Topic: Foreign Policy and National Security

North Korea Wants Attention: Let’s Talk to Pyongyang

North Korea has been in a conciliatory mood recently, suggesting a summit with South Korean President Park Geun-hye.  Pyongyang also indicated that it would suspend nuclear tests if the United States cancelled joint military exercises with the South. 

The United States refused and went ahead with the naval maneuvers.  In fact, the Obama administration recently expanded sanctions on North Korea in response to the Kim regime’s apparent hacking of Sony pictures.  Alas, past experience suggests the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea likely will respond with new provocations, perhaps another nuclear test.

Frustration with the Kim regime led retired Gen. John Macdonald to propose turning the movie ‘The Interview’ into reality:  “We’ve got to do something.”

Since Pyongyang hasn’t changed its behavior, the United States should try a different approach, but not an assassination attempt on Kim Jong-un.  Washington should start by dropping the annual military exercise and reducing America’s military presence.  The administration also should develop a comprehensive engagement plan for North Korea.

Obviously, there’s no guarantee that engagement would yield a more positive result.  However, the People’s Republic of China’s growing frustration with the younger Kim provides an unexpected opportunity for Washington. 

So far, Beijing has proved unwilling to apply significant pressure on the DPRK lest the result be a messy collapse with advantage to a united Korea allied with America.  But China has tired of the antics of its irresponsible neighbor, especially the latter’s nuclear weapons program. 

The PRC nevertheless remains reluctant to cooperate with Washington unless the United States reduces the perceived threat to North Korea.  The United States should express its willingness to negotiate with the North, and even create a low-key diplomatic presence, such as a small consular office. As I point out in National Interest:  “Whatever the North’s response, the U.S. would gain a useful window into a mysterious political system and provide the Kim regime with something to lose for bad behavior.”

Budget Snapshot: Average Annual Defense Spending by Administration

In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute yesterday, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry lamented the effects of the Budget Control Act’s spending caps: “the plummeting readiness levels, the long lines of equipment in disrepair, the jets that aren’t flying, and the soldiers who aren’t practicing at the rifle range.” These are problems, to be sure. The bigger problem is a general trend that has the Pentagon spending more, and getting less.

Consider the chart below, prepared by my colleague Travis Evans. Following World War II, the United States did what it had always done at a wars’ end: it demobilized. The result was a sharp and sudden decline in both military manpower and funding. From 1948 to 1950, Pentagon spending averaged $187 billion per year (all figures in 2015 dollars). Demobilization was short-lived, however. As the British and French empires retrenched and the Soviet Union expanded, the United States assumed the role of communist counterweight. Then North Korea invaded South Korea, and all hell broke loose. The primary beneficiary of the strategic shift was the Pentagon, whose budget increased by 156 percent in just one year, from $198 billion in 1950 to $508 in 1951. Large defense budgets became the norm, with spending even after the Korean armistice well above the pre-war levels.

All told, Pentagon spending averaged $458 billion per year throughout the Cold War (1948-1990). That figure includes funding for wars in Korea and Vietnam, as well as for the 1980’s arms buildup. Pentagon spending decreased steadily following the fall of the Berlin Wall, only to ramp back up as the United States embarked on the current round of post-9/11 wars. Defense budgets under Bush the younger averaged $601 billion per year, while his successor has presided over annual budgets averaging $687 billion between 2009 and 2014. Indeed, President Obama, who was elected during an economic crisis, will leave office having approved more military spending than any presidential administration in the nuclear era. Not too bad for a president who is often accused of trying to gut the military.

Listen to China to Confront North Korea

One of Washington’s greatest policy failures is North Korea.  Apparently, Pyongyang’s most recent provocation was hacking Sony Pictures in retaliation for the movie ‘The Interview.’  More fundamentally, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains determined to create a sizeable nuclear arsenal.

Successive administrations have sought China’s aid to restrain the DPRK, but have failed to listen to Beijing while lobbying Chinese officials for their support.  If Washington hopes to win support from the People’s Republic of China, American policymakers must respond to the PRC’s concerns.

