Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

No Foreign Aid for North Korea if Another Famine Strikes

SHENYANG, CHINA—North Korea is a major topic of interest in this provincial capital in China’s northeast. The “Hermit Kingdom” is just a couple hours away by car. Again, the North’s harvest does not look good. Observers warn that another famine may be coming.

The first reports of drought appeared earlier this year. The United Nations warned that 70 percent of North Korea’s population faces a food shortage.

Another famine is a grievous embarrassment. Several hundred thousand, and perhaps as many as two million, North Koreans died between 1995 and 1997 from a brutal, extended famine. The North since has been dependent on the generosity of others to feed its people.

The DPRK again has begun to bang its tin cup, seeking aid. The People’s Republic of China remains the North’s most important food supplier. The Chinese government almost certainly will continue to stand by its ally.

The Bad and Ugly of the GOP’s Foreign Policy, Part 1

The GOP’s Cleveland debate was spirited, but shed little light on foreign policy. There are important differences among the participants, but few were exposed.

For instance, elsewhere Donald Trump opined that Crimea was Europe’s problem and asked why Washington still defended South Korea. These sentiments deserved discussion.

No multi-candidate forum can delve deeply into such complex issues, however. Even those Republicans giving formal foreign policy addresses have come up short. The GOP contenders have been largely captured by a reflexive, even rabid interventionism which ignores consequences and experience.

Leading the hawks is Sen. Lindsey Graham, a member of the Senate’s unabashedly pro-war caucus. In the interventionist middle some candidates demonstrate hints of reluctance, such as Ted Cruz and John Kasich. Sen. Rand Paul brings up the rear, uncomfortably gyrating between his father’s views and the GOP conventional wisdom.

Chris Christie delivered a formal foreign policy address in which he easily staked his claim to being most committed to violating Americans’ civil liberties through surveillance of dubious value. He charged that his critics were “ideologues,” yet opposed any restraints on the new, far-reaching presidential powers that he demanded.

His foreign policy views are even worse. At age 52, Christie declared: “I don’t believe that I have ever lived in a time in my life when the world was a more dangerous and scary place.”

This is nonsense. As I pointed out on Forbes online: “Christie barely missed the Cuban missile crisis. During his life the Cold War raged, the Vietnam War was lost, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and China’s Mao Zedong unleashed the bloody Cultural Revolution. People talked about the potential for a ‘nuclear winter’ from a nuclear exchange. Today the U.S. vastly outspends its potential adversaries and is allied with every major industrialized power save China and Russia.”

 “Building stronger alliances” is a “pillar” of Christie’s foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy is based on “partnership with the people and nations who share our values,” he explained. Like the totalitarian Saudis, brutal Egyptian military, and dictatorial Central Asian states?

Moreover, America’s friends can defend themselves. For instance, South Korea has 40 times the GDP of the North; Japan possesses the world’s third largest economy. Europe has a larger GDP and population than America and multiple of those of Russia.

Many so-called allies are security black holes, making America less secure. Why would Washington wish to confront nuclear-armed Moscow over interests the latter considers vital by defending nations such as Georgia and Ukraine, which always have been irrelevant to America’s security?

Christie argued that “We didn’t have to be a global policeman who solved every problem.” But that’s what Washington has done with perpetual social engineering through foreign aid, military intervention, war, and more.

In Christie’s view squandered U.S. credibility is why Russia grabbed Crimea, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad used force against his opponents, and “Iranian-backed militias are rampaging across Yemen.”

In fact, Washington never was going to go to war over Crimea with nuclear-armed Russia. Assad was determined to remain in power and therefore had to fight, irrespective of Washington’s view. Yemen’s Houthis have been in revolt for decades and have never had much connection to Iran, let alone America.

Of course, Christie demanded more military outlays. But it would be easier “to keep our edge” if Washington didn’t constantly squander Americans’ resources defending other nations and rebuilding failed states.

Christie insisted that “What happened on 9/11 must never happen again.” But he failed to understand that promiscuously supporting authoritarian regimes, aiding foreign combatants, dropping drones and, most important, bombing, invading, and occupying other lands creates enemies determined to do America ill.

