continue to be concerned about Iranian operatives “taking al-Qaeda into Iran, training them and sending them back.”

Pressed to elaborate, McCain said it was “common knowledge and has been reported in the media that al-Qaeda is going back into Iran and receiving training and are coming back into Iraq from Iran, that’s well known. And it’s unfortunate.” A few moments later, Sen. Joseph Lieberman, standing just behind McCain, stepped forward and whispered in the presidential candidate’s ear. McCain then said: “I’m sorry, the Iranians are training extremists, not al-Qaeda.”

Yet another lesson that talk can be simultaneously straight and wrong. The persistence of this sort of unified field theory of terrorism is truly remarkable. Anyone who’s reading the newspapers knows that Iran is, of all countries in the region, most supportive of the Iraqi government. Don’t take my word for it: ask Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who referred to President Ahmadinejad on his recent victory lap visit to Iraq as a “brother.” And then there’s al Qaeda in Iraq, which is not so supportive. It can be difficult to keep all this straight, but the man’s running for president on the basis of his *ahem* peculiar expertise in fighting terrorism, after all.

The Remarkable Moral Deafness of Rep. Rohrabacher

Walter Pincus has a writeup today of a House hearing last Tuesday on what we should be doing about Iraqi refugees. Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-N.Y.) remarked on the failure of the administration to help Iraqis who have worked for the Coalition as translators:

“I can’t remember President Bush speaking about this refugee crisis or the need for the United States to respond aggressively to it except in passing,” Rep. Gary L. Ackerman (D-N.Y.) said.

As for the Iraqi translators, some 500 more of whom have signed up to seek visas, Ackerman said, “I don’t understand why the administration isn’t processing them … unless that was never their intention and all along they were willing to talk a good game but leave these people high and dry.”

Then there’s the Republican position, as presented by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.):

“They’re wonderful people who’d like to live here, especially the ones who have helped us, but the last thing we want to do is to have people who are friendly to democracy … moving here in large numbers at a time when they’re needed to build a new, thriving Iraq.”

So Rep. Rohrabacher knows better than these Arabic-speaking, living-in-Iraq Iraqis what’s best for them. And, as it happens, what’s best for them is to stay in the hellish maelstrom of violence that is Iraq, despite the stated views of these folks themselves. Somehow the foolish idea has gotten into their heads that they’re owed something for having put their lives on the line, day in and day out, to assist the Coalition. In fairness to Rep. Rohrabacher, he’s offering them something: the right to help salvage the grandiose political science theories of men like Rohrabacher. And for that, we should be sure they’ll be eternally grateful.

My colleague Malou Innocent had a piece on the plight of Iraqis who’ve aided the Coalition back in December. Give it a read and see if Rohrabacher’s position doesn’t become all the more uncomfortable.

Airbus, Alabama, Boeing, and McCain

Press reports on the tanker saga have left two points unappreciated. The first is the hidden cost of creating a new aircraft assembly facility in Alabama. The second is how John McCain’s demands for competition in this deal helped Airbus and Northrop – not because McCain is crooked but because competition in defense contracting is phony.

To review: The Air Force needs refueling tankers because we fight far-off wars and don’t want to ask permission for overseas basing rights. B-52 bombers couldn’t fly from Missouri to Afghanistan to bomb the Taliban without tankers. Fighters and cargo aircraft need them too. The Air Force’s tanker fleet of 520 KC-135s and 59 larger KC-10s is old. In 2004, the Air Force tried to begin replacing them by leasing tankers from Boeing, as private airlines do. The deal unraveled when it emerged that leasing the tankers would add $6 billion to the taxpayers’ bill, that the deal was partially intended to prop up Boeing, and that Boeing had bought influence with Pentagon officials. McCain led the opposition. Two Boeing executives and one Air Force official went to prison. The Secretary of the Air Force and the head of Boeing lost their jobs.

Still looking for new tankers, the Air Force solicited another set of proposals for the new tanker, now dubbed the KC-45A. A few weeks ago, Airbus, a subsidiary of EADS, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, won, along with its partner, American defense contractor Northrop-Grumman. The deal would eliminate jobs in Kansas and Washington where Boeing has production facilities. Congressmen and Senators from those states erupted into patriotic indignation and vowed hearings. Politicians from Alabama, where Airbus will place a new production facility, vowed to fight for the deal. Boeing protested, which forces a GAO review – delaying the start of production by at least 100 days. Now allegations have emerged that McCain aided the victors while taking their money and their lobbyists for his Presidential campaign. Got it?

