Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

President Poroshenko Goes to Washington

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko spoke before the U.S. Congress yesterday morning, and afterward met with President Obama at the White House. The visit was overshadowed by other major events of the week—Congress’s vote to authorize arms and training for Syrian rebels, and the Scottish independence referendumbut it was noteworthy that the visit didn’t elicit any U.S. offers of military support for Ukraine.

Poroshenko’s speech to Congress focused heavily on Ukraine’s role as a “strong American partner” and fellow democracy, and argued for greater U.S. involvement in the crisis. He even went so far as to argue that “this is America’s war too,” though he certainly offered no justification for why Ukraine is of key strategic interest for the United States. Between rousing rhetoric, references to John F. Kennedy, and anecdotes about brave Ukrainian warriors, he did ask the United States for three pieces of aid:

First, he asked for weaponry. Poroshenko thanked the United States for the humanitarian aid it has provided to Ukraine, but argued that “we can’t win a war with blankets.” The White House has promised a new $53 million aid package, comprising nonlethal military aid (i.e., blankets and food supplies). In contrast, the Ukrainians are particularly interested in heavy and antitank weapons.

Second, Poroshenko asked Congress for a massive injection of financial aid to support investment, fight corruption, and reform the Ukrainian state.

Finally, and most worrisome, he asked the United States (and NATO) to grant Ukraine a “special, non-allied partner status” for security and defense. It’s unclear exactly what this would entail, but it sounds suspiciously like a plea for NATO protection of Ukraine without full NATO membership.

There is limited interest in Congress to give Poroshenko some of what he is seeking. Sens. Bob Corker (R-TN) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) have co-sponsored the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, which would seek to arm Ukrainian troops. But though the bill unanimously passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is unclear what will become of it as the Senate begins its recess, or whether it would command broader support from Congress.

Arming Ukraine’s government is foolhardy at best. Even if Ukraine were central to U.S. interests, the United States cannot possibly provide enough military aid to allow Ukraine to prevail against the Russian military. Such aid has the potential to escalate the situation and undermine a diplomatic settlement. Giving Ukraine a “special defense status” is an even worse idea, especially if it were to commit NATO to the military defense of Ukraine.

Luckily, the Obama administration seems determined to give Poroshenko a public relations boost—rolling out the red carpet for his visit—and nothing more. President Obama’s remarks praised Poroshenko’s leadership, but promised only to continue to help Ukraine reach a diplomatic settlement with Russia. With the U.S. military already gearing up for action on two different continents, it isn’t surprising that American leaders would choose to avoid escalating another regional conflict. Let’s hope this restraint continues once the other crises are past. 

Countries at Risk, not Fake U.S. Coalition, Should Stop the Islamic State

President Barack Obama is fighting the Islamic State with a coalition without members.  What are allies for?

Washington collects allies like most people collect Facebook friends.  It doesn’t matter if the new “friends” enhance America’s security.  Washington wants more allies.

Yet America’s allies do little for the U.S.  Their view is that Washington’s job is to defend them.  Their job is to be defended by Washington. 

For decades Washington faced down a nuclear-armed power—the Soviet Union and then Russia—to protect the Europeans.  The Europeans did essentially nothing for the U.S. 

After 9/11 several European states contributed to America’s efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Neither invading the latter nor attempting to build a democratic central government in the former made policy sense, but some Europeans sacrificed on behalf of a professed U.S. interest. 

However, Washington quickly repaid the favor, underwriting Britain’s and France’s foolish war in Libya.  Now the Europeans want Washington to save Ukraine and “reassure” countries to the east.  Yet the EU has a larger GDP and population than America. 

With the U.S. now calling for assistance against ISIL, the continent has turned more frigid.  No one seems interested in joining Washington’s air war, even Great Britain.

Washington’s Asian friends are even less helpful.  For decades Japan wouldn’t help U.S. forces, even if they were defending Japan.  That is finally changing, but there still is no good reason Washington to stare down the People’s Republic of China to secure Tokyo’s disputed claim to the Senkaku Islands. 