Rubio and Bush also have given formal speeches, but sound no better than Christie. Most GOP candidates promise brave new interventions and wars.

If Republicans really believe in limited government and individual liberty, they should promote peace. It is time for a real Republican debate over foreign and military policy.

A Blinkered Foreign Policy Debate

Foreign policy didn’t get a lot of air time in last night’s GOP debate, which often seemed to focus primarily on Donald Trump and the fact that John Kasich’s dad was a mailman. The candidates appeared worryingly ill-prepared to discuss foreign policy issues, with confused and misleading statements, incorrect facts, and a few truly bizarre comments.

There is a lot of great news coverage - see here or here for examples - highlighting these statements, from Jim Gilmore’s call for the U.S. to create a Middle Eastern NATO, to Ted Cruz’s decision to describe the opinions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Martin Dempsey, as nonsense. At least one candidate conflated Iran with ISIS. The first debate included a baffling discussion of ‘cyberwalls,’ a never-before heard term that seemed to encompass both the Great Firewall of China, and the refusal of private companies like Google to hand over data to the U.S. government.

The bigger problem with the debate, however, was the mass oversimplification of foreign policy. Only one candidate, Carly Fiorina, acknowledged that foreign policy can be complicated, a statement immediately undermined when she noted that some issues are black and white, and promised to tear up the Iran deal on her first day in office. Unfortunately, foreign affairs is actually complex. Take the Middle East, where the United States is involved in conflicts both in opposition to, and in alignment with Iranian proxies. Or our relationship with Russia, which isn’t limited to confrontation in Ukraine, but includes cooperation on the Iranian nuclear deal and Syrian issues. Debates, with their reliance on manufactured soundbites, aren’t the best place to delve into these complexities. But no candidate on the stage gave any indication of a willingness to engage with the complicated nuances of foreign policy.

Taiwan Tensions Return

The Taiwan issue, which has been mercifully quiescent since the election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president in 2008, shows increasing signs of returning as a major source of geopolitical tensions.  That point was underscored this week when Zhang Zhijun, the head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, the agency with primary responsibility for dealing with the self-ruled island, warned the Taiwanese that they must not return to “the evil ways of independence.”  He added that the Taiwanese people would “soon have to choose” between continuing the development of peaceful economic and political ties with the mainland that have taken place since 2008 or reigniting the animosity that existed during the administration of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 20008.

That warning reflects growing worries in Beijing that the DPP is poised to return to power in next year’s elections.  Given the pervasive unpopularity of Ma and the governing Kuomintang Party (KMT) among Taiwanese voters, a DPP victory is indeed probable. That outcome has become even more likely with the entry of James Soong, chairman of the People First Party, into the presidential race.  Soong is certain to siphon votes from the already beleaguered KMT.

A DPP triumph does not necessarily mean an immediate crisis.  DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen is considerably more circumspect than Chen and less inclined to provoke Beijing.  Moreover, the surge of economic links with the mainland over the past seven years has benefited key DPP constituencies and dampened the enthusiasm for aggressively pushing the party’s official independence agenda.

Nevertheless, a DPP electoral victory will make Beijing deeply unhappy and increase cross-strait tensions.  China’s strategy toward Taiwan since Ma’s election has been to draw the island into an ever tighter economic embrace, with an underlying assumption that the growth of such ties will gradually erode support for independence and lead to a corresponding receptivity to political reunification with the mainland.  

It was always a flawed strategy.  Most Taiwanese show no enthusiasm for reunification, even as economic relations with the mainland have surged. Wide majorities prefer the status quo of de facto independence, and many would prefer formal independence, if they did not fear that Beijing would use force to prevent such an outcome.  Understandably, few Taiwanese want to merge their democratic capitalist society with a mainland ruled by a one-party dictatorship.  Indeed, given the economic and cultural differences between the two societies that have developed over more than a century, many Taiwanese would be reluctant to relinquish control of their own affairs and have their island become merely one small province of a vast country even if the mainland was fully democratic.