The Air Force says EADS’s tanker is better than Boeing’s. I believe them. It would be reckless to choose an inferior product given the likely protest from the loser and what happened in 2004. But while getting the best plane for the least money is essential, when it awards contracts, the Pentagon should be able to consider their effect on the political landscape, because that landscape drives future contracts. You can’t get the politics out of defense contracting, so you need to get the politics right.

The political problem with the Airbus deal is that it opens a production facility in Alabama to make conventional aircraft assembled elsewhere into tankers, but will not close Boeing’s similar plant in Wichita, Kansas. This means taxpayers have a new mouth to feed. Because they create concentrated interests, US military production facilities are nearly impossible to close. In the private sector, sellers make money by cutting costs and delivering products more efficiently. In defense contracting, companies succeed by keeping production lines open and relying on local Congressman, workers and lobbyists to get them work. That’s why the US has twice the number of shipyards it needs despite consolidation in the shipbuilding industry. It would have been better to keep all the production in Europe, preventing new domestic lobbies from forming, or more realistically, accomplish the same thing by making Airbus lease Boeing’s plant.

Senator McCain has mud on his face because after he blocked the Boeing lease deal and pushed to reopen the bidding, he got around $14,000 in contributions from EADS employees, more than any other politician. Then he hired some of their lobbyists for his presidential campaign. Did that affect his behavior on the current round of proposals? McCain says no. “All I asked for in this situation was a fair competition,” he says.

But keep in mind what fair competition here means. As my friend Owen Cote, a researcher at MIT, points out, with only two viable competitors, this is a not a real market. Ensuring competition among two sellers means giving both leverage over the buyer, because if one exits the process, competition is lost. What the press has not pointed out is that McCain’s insistence on competition gave Airbus the power to force changes in the Air Force’s criteria.

There were two disputes about the Pentagon’s request for proposals that McCain got involved in to the benefit of Northrop-Airbus. First, in September and December 2006, just before the Pentagon was to release its RFP, McCain wrote to top Pentagon officials, asking them to eliminate language in the RFP forcing consideration of how penalties due to a WTO dispute over subsidies might affect the tanker’s production cost. That provision, championed by Boeing booster Norman Dicks (D-WA), would have hurt Northrop-Airbus more than Boeing. McCain got his wish.

Second, in the December letter, McCain asked the Pentagon to give the proposals credit for having more cargo space, instead of equal points for having in excess of a certain amount of space. Meanwhile, the Northrop-Airbus team, which was proposing a bigger aircraft, threatened to withdraw their bid if the Air Force did not change its criteria on this issue. This double whammy put the Air Force up a creek. If Northrop and Airbus weren’t bluffing, leaving the criteria be would hand the deal to Boeing, and enrage McCain, who could then accuse the Air Force in public hearings of giving Boeing another sweetheart deal. The Air Force complied, giving another advantage to Northrop-Airbus.

It therefore appears that John McCain was necessary to EADS getting this deal, even as he was taking in their campaign contributions and lobbyists. That doesn’t mean there’s anything nefarious here. McCain had good reason to help block the deal in the first round. The changes he asked for in the second round were arguably wise. The subsidy issue could actually be seen as an ace in the hole for Boeing that should not have been there in the first place. Plus $14,000 is cheap if he were going to sell out.

But it sure doesn’t look good. Who was it that said that “questions of honor are raised as much by appearances as by reality in politics”?

Don’t Cry for Fox Fallon

The news that the commander of U.S. Central Command, William “Fox” Fallon, is retiring early is going to cause some panic among people concerned about war with Iran. There’s some reason to worry, but not much more than yesterday. Time will tell, but I don’t think this is about bombing Iran.

Whether Fallon got fired or resigned, it happened because he screwed up — he got caught disagreeing with administration policy in an overwrought article by Thomas Barnett in Esquire. Even before that, it was a terribly kept secret that he was out of sync with the White House on Iran, Iraq, and probably China.

I agree with Fallon on all those fronts, but he works for the president. Civilian control of the military means you can’t just go around telling everyone, off the record or no, that you dissent from the administration’s policies, and still work for them, even if those policies are dumb. It’s probably Fallon’s good sense that made it impossible for him to work for this administration.

Democrats who take his side because they dislike Bush administration policy ought to keep in mind that a president they support may be in power soon, and they’re going to have to run the military too.