The Costs of Independence

As my colleague Doug Bandow noted on Cato@Liberty a few days ago, Scottish independence is for the voters of Scotland to decide. And so it should be. But, as I write over at Foreign Policy, U.S. policymakers need to be aware that Scottish independence would carry some key costs for the United States:

  1. The loss of nuclear submarine basing privileges is the most concrete cost of Scottish independence, with Scotland’s nationalist party pledging a ‘nuclear-free’ Scotland if a Yes vote occurs. U.S. nuclear submarines, though based in King’s Bay, Georgia, use the United Kingdom’s HMNB Clyde Naval Base at Faslane, Scotland for maintenance and deployment needs. The site is located conveniently close to key North Sea patrol waters, and has acted as a visiting port for U.S. submarines since the Cold War. The loss of the base will force the UK to relocate its four Trident submarines, and the paucity of available sites in Europe may eventually lead to UK submarines being based alongside their American counterparts in Georgia.
  2. The UK and United States also have strong, historical links in intelligence sharing and military cooperation, formalized in the 1946 UKUSA agreement. Intelligence sharing and operational burdens are widely shared; officers on both sides of the Atlantic even refer to each other as ‘cousins.’ But independence could undermine the value of this alliance for the United States, at least in the short term.  In the case of a Yes vote, the remainder of the United Kingdom (RUK) will need to rebuild its military and intelligence capabilities, extricating itself from Scotland, and negotiating which military assets will go to which country. During this period, the United States will lose the benefit of British intelligence and military support.
  3. The breakdown of the UK will also result in the loss of a valuable U.S. supporter on the world stage. The UK is often the only nation which commits substantial levels of troops or financing to joint military or humanitarian operations. While ‘partner states’ like France committed only 88 troops to the War in Afghanistan, the UK contributed 10-15% of total troops to the conflict. In Iraq, the UK was responsible for almost half of the non-U.S. troops involved. The UK also carries its own weight in NATO, contributing between 2.5-3% of GDP in military spending each year, a level few European states achieve. The loss of Scotland will carve up the UK, removing at least 8% of its population and tax base, making it less able to commit to any U.S. initiatives.

The timing could not be worse: achieving consensus on Syria, Ukraine or a host of other issues will be harder in the turmoil of a Yes vote for independence. Whether the United States should be involved in these conflicts is debatable at best, but they will be costly, especially if Britain can’t contribute.  An independent Scotland, even without the incipient startup costs of independence, is not going to fill that gap. U.S. policymakers shouldn’t be telling Scotland what to do. But they should be worried. If a Yes vote occurs, the costs will certainly impact the United States

Imperialist Tourist Spots Help Explain Chinese Aggressiveness Today

BEIJING—Modern China continues to rise.  But ancient China remains.  And bears witness to a history the West would prefer to forget.

The Summer Palace is one of Beijing’s most enchanting tourist destinations.  But some of the old buildings are in ruins—courtesy of the Western powers.

Imperial China long was a cultured and advanced civilization that eventually fell into decay.  By the 1800s the Western powers had begun to carve out concessions and colonies.

The Summer Palace first was created in the 12th century and was meant to ease the life of the royal family.  In 1860 during the Second Opium War French and British troops destroyed most of what is now called the Old Summer Palace.

In 1886 the Empress Dowager Cixi used funds planned for a navy to rebuild the royal playground.  She called the site the Garden of Peace and Harmony, an appropriate name, except for the garden’s unwanted guests.

In 1900 came the Boxer Rebellion, named for the violent xenophobic, spiritual movement named the “Righteous and Harmonious Fists.”  The Boxers targeted foreigners, especially missionaries, and Chinese Christians.  The revolt, supported by the Empress Dowager, reached Beijing, in which Western diplomats were killed and legations were besieged.  The Western nations raised an eight-nation rescue force, including American troops.

The allied forces eventually relieved the city—alas, the Boxers discovered that their training did not render them immune to bullets.  One of the casualties was the New Summer Palace. The gardens and buildings were burned by the allies, objects contained within were plundered.

