Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

Century Old Terrorists Still Creating Wars From Iraq To Ukraine

The conflict in Iraq started a century ago. So did the civil war in Syria. And so did Russia’s dismemberment of Ukraine. 

All of those conflicts, and much more, grew out of World War I.

At the turn of the 20th century, Europe was prospering. But on June 28, 1914, 19-year-old Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and his wife Sophie.

The following weeks were filled with ultimatums, plans, and pleas. But governments soon found that “control has been lost and the stone has begun to roll,” as German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg put it.

Among the Great War’s participants, Great Britain enjoyed the best reputation because it was on the winning side and ran the war’s most brilliant public relations operation. Germany’s franchise was in fact broader, though Wilhelmine Germany’s political structure was flawed. Belgium looked to be the most innocent, but its rule killed millions of Africans in the Belgian Congo. France was a revenge-minded democracy. Austro-Hungary was less democratic, but the empire contained important checks and balances within.

A member of the Entente—the allies that included Britain, France, and ultimately the United States—was the antisemitic despotism of the Tsar. Its protégé, Serbia, backed Princip as an act of state terrorism against Austro-Hungary. The sclerotic and authoritarian Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria completed the Quadruple Alliance, while Romania, Italy, and Japan, joined the Entente.

The United States had nothing at stake in this quarrel. Unfortunately, America’s president, the haughty, sanctimonious, and egotistical Woodrow Wilson, imagined himself as being annointed by God to bring peace to the earth.

With Germany facing defeat, an armistice was reached in November 1918. The vainglorious Wilson enunciated high-minded principles for peace, but was out-maneuvered at the Versailles Peace Conference the following year.

The allies plundered the defeated while dictating a vengeful peace. Like the journey from Princip to World War I, the path from Versailles to Adolf Hitler was long but clear.

Uh Oh: The North Koreans are Mad and Won’t Take it Any More!

It’s hard being dictator of North Korea.  You’re a god, or the nearest human thing to it, but you aren’t allowed any time to yourself.  The rest of the world privately admires you and publicly envies you. 

Some of them even mock you. 

In 2002 Pierce Brosnan played a hero in fighting against the Korean people in the James Bond movie “Die Another Day.”  Worse, two years later the great and wonderful “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il was mercilessly insulted by the movie “Team America:  World Police.”  Unable to stop him from impoverishing his desperate people to build nuclear weapons, the U.S. government turned loose the most fearsome of weapons against the movie-loving Kim:  Hollywood.

Of course, the Dear Leader was a convenient target, with his bouffant hairdo and platform shoes.  As I point out in my article at American Spectator online:  “The great and wonderful man-god was too busy traveling the country giving guidance to farmers and workers whose farms and workplaces were no longer operating to take time off to retool his appearance to satisfy international critics.  But he persevered, drowning his many sorrows in Hennessy cognac while comforting the beautiful young virgin girls who flocked to his side.”

Now “Great Successor” Kim Jong-un has taken over the sacred mission of his grandfather and father:  to reinvigorate monarchy in Asia.  He has shown the way to the next century by dancing with Mickey Mouse and partying with Dennis Rodman.

Naturally, Washington has rejected Kim’s friendly demands for tribute to remedy the economic injustices created by the unfair success of market economics compared to Stalinesque central planning.  Now the common criminals who run Washington—at least there is one thing Americans and North Koreans can agree upon—have turned again to their secret agents in the movie industry. 

Drones Risk Putting US on ‘Slippery Slope’ to Perpetual War

As the New York Times reports, the Stimson Center today released a report warning that “the Obama administration’s embrace of targeted killings using armed drones risks putting the United States on a ‘slippery slope’ into perpetual war.” The Washington Post, the Guardian and Vox all lead their articles on the report with that warning.

The slippery slope point probably isn’t new to most readers. But it’s worth focusing on here, both because the argument is often misstated or misunderstood, and because, in this case, I helped make it. The report’s task force, co-chaired by retired General John Abizaid, former head of U.S. Central Command and Rosa Brooks of Georgetown Law, included working groups. I was on one that considered, among other things, what danger drones create for U.S. foreign policy. The report largely reflects those we identified: the erosion of sovereignty, blowback from those in targeted countries, drone strikes’ tendency to undermine democratic oversight, and the slippery slope problem.

The report puts those concerns in context. It points out that: drones can serve wise or dumb policies; that most drones are for surveillance or other non-strike uses; and that it is drone strikes that occur off declared battlefields that have generated the most controversy. The report notes that past military innovations, like cruise missiles, raised similar concerns by making waging war easier.

The report rejects several common complaints about drones. It denies that they create a reckless, “playstation mentality” among pilots. It explains that drones are not more prone than other weapons cause civilian casualties.

Having delimited the circumstances where drones raise concerns, the report goes into considerable causal detail, at least compared to most reports of this kind, about what the trouble is. The blowback, oversight, and sovereignty problems are relatively easy to understand, in theory. The tricky part is measuring the harm.

Military Cooperation with China: RIMPAC as a Model for the Future

The Rim of the Pacific Exercise recently concluded in waters near Hawaii.  For the first time China joined the drills.  It was a small but positive step for integrating Beijing into more international institutions.

RIMPAC started in 1971.  This year there are 23 participants, including the People’s Republic of China, which explained that the maneuvers are “an important mission of military diplomacy” and a means to strengthen “friendly relations with countries of the South Pacific through public diplomacy.”

Beijing’s participation comes at a time of significant regional tension.  The PRC’s more aggressive stance in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea and Sea of Japan have led to dangerous maritime confrontations. 