Results from the Libertarianism vs. Conservatism Post-Debate Survey

The Cato Institute and Heritage Foundation recently co-hosted a debate in which interns from both organizations debated whether conservatism or libertarianism is the better philosophy. At the conclusion of the debate, the Cato Institute conducted a survey of debate attendees finding important similarities and striking differences between millennial conservative and libertarian attendees.

Full LvCDebate Attendee Survey results found here

The survey finds that libertarian and conservative millennial attendees were similar in skepticism of government economic intervention and regulation but were dramatically different in their stances toward immigration, LGBT inclusion, national security, privacy, foreign policy and perceptions of racial bias in the criminal justice system.

While the survey is not a representative sample, this survey offers a snapshot of engaged conservative and libertarian millennial “elites” who have higher levels of education and political information, and who chose to come to this event. To date, little information exists on young conservative and libertarian elites. Since these attendees are politically engaged millennials, their responses may provide some indication of the direction they may take both movements in the future.

Eighty-percent of millennial respondents self-identified as either conservative (41%) or libertarian (39%): This post will focus on these conservative and libertarian millennial attendees.

Iran Cannot Dominate the Middle East

On July 24, Rep. Robert Pittenger (R-NC, pictured at right) remarked on the radio that the consequences of the Iran deal bear comparing to the consequences of the Munich Agreement signed in 1938, except that Pittenger

The consequences of this deal make Hitler look - is a minor player in the context of the challenge to the rest of the world.

I wish I had seen this comment in time to include it in a piece I published yesterday at the Washington Examiner, highlighting the fact that Iran cannot dominate the Middle East, with or without a nuclear deal, with or without an extra $100 billion, with or without nuclear weapons. Pittenger’s remark, one would hope, was given thoughtlessly, but a lot of people who have allegedly spent a lot of time thinking about Iran have made claims that Iran is poised to dominate the Middle East, or if you prefer political science jargon, become a “regional hegemon.” As my piece argues, however,

Iran is capable of engaging in an array of provocative behaviors throughout the region, to include support for terrorism, support for nasty regimes like Bashar al-Assad’s in Syria, and meddling in other foreign civil wars like Yemen’s or Iraq’s. All of these things make Iran problematic, but do not help it dominate the region.

After discussing what regional hegemony means and demonstrating that Iran cannot attain it, I conclude that

An Iran that could keep the profits from its oil sales and that engaged in more terrorism and proxy wars throughout the Middle East would look a lot like the Iran of 2007 or 2008, before most of the sanctions were enacted. No one argued then that Iran was a regional hegemon, and for good reason. Returning Iran to this status would not make it a regional hegemon today, and policymakers ought to stop inflating the Iran threat. U.S. policymakers should not signal to Tehran that they believe Iran could dominate the region as a consequence of the deal, if for no other reason than Iranian policymakers may foolishly believe them and act out accordingly.

[…]

Far from being a regional hegemon or dominating the Middle East, Iran is a nuisance. Great powers, to say nothing of the self-styled “home of the brave,” should not convince themselves that nuisances somehow constitute peers.

Read the whole thing, if you like.

U.S. Taxpayers Still Subsidizing Bloated Welfare States

Last month, the British government announced plans to spend two percent of GDP on defense through 2020, meeting the NATO mandated level. This comes after months of nudging from the Obama administration that feared “if Britain doesn’t spend 2 percent on defense, then no one in Europe will.” The reasoning is bizarre given that few nations were meeting this spending threshold to begin with. As I wrote in June:

In 2014, only Greece, Estonia, the U.S. and the U.K. spent as much as 2 percent of GDP on defense. Excepting NATO member Iceland, which is exempted from the spending mandates, the 23 other NATO members failed to spend even two cents of every dollar to defend themselves from foreign threats. And Greece only met the 2 percent threshold because their economy is falling faster than their military spending.

Perhaps things are shifting a bit among the NATO nations. Fear of Russia has prompted some members to announce increases to their defense spending. Germany, which currently spends only 1.2 percent of its GDP on defense, pledged to increase its defense budget by 6.4 percent over the next five years. Latvia and Lithuania will also increase their defense spending, reaching two percent of GDP by 2018 and 2020, respectively.