The Empress Dowager had to rebuild again on her return to Beijing, which she had fled in advance of the allies.  She died in 1908 and the republican revolution occurred three years later.

This unseemly history is of more than just academic interest.  It helps explain Beijing’s behavior today.

No doubt, some Chinese, both in and out of the People’s Republic of China, have an exaggerated sense of Chinese history, civilization, and destiny.  And Imperial China, despite the fascinating esoterica surrounding it, was an unfriendly place for most of the humane values which we value today.  Nevertheless, China has been treated badly, especially by the Western powers which today are most insistent on Beijing following Western standards.

This historical experience helps explain the nationalism which afflicts even young Chinese who are liberal in many other ways.  The same students believe in a strong, even dominant China.

In fact, many ethnic Chinese living outside of the PRC cheered Hong Kong’s 1997 reversion to Beijing’s control.  For them, the issue was CHINA, not the particular regime ruling the territory known as China at this moment.

More important, those in charge feel a special responsibility as their nation gains the resources, influence, and power necessary to reverse a century or more of humiliation.  That may not justify increasing Chinese assertiveness, especially in the West’s eyes.  But it helps explain the behavior.

This doesn’t mean other nations should automatically concede the PRC’s claims.  But it suggests that Chinese assertiveness involves something other than malevolent aggression.

In which case, as I write in my new article on China-US Focus, “Washington is foolish to militarize disputes which are, at most, of only moderate geopolitical interest.  Other nations, especially those, like Japan, whose behavior has been, shall we say, less than exemplary, have a special responsibility to accommodate Beijing’s perceptions and interests.”

History helps explain Beijing’s policies and politics today.  While those in the West might have amnesia about what their ancestors did to the forebears of China’s leaders, the latter are not so likely to forget.  Policymakers in the U.S. would do well to consider that history in designing their approach to Beijing.  A peaceful and prosperous 21st century might depend on it.

War Powers in the Bush-Obama Era

Over at the National Interest, I have a piece examining President Obama’s claim, in his nationally televised address Wednesday night, that “I have the authority to address the threat from ISI[S].” 

Just where he’s supposed to get that authority isn’t clear—even to the Obama administration itself. In the last week, Obama officials have invoked (1) the War Powers Resolution, (2) the 2002 Authorization of Military Force (AUMF) against Iraq, and (3) the AUMF that Congress passed three days after 9/11. Any AUMF in a storm, it seems. 

As I explain in the article, not one of those claims survives a good-faith reading of the relevant legislative text. The WPR specifically forecloses any interpretation that it grants the president a “free pass” for elective bombing. And invoking the 2001 or 2002 AUMF for a new war against a new enemy over a decade later is the sort of statute-stretching that makes using TARP to bail out car companies look timid by comparison. 

You could describe the president’s approach as “three bad arguments in search of a theme.” Near as I can discern it, that theme is, “I’m not George W. Bush.” 

Apparently, it’s very important to Barack Obama to make clear that he doesn’t subscribe to the Congress-be-damned, I’m the “Decider” approach of his predecessor. Justifying war on a pure presidential power theory is for bad people like Dick Cheney and John Yoo, the legal architect of the Bush-Cheney “Terror Presidency.” (Though, of course, Bush went to Congress for authorization in Iraq and Afghanistan, even while denying he needed it).

Obama’s nothing like that, he’ll have you know. He’s the guy who told us on the campaign trail that “The separation of powers works. Our Constitution works. We will again set an example for the world that the law is not subject to the whims of stubborn rulers,” and affirmed that the president lacks the power to launch military attacks absent an “actual or imminent threat to the nation.”  (His eventual veep, Joe Biden, went further, promising to “impeach [Bush] if he takes the nation to war against Iran without congressional approval.”)

And yet, it’s hard to escape the echoes of Obama’s predecessor in Wednesday night’s speech, from his case for preventive war against an enemy that “if left unchecked… could pose a growing threat beyond that region—including to the United States,” to his promise to “support Iraq’s efforts to stand up National Guard Units” (When they stand up, we will stand down). As John Yoo himself said last week: “Obama has adopted the same view of war powers as the Bush administration.”