RIMPAC offers an opportunity to create some countervailing pressure in favor of a less threatening regional naval environment.  At the political level inviting Beijing to participate demonstrates respect for China’s increased military power and international role.   Doing so also counters the charge that Washington is seeking to isolate and contain the PRC.

Moreover, inclusion hints at the benefits for Beijing of a civil if not necessarily friendly relationship with its neighbors as well as America.  No doubt, the direct pay-off for China from RIMPAC is small. 

But to be treated as an equal and regular participant in international affairs is advantageous.  Although any great power must be prepared to accept unpopularity when necessary, in general a friendly environment is more conducive to ensuring both peace and prosperity. 

The Truth about Military Spending

In April, the CBO projected – based on current law – that the Pentagon would spend roughly $606 billion dollars in 2015. The just-passed House defense budget spends $570.4 billion. Both figures assumed, among other things, that we we would spend about $79 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO), which is mainly for the war in Afghanistan. We have since learned that the Obama administration’s actual OCO request is likely to be “substantially smaller” than $79 billion, so perhaps $560 or $565 billion in total Pentagon spending when combined with their earlier base budget request.

One glance at Cato’s latest infographic* will tell you that even the lowest of these figures is too high.

For a little perspective, CBO’s original estimate of $606 billion dollars is roughly $10 billion more – in inflation-adjusted dollars – than the Pentagon spent in 2005, when the United States was engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is close to the United States’ Cold War peak of $611 billion in 1985, when the Soviet Union was spending an estimated $590 billion. Today, however, the United States is out of Iraq and is winding down its war in Afghanistan, and its nearest competitors – Russia and China – combined spend less than half as much as the United States on their militaries. Yet, some on the right continue to believe that Pentagon cuts should be off limits, including House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R-WI), who argues that the United States should be spending much more on its military.

Rep. Ryan’s budget proposal would have busted the current spending caps to a tune of nearly $50 billion a year for the next decade. This would have amounted to $500 billion more than is currently projected, and around $1.7 trillion more than was spent in the decade following the Cold War. Incredibly, Ryan called for more spending while admitting that “the Department of Defense has repeatedly revised downward its estimates of the budgetary resources necessary to meet the nation’s security objectives.” Think about that: The military says that it does not need additional funding to meet its objectives, yet Ryan insisted that it should receive more money anyway. Luckily, if the budget that recently passed the House is any indication, few of Ryan’s colleagues seem to agree. Indeed, it now seems almost certain that we will spend less than CBO projected, and far less than Ryan called for. 

Poland’s Alliance with America: Worthless to Whom?

The outspoken Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, apparently believes his nation’s alliance with America is “worthless.”  Washington should not race to reassure him.  Instead, Warsaw should demonstrate why it is worthy of Washington’s support.

A weekly Polish publication received a recording of Sikorski’s conversation in which he declared:  “This Polish-American union is worthless.  It is even harmful because it gives Poland a false sense of security.  Complete [B.S.].  We get into conflicts with the Germans, with Russia, and we think everything’s great because the Americans like us.  Suckers.  Complete suckers.” 

There are suckers in the existing relationship, but they are American rather than Polish.

The United States spends more than four percent of its GDP on the military and accounts for three-fourths of total defense outlays by NATO members.  Poland has been patting itself on the back for recently hiking defense expenditures—to 1.8 percent of GDP.  Overall, America’s contribution to direct NATO expenditures is nearly ten times that of Poland.

The collapse of the Soviet Union exacerbated the discrepancy among alliance members.  While Washington preserved its globe-spanning military, the Europeans cut their armed forces significantly.

Worse, the alliance expanded willy-nilly to the Russian border, bringing in nations combining minimal military capabilities and serious potential disputes with Moscow.  None had ever mattered to American security, but Washington handed out security guarantees like hotels place chocolates on pillows:  everyone got one, including Poland.

American and European officials simply assumed that they would never have to make good on their promises.  Then came the crisis in Ukraine. 

When Does Defense Aid Work?

The debate over an appropriate American response to Iraq’s resurgent violence and the threat of radical rebels has highlighted the challenges and risks of even limited U.S. assistance.

As I argue in a post at The National Interest, Iraq is emblematic of a larger challenge in U.S. foreign policy. President Obama’s West Point address last month emphasized the role of “partner nations” who may leverage US assistance to counter security threats within their own borders and regions. But the president’s speech and subsequent debate about it have largely failed to provide criteria for selecting these partners.

Both the threats (insurgency, instability, radical rebels) and the possible solutions (military advisers and training, direct intervention, pushing for better governance) have cropped up in discussion of numerous other events: Boko Haram’s kidnappings in Nigeria, Al-Shabaab’s siege of Westgate Mall in Kenya, unrest in northern Mali, continuing instability in Libya, and so on.

All of these policy suggestions constitute calls for foreign internal defense (FID) assistance. FID, or “Helping others defend themselves,” sounds like an attractive option while facing a fiscal and domestic political reality that limits prospects for direct intervention. However, the Iraq debate highlights a crucial question: how do we tell the difference between states we can “partner” into effective and self-sufficient stability, versus those that risk pulling the US into local quagmires or exacerbating security problems?

Policymakers, media, and the American public are asking these questions about Iraq, in part because we have a lot of information about Iraq’s internal dynamics. But we should ask these questions about other potential partners too.

Join us to discuss the challenges and opportunities of Foreign Internal Defense aid next month at our Cato Policy Forum on the topic. Register here.