Understandably distrustful of Pyongyang, the United States has insisted upon de-nuclearization before delivering substantial aid to the North.  However, when approached by Washington for assistance, China has responded by blaming America for creating a sense of insecurity which encouraged the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons. 

In 2013, Wang Jiaru, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department, met with several China specialists in Beijing.  I asked him about North Korea.  He criticized the United States and South Korea for contributing to increased tensions through such policies as regular military exercises.  He contended that while “the United States believes talks should start after the North abandons nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons should be abandoned through talks.”  He explained, “If the United States does not act, it cannot rely on China to solve the problem.” 

In Beijing’s view, the DPRK will not yield its nukes so long as it feels insecure.  Of course, Pyongyang might not do so in any case.  But it almost certainly is true that the Kim regime will not give up what looks like the ultimate security guarantee if it believes its future is at risk. 

Japan’s Defense Budget Is Still Inadequate

The Japanese government and Western news outlets are highlighting Tokyo’s commitment to increase its military spending for the third straight year.  Pundits and policy experts see the boost as a response to the spike in bilateral tensions with China—especially the bitter dispute concerning sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.  But as with similar moves by the Baltic republics and Washington’s other NATO allies that reflect worries about Russia’s recent behavior, there is more symbolism than substance in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s decision. 

Japan’s defense budget for the fiscal year beginning in April will be 4.98 trillion yen ($42 billion). The increase is quite modest—up from 4.84 trillion yen in the current year. Moreover, even the larger sum is less than half of China’s official military budget and less than one-third of what the Pentagon and most independent experts believe is Beijing’s actual level of spending. Although Japan’s “Self Defense Forces” already can deploy a significant amount of modern weaponry, such a large disparity in spending is cause for concern. 

That is especially true since Abe’s government has adopted an increasingly assertive posture toward China on a range of issues. In one sense, U.S. officials have reason to be gratified by that move and Tokyo’s greater overall interest in East Asia’s security. Japan finally seems to be taking steps to become a normal great power regarding military matters instead of clinging to pacifism and relying on the United States to protect important Japanese interests. Abe’s efforts to “reinterpret” Article Nine of the country’s constitution, which officially places draconian restraints on the military, also reflect the shift in thinking.

The Danger of Analogies

Last week I wrote a piece for the Orange County Register, talking about the dangers of describing the current U.S. conflict with Russia as a new Cold War. In it, I highlighted the problems that arise when policymakers use historical analogies as a cheat sheet to understand today’s foreign policy crises.

Drawing analogies to past crises is a natural human reaction, and one which is widespread among foreign policy decision makers. As I noted:

Political science research demonstrates that leaders often rationalize their decisions by making analogies to prior crises. Policymakers also frequently use historical analogies to justify their choices.

Such analogies range from the sublime to the ridiculous. The prize for most ridiculous, at least recently, goes to those who described the North Korea/Sony hacking scandal as a potential “cyber Pearl Harbor.” But there were also a variety of serious analogies which dominated the news last year.

The idea that the United States and Russia are now engaged in a new Cold War has been mooted by media and by politicians. Yet current tensions with Russia over Ukraine differ in key ways from the cold war: Russia and Europe are far more economically linked than during the cold war, and disagreement centers primarily on the issue of NATO expansion, rather than on ideological grounds. By describing tensions with Russia as a new cold war, policymakers interpret all facets of the U.S.-Russian relationship in a conflictual way, preventing cooperation on other policy issues like Syria.

Kerry, Obama Pressuring India on Climate Change

Secretary of State John Kerry is currently in India as advance guard for President Obama’s visit later this month. The president is going there to try and get some commitment from India (or the illusion of a commitment) to reduce its emissions of dreaded greenhouse gases. Until now, India, along with China, has resisted calls for major reductions, effectively blocking any global treaty limiting fossil fuel use. The president is very keen on changing this before this December’s United Nations confab in Paris, where such a treaty is supposed to be inked. 

Kerry’s mission is to get India ready for the president. Speaking at a trade conference in the state of Gujarat, Kerry said, “Global climate change is already violently affecting communities, not just across India but around the world. It is disrupting commerce, development and economic growth. It’s costing farmers crops.”

In reality, global climate change is exerting no detectable effect on India’s main crop production. 

As shown below the jump, the rate of increase in wheat yields has been constant since records began in the mid-1950s, and the rate of increase in rice yields is actually higher in the last three decades than it was at the start of the record.

Further, if Kerry was saying that climate change is reducing crop yields around the world, that’s wrong too. The increase in global yields has also been constant for decades.

Martin Anderson: Renaissance Idea Man for Liberty

When I was growing up, the draft was an ugly rite of passage for young men.  But when I turned 18 no “Uncle Sam wants you” notice arrived in the mail. 

America had shifted to a volunteer military.  At the time I didn’t know who to thank for the freedom to choose my future.  But I later met the man responsible while attending Stanford Law School.

Martin Carl Anderson, who died a few days ago, then was in residence at the Hoover Institution.  I thought our encounter was happenstance, but years later Anderson told me that he had been reading my articles in the Stanford Daily and elsewhere and wanted to meet me.

Anderson left to help set up the Ronald Reagan campaign operation in March 1979.  As I approached graduation he asked me to join the campaign. 

Anderson was a stellar example of an intellectual able to translate detailed academic research into policy ammunition.  He received his PhD in 1962.  Five years later he began advising Richard Nixon, ending up as a special assistant to President Nixon before joining the Hoover Institution in 1971.

As I wrote in American Spectator online:  “Anderson had many interests, but one overriding philosophy:  He believed in individual liberty.”  He began his policy career with an explosive attack on urban renewal, through which slums would be cleared and new communities created. No surprise, the effort was extraordinarily expensive and socially destructive.  In 1967 the MIT Press published The Federal Bulldozer:  A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962

Anderson was a draftee who turned his intellect and energy to ending conscription.  He seamlessly joined policy research and political maneuver, selling Nixon on the virtues of a volunteer military. 

Anderson left the Nixon administration before its ugly implosion, but returned to government with Reagan to address the AVF’s deficiencies, an effort in which I was involved as his assistant.  However, Anderson’s most important work for Reagan was shaping the economic agenda. 

Although Anderson was loyal to those he served—he never published a kiss-and-tell memoir—he did not let personalities get in the way of principle.  When Nixon proposed essentially a negative income tax in the guise of the Family Assistance Plan, Anderson brought his accustomed skills into opposition.  In 1978 Hoover published Anderson’s Welfare:  The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States

Anderson’s most important work after leaving the Reagan administration was explaining and amplifying President Reagan’s legacy.  In 1988 Anderson published Revolution:  The Reagan Legacy, a wonderfully readable account of what Reagan’s success and presidency meant.  In 2001 Anderson and his wife Annelise joined historian Kiron K. Skinner to produce Reagan, in His Own Hand:  The Writings of Ronald Reagan that Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America

Like most everyone in or seeking high political office Reagan employed ghost-writers on occasion.  But the Andersons found a treasure trove of the articles and scripts in Reagan’s own hand.  The latter wrote the vast majority his material from start to finish.  Two years later the two Andersons along with Skinner released Reagan:  A Life in Letters, revealing fascinating glimpses of the former president’s life through the letters he wrote.

Even more significant was Reagan’s Secret War:  The Untold Story of his Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, written by both Andersons.  Declassified documents demonstrated Reagan’s determination to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.  Reagan abhorred what he called the Evil Empire for all the right reasons, but worked with Mikhail Gorbachev to end the Cold War.

Although Anderson operated at the pinnacle of the American political system, he was an ideas man uncomfortable with typical bureaucratic infighting.  He left the Reagan administration after little more than a year and then concentrated on offering advice as an outsider.

In recent years Marty, as I will always know him, and I only talked occasionally, and not nearly enough.  But he fought the good fight until the end.  We are all better off because of his manifold efforts.  Marty, RIP.