Tortured, bad-faith constructions of authorization passed by past Congresses for different wars can’t hide that underlying reality. Obama may not be George W. Bush, but he’s doing a pretty decent imitation.

Why Is Barack Obama Lecturing Scotland about Its Independence Vote?

Polls show a close vote over Scottish independence.  It is a momentous decision, but why is President Barack Obama bothering the Scots with his opinion?

Until recently virtually everyone outside of Scotland believed that the Scots would deliver a solid no vote.  But many in the UK’s north feel disenfranchised.  More fundamentally, many Scots reject the more vibrant market system which characterizes the UK as well as U.S. 

The tightening race has created panic in Westminster.  Now the three largest national parties are promising to pass along additional powers to the Scottish assembly—though they can’t agree on how much and which powers.

Britain’s government long has been overly centralized, but the rush to toss national authority overboard raises the question:  what is Westminster hoping to preserve?  If the Scots are so unhappy with the present system, why not accept the result with grace? 

Even a narrow win in which almost half of voters say they wanted to leave might prove Pyrrhic.  It would leave a barely united United Kingdom, one likely to face continuing Scottish dissatisfaction and future secession votes.

Yet a comical cavalcade of outsiders has been telling the Scottish what to do.

For instance, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said “it’s hard to see how the world would be helped by an independent Scotland.”  Russian President Vladimir Putin observed:  “one should not forget that being part of a single strong state has some advantages.”  Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang endorsed a “strong, prosperous and united United Kingdom.”

In June President Barack Obama declared:  “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” meaning the UK, which he said appeared to have “worked pretty well.”  He worried about the impact on the U.S.:  “the United Kingdom has been an extraordinary partner for us.”  Moreover, “we obviously have a deep interest in making sure that one of the closest allies that we will ever have remains strong, robust, united and an effective partner.” 

President Obama didn’t stop there.  He also told the United Kingdom that it should remain in the European Union.  Opined the president:  “With respect to the EU, we share a strategic vision with Great Britain on a whole range of international issues and so it’s always encouraging for us to know that Great Britain has a seat at the table in the larger European project.” 

Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Ca.) argued:  “It’s clear from this side of the Atlantic that a United Kingdom, including Scotland, would be the strongest possible American ally.”  He was joined by 26 colleagues in introducing a resolution declaring “that a united, secure, and prosperous United Kingdom is important for U.S. national security priorities in Europe and around the world.” 

While Westminster, which apparently requested the president to intervene, might find these arguments convincing, not so the Scottish public.  Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, who is running the yes campaign, observed that “Being told what to do tends to instigate a position in Scotland where we will say we will choose our own way forward.”

The American experience inspires some.  One Scottish independence activist told NBC News:  “Americans went through their own struggle for independence 200 years ago and it turned out pretty well for them.  They were the pioneers of this process!  You would expect America to look out for what’s in its own best interests and there’s no reason why Scotland shouldn’t be exactly the same.”

Indeed.  As I wrote in my new American Spectator article:  “Whatever the Scots choose on September 18, Americans should wish them well.”

What the President Said about ISIS, and What I Heard

It seems particularly appropriate, on this 13th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, to ponder anew what counterterrorism steps are prudent and effective, and what measures are reckless and counterproductive.

With this in mind, I was moderately inclined to go along with President Obama’s plan to attack the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), provided that he defined a limited and achievable set of goals, and therefore established limits on the size and scope of the U.S. military mission.

But when the president says this:

“We will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are.” 

I hear this:

“All that we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, in order to make generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving anything of note…”

Though they didn’t race there, a team of U.S. special forces eventually made their way to Pakistan and pumped a couple of bullets into bin Laden, so he’s not making these videos any more. That seems worthy. If we can repeat these sorts of operations elsewhere, and shut up a few more loudmouths, we should.

But the larger point stands. We shouldn’t terrorize ourselves. We shouldn’t exaggerate the threat posed by terrorism. And we shouldn’t react in ways that feed the terrorists’ narrative, or serve the terrorists’